With the British Army in The Holy Land

by H. O. Lock

CHAPTER IX

NEBY SAMWIL

Our advance had hitherto been northwards along the low country, and had already reached a point on the Maritime Plain some miles north of the parallel of Jerusalem. It now wheeled to the right and struck into the Hills, with the object of getting astride the Jerusalem-Nablus road and of thus capturing the Holy City.

It will be remembered, from our survey of the geography of Palestine, that the ridge of the Judæan Hills runs approximately north and south, and that along the top of this ridge runs a first-class metalled road connecting Nablus with Jerusalem. From this ridge spurs run east and west down towards the Maritime Plain. These spurs are steep, bare and stony, and in places, precipitous, and are separated from one another by narrow valleys. Between such spurs, a few miles to the north-west of Jerusalem, sweeps down the Valley of Ajalon, with the villages of Beit-ur el-Foka (Beth-horon the Upper) and Beit-ur el-Tahta (Beth-horon the Lower), where Joshua won his memorable victory over the five kings of the Amorites. It was here that the routed hosts of the Amorites were pursued in panic, and near here that the sun and moon "stood still" at the bidding of Joshua. Further to the south, another gorge, or pass, roughly parallel to the Valley of Ajalon, leads down to the Plain, and along this pass runs the metalled road through Kurzet-el-Enab (Kirjath-Jearim), Saris and Bab-el-Wad, to Ramleh and Jaffa; this is the road followed by the Pilgrims. Other paths were shown upon the map, but these were found to be mere tracks on the hillside or up the stony beds of wadis, and, without considerable improvement, were impracticable for wheeled guns or transport. The only routes along which guns, other than mountain artillery, could be moved, were the two first-class roads running northwards and westwards out of Jerusalem.

Ten miles north of Jerusalem, along the Nablus road, at a height of nearly 3,000 feet above sea level, is the village of Bireh. This commanding position overlooks the Jordan Valley and all the surrounding country. This was the point which General Allenby decided to make his next objective. Reports had indicated that it was the probable intention of the enemy to evacuate Jerusalem, and in the known or suspected state of the demoralisation of the enemy, it was felt that considerable risks could be taken. Thus a bold and immediate dash for Bireh seemed to be indicated. Furthermore, an advance on this objective would take our forces well clear of Jerusalem itself. And so this plan best conformed with the determination that had previously been arrived at, that fighting should be within five miles of the Holy City.

The general idea of the operation was, that our troops should move up into the hills, some going by the Valley of Ajalon, and some by the main Jaffa-Jerusalem road as far as Enab, and thence by the "Roman road" running north-east. Although it was thought likely that the Turks, reinforced from Damascus, and perhaps from Aleppo, would come down and attack our new line, yet it was hoped that Bireh would be reached before serious opposition was encountered. The enemy, however, changed his mind. Having, early in November, decided to withdraw from Jerusalem, he now determined to hold it till the bitter end. Turkish resistance stiffened immensely. Pushed far into the hills, as were our advanced troops, and without much artillery support, it was found impossible for them to reach Bireh in the first stride; and further operations upon a more elaborate scale had to be undertaken before Jerusalem could be captured.

But we anticipate. Let us, then, return to the middle of November, at which time our forces had captured, and were holding, positions covering Jaffa, Ramleh and Junction Station. On the 17th November, the yeomanry commenced to move from Ramleh through the hills direct on Bireh, viâ the valley of Ajalon and Lower Beth-horon; and, by the evening of the 18th, one portion of the yeomanry had reached Lower Beth-horon, while another portion had occupied Shilta.

On the 19th, the infantry commenced its advance. Latron and Anwas were captured in the morning. For nearly 4 miles, between Bab el Wad (2½ miles east of Latron) and Saris, the Jaffa-Jerusalem road passes through a narrow gorge or defile. The remainder of the day was spent in clearing this defile up to Saris. "These narrow passes from the plain to the plateau of the Judæan range have seldom been forced, and have been fatal to many invading armies." The natural facilities for defence in this pass were undoubtedly very strong. "Had the attempt not been made at once, or had it been pressed with less determination, the enemy would have had time to reorganize his defences here, and the conquest of the plateau would then have been slow, costly and precarious."

The character of the fighting now changed, and more nearly resembled the mountain warfare of the north-west frontier of India. The bulk of this hill fighting fell upon the 75th Division, whose Indian experience proved invaluable. It was interesting to note the points of resemblance and of distinction between hill fighting here and on the Indian frontier.

In India, frontier warfare is usually conducted against ill-organized semi-savages, unarmed with artillery or machine guns, but furnished with the instincts and cunning of beasts of prey. Here the conditions were reversed. The enemy were well provided with artillery and machine guns, both of which they had had abundant opportunity to post advantageously and use effectually; whereas we had difficulties in getting forward our guns and bringing them into action, and were at times without artillery assistance. On the other hand, our troops surpassed the enemy in their familiarity with mountain fighting.