With the British Army in The Holy Land

by H. O. Lock

We have seen that the general formation of this range of mountains is like the backbone of a fish. We should therefore expect to find communications from north to south easy enough along the "spine" or ridge, but difficult on either side, where there would be a succession of "ribs" or spurs to be crossed. This is the case. There is only one first-class road from north to south through this hill-country, namely, that which runs along the ridge from Samaria through Nablus, Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron to Beersheba. Communications from east to west are, however, more easy along the spurs and intervening valleys. To attempt an advance northwards, from spur to spur, is tedious work; after a comparatively short push a pause is necessary to enable roads to be constructed for bringing forward guns and supplies. We had an illustration of this in March, 1918, when a forward move of this character met at first with but moderate opposition. A pause of a few weeks was necessary to enable fresh roads to be made. In the meantime, the enemy had been heavily reinforced, and, when the next advance was attempted, stout resistance was encountered. This hill-country lent itself readily to defence. Mutually supporting heights could be held. A hill, when captured thus, became a focus for fire concentrated from all the hills around. So when the Turks attacked us in these hills they met with much less success than in the Jordan Valley; and, on the other hand, they were able to offer a stouter resistance to our attacks in these hills than they could on the Coastal Plain.

The Jordan Valley, as we have already seen, is more than a thousand feet below the level of the Mediterranean, that is, below what we speak of as "sea level." In this respect it is unique in the geography of the world. In winter time the climate is equable; in summer it is unbearable. In peace time, even the Bedouin forsake it in summer. The district is pestilential to a degree, and, in no sense of the word, a white man's country. It possesses a feature of considerable importance in the river Jordan itself, almost the only river in Palestine with a perennial flow. The river is tortuous and rapid and not adapted to navigation. These features indicate this area as a difficult one in which to hold a fighting line, and a no less difficult one across which to maintain communications. In the summer of 1918, our line ran along the river valley, and the troops in this sector suffered much from diseases.

East of this strong natural boundary formed by the deep trough of the Jordan, we find a very different country. It rises abruptly from the Jordan Valley, and is in itself a plateau. It is at first fertile, but, at distances ranging from 40 to 60 miles inland, it merges into steppe and then into sheer desert. Thus it is a country apart, difficult of access from Jerusalem and Western Palestine, more easy of access from Damascus or from Arabia. Through it, from north to south, runs the Hejaz railway, on its way from Damascus to Medina. And so it proved an area in which the Turks, based on Damascus, and the Arabs, operating from Hejaz, were at greater advantage than our columns based on Jerusalem.

We have now glanced at those portions of Palestine in which took place the principal fighting in this campaign. Our review would still be incomplete if we omitted all reference to the Plain of Esdraelon. Starting from the sea coast immediately north of Cape Carmel, at the ports of Haifa and Acre, this Plain runs east south-east across the country to the Jordan Valley. Rising slightly at first, it forms the watershed of "that ancient river, the river Kishon." After the watershed is crossed, there is a drop towards the Jordan Valley; this latter portion of the Plain constitutes the Vale of Jezreel. This Plain of Esdraelon is Armageddon. Here Barak overthrew Sisera, Gideon defeated the Midianites, and Saul and Jonathan met disaster and death at the hands of the Philistines. Here Josiah was defeated and slain by Pharaoh Necho. Near here, the Christians were defeated and their kingdom overthrown by the Saracens. On this Plain Napoleon won his final and crushing victory over the Turks.

No battle, beyond a few cavalry engagements, took place here during the campaign which we are to consider. The Turks had been totally defeated before ever this line was reached. But this Plain has still for us a military interest. It may well be that here, where the mountains of Samaria overlook and command all approaches from the north, is to be found the best strategic line for the defence of the Suez Canal.

In a country like Palestine, where levels and characteristics are so divergent, diversities of climate are to be expected. We have seen that the summer climate of the Lower Jordan Valley is pestilential. Parts of the Coastal Plain also are very malarious, particularly from north of Jaffa to Mount Carmel. With these exceptions, the climate is by no means unpleasant nor unsuitable for the conduct of military operations. Far enough south to enjoy plenty of bright sunshine, it is still some distance north of the tropics. Pleasant and regular breezes from the sea mitigate the discomfort which might otherwise prevail in a country almost surrounded by desert. The whole of the rainfall comes in the winter months. From about April to October, though dews are heavy, rain is unknown. But in the winter months, especially December and January, and to some extent February, the rainfall is intense, and the country on the Plains and lower lying districts is reduced to a sea of mud well-nigh impassable. Thus military operations in summer are liable to be prejudiced by a shortage of water; in winter by an excess. The ideal season for operations is therefore in the spring, when there is an abundance of water and a plentiful feed; and, next to this, the autumn, when the heat of the summer has passed its height and the rains of winter have not yet made the country impassable.

The importance of good railways in modern war is immense. We have already traced the construction of the broad gauge line from Egypt which followed close behind the British in their advance across the Desert and into Southern Palestine. The Turks in Western Palestine were at a perpetual disadvantage through the inferiority of the railway service; but, in Eastern Palestine, i.e. across the Jordan, the position was reversed. Before the war, Syria had been connected with Asia Minor by a broad gauge line from Aleppo to Rayak, where it effected a junction with a narrow gauge line from Beyrout to Damascus. The broad gauge line was part of the Baghdad railway scheme. But at this time, that railway, even between Constantinople and Aleppo, was only partially completed. The tunnelling of the Taurus Mountains was yet unfinished. Thus troops or supplies, coming from Constantinople to Damascus, had to break the journey at the Taurus Mountains and again at Rayak. These two interruptions provided admirable opportunities for delay and confusion, which the dilatory Turk embraced. The tunnelling of the Taurus was pushed on with during the war, and in 1918 rumours reached us that these mountains had been pierced, so that trains could then run through from Constantinople (Haida Pasha) to Rayak. The installation of more business-like Germans at the latter station went far towards minimising the delays and confusion due to the break of gauge.

From Damascus, the Hejaz railway, constructed nominally for Mecca pilgrims, runs due south, and, passing along the high plateau of Eastern Palestine, had already reached Medina. A branch from this line, starting from a junction at Deraa, ran westwards along the Plain of Esdraelon to Haifa. Another line, almost parallel to the Hejaz railway, ran from Damascus due south to Mezerib; this line was removed by the Turks after the commencement of the war, as the materials were required for railway construction elsewhere. Unconnected with any of these railways, a French line ran from Jaffa to Jerusalem; this also the Turks removed, as between Jaffa and Ludd, while, for the remainder of its length, they altered the gauge so as to adapt it to the rolling stock of the Hejaz Railway. All these railways south of Damascus were narrow-gauge lines, without much rolling stock available, so that their carrying capacity was limited.

On the outbreak of war, the Turks, acting under the guidance of the Germans, embarked upon a considerable programme of railway construction. Starting from a point on the Plain of Esdraelon, El Apele, they constructed a new line which crossed the mountains about Samaria and reached the Plain of Sharon at Tul Keram. Thence it ran down the length of the Coastal Plain to Beersheba, and, ultimately, to Auja in the Desert. This railway was constructed in 1915 for the invasion of Egypt. Into this railway was incorporated portions of the old Jaffa-Jerusalem line, as between Ludd and "Junction Station." This was the none too distinctive name given to the important station which was constructed at the point where the older railway left the Plain; this now became the junction for Jerusalem. At a later date, the Turks withdrew from Auja to Beersheba, the line south of the latter place was removed and a new line was constructed from near Junction Station to points just north of Gaza.

Roads in the coastal sector are good, though difficult for heavy motor traffic after rain. In the hills, the only first-class roads were the road running north and south along the ridge from Nablus through Jerusalem to Beersheba, and the road west and east from Jaffa to Jerusalem, continued eastwards through Jericho and across the Jordan to Es Salt and Amman Station on the Hejaz Railway.