At the Court Bassompierre found the Prince de Piedmont, who had been sent by his father, Charles Emmanuel, to persuade Louis XIII to prosecute the war in Italy with the utmost vigour during the coming spring. Créquy had been despatched to Paris by the Constable with the same object; and they begged Bassompierre to go with them so soon as possible to the King, when they hoped that their united solicitations would induce his Majesty to come to a decision in accordance with their wishes.
There was certainly every indication that the French Government were disposed to a vigorous offensive. At the beginning of February peace had been signed with the Huguenots, and they were now free to employ all their resources against the foreign enemy. The King had appointed the Prince of Piedmont lieutenant-general of his armies beyond the Alps, and had promised reinforcements of 8,000 foot and 1,000 horse to the Army of Italy, to which he intended to send the bulk of the troops now in the Valtellina; while Bassompierre, with the levy which the Swiss cantons had promised, was, it was understood, to invade the Milanese. However, the hopes of the anti-Spanish party and of France’s allies were about to be rudely shattered.
Two or three days after Bassompierre’s return, he happened to visit the Venetian Ambassador, Contarini, who told him that the republic’s representative at Madrid had sent information that a secret treaty had been signed there between France and Spain. The marshal affected to treat the matter as a canard and assured him that it was impossible; nevertheless, he felt decidedly uneasy, and having to go and see Richelieu that evening to give him an account of his mission to Switzerland, he told him what Contarini had said.
“He [Richelieu] pressed my hand and answered that I might be assured that there was no thought of a treaty, and that the Spaniards were, after their knavish fashion, spreading false reports to create ill feeling between us and our allies, whom I could reassure. And this I resolved to do and to go on the morrow to visit Contarini, to set his mind at rest on this matter. The same evening I saw the Prince of Piedmont and told him of the apprehensions of Contarini, of how I had acquainted the Cardinal de Richelieu with them, and of the answer he had given me. The Prince replied that the Venetians were speculative and suspicious people, who retailed their dreams and their imaginations as authoritative news; that they had spread this report from suspicion rather than from any information they had obtained; and that, for himself, he was perfectly sure that no negotiations to the prejudice of the League or to our present projects were in progress.”
Bassompierre left the Prince and proceeded to the Queen’s apartments, where he found Créquy. Presently, a message came from Louis XIII summoning the two marshals to the Queen-Mother’s cabinet, where they found the King in company with Marie de’ Medici, Schomberg, and d’Herbault.[30] To their astonishment, the King informed them that he had just received a treaty which had been made with Spain, without his knowledge, by Du Fargis, and ordered d’Herbault to read it to them. This document stipulated that the sovereignty of the Valtellina was to be restored to the Grisons, but it was to be confined to a simple right of tribute, with a confirmation purely nominal of the magistrates whom the Valtelliners might appoint; while the Catholic religion was alone to be permitted in that country. The passes were to remain at the disposal of France, but the forts were to be surrendered to the Pope to be demolished. The Kings of France and Spain were to intervene to re-establish peace between Savoy and Genoa.
“We found it,” says Bassompierre, “so badly conceived, so badly drafted and so contrary to reason, so disgraceful for France, so opposed to the interests of the League, and so damaging to the Grisons, that, although at first we were persuaded that it had been made by order of the King, but that he wished, in order to appease his allies, to appear to know nothing about it, we finally believed that it had been concluded contrary to his orders. And this obliged us to dissuade the King from accepting and ratifying it.”
Louis XIII told the three marshals[31] and d’Herbault to go on the following morning to the Petit-Luxembourg and confer with Richelieu, and to return with the Cardinal in the afternoon to the Queen-Mother’s cabinet, where a meeting of the Council was to be held. Meanwhile, they were to say nothing about the matter to the Prince de Piedmont.
Bassompierre tells us that “never was he more provoked to speak against anything than against this infamous treaty”, and that “his mind was so excited, that he was more than two hours in bed without being able to get to sleep, projecting a number of reasons which he wished to lay before the Council on the morrow against this affair.” But, when he rose in the morning, he reflected that perhaps, notwithstanding the King’s protestations to the contrary, he might have given authority to Du Fargis to sign the treaty, under the influence of the Queen-Mother, “who wished to make peace between her children,”[32] or of the cardinal, “who, seeing troubles increasing within the State, wished to make peace outside it,” and that, if they intended to ratify it, he would be only injuring himself to no purpose by denouncing it too warmly. He therefore decided to be on his guard and to watch carefully which way the wind was blowing; and when he went to see Richelieu, he “listened more than he spoke.” He did wisely, for “the Cardinal was very cautious and opened his mind but little, blaming only the levity, precipitation, and want of judgment shown by Du Fargis, who, he said, merited capital punishment for having concluded an affair of such consequence without instructions from the King.” It was the same at the Council, where “he perceived that everyone was more concerned to blame the workman than to demolish the work, and to discuss the means by which the treaty might be amended than to propose to disavow or break it.” This removed any doubt that he might have had that the Government desired peace with Spain, and that Du Fargis, though he had not obtained the terms desired, had been empowered to treat for it. He therefore begged the King to excuse him from expressing an opinion, and withdrew, as, being an honest man, he refused to associate himself with a treaty whose existence Richelieu had only the previous evening authorised him to deny.
Richelieu, both at the time and afterwards, declared positively that this peace was not of his making. This, in a sense, is true. It was Père Bérulle, of the Oratory, who had some time before become the directeur of the Queen-Mother’s conscience, and the Spanish faction to whom the credit—or rather discredit—of it belonged. It was they who had instigated Du Fargis to begin negotiations with the Court of Madrid, and it was the hope of striking a better bargain with this irresponsible diplomatist that had caused Philip suddenly to revoke the powers which he had given to Mirabello, his Ambassador in France. But when the treaty, which had been signed on New Year’s Day, 1626, reached Paris in the middle of January, Du Fargis was not recalled or disavowed. The matter was