CHAPTER XVII.
Omissions in Preceding Chapters
After leaving Cumberland Gap our army again moved into Middle Tennessee, with headquarters at Murfreesboro. Our cavalry in the advance camped near La Vergne, at Nolandsville and Triune. The enemy concentrated at Nashville, from whence they sent out foraging parties, supported by large infantry forces with which we had daily engagements, restricting their foraging within a small area of country. At Nolandsville, where General Wharton made his headquarters, we camped nearly a month, when Lieutenant Decherd was instructed to select about fifteen men and cross the Cumberland Mountain, for the purpose of buying fresh horses, which were very much needed. I was ordered to go with this party.
While camped near Winchester, Tennessee, intending to cross the mountain the next day, we heard the distant roaring of the guns of the battle of Murfreesboro, which was not expected so soon when we left the command, and which proved a great disappointment to our party, as we felt that every man was needed for such an event. We, therefore, hastened back to the army, which we found evacuating Murfreesboro, and reported. Of the Rangers’ part in that great battle I will not mention in this, as that is of record in the general reports of General Bragg and others, and will only say that they fully sustained their character as one of the leading regiments in this army, capturing prisoners, artillery, wagon trains, etc., and finally covering the retreat of the army off the field.
Our army then continued its retreat through Shelbyville to Tullahoma, our cavalry still operating on the north side of Elk River. Before crossing Elk River a courier reached General Wheeler from General Forrest, after Wheeler had crossed the bridge, requesting him to hold the bridge until he (Forrest) could cross with his command. Promptly on receipt of this information, General Wheeler, with a portion of his command, notably the Fourth Alabama Cavalry, recrossed the bridge to the north side, determined to hold the same until General Forrest had crossed with his command. Before Forrest reached Shelbyville, however, General Stanley, with a heavy force of cavalry, outnumbering Wheeler’s little force ten to one, charged and forced them back across the river, cutting General Wheeler off from the bridge. General Wheeler spurred his horse to the bank and over it, into the dangerous river, which had been swollen by excessive rains, making a leap of not less than twenty feet, with Stanley’s cavalry shooting after him and continuously firing on him until he reached the opposite bank. This was, perhaps, the most miraculous escape he had during the war.
Before reaching Tullahoma, a Captain Gordon, who had distinguished himself near Bardstown, where he held in check a whole brigade of the enemy’s infantry on the Bloomfield Road for a whole day with only twenty men, was ordered to select twenty men from the Rangers and enter Kentucky, for the purpose of gaining information of the disposition of the enemy’s forces, preparatory to a general raid by our cavalry. The history of this trip, which resulted in my being wounded and captured and held a prisoner just one year, lacking a day, I have already recorded, and by an oversight, it crept into this history ahead of the proper time.
Recurring to the hard service sustained by us in the mountains between Crab Orchard and Cumberland Gap: The last night we were on picket duty our company had dwindled down to seven men and I happened to be on vidette with a messmate, John Cochran. Just at daylight, when the enemy usually made its appearance, we were relieved by two others of the command and when we reached the reserve picket, discovering a grassy spot in the middle of the road, I told Cochran I must try to steal a little nap, and laid down on this grassy spot, holding my horse by the bridle, when I was awakened, only about ten minutes after, by Cochran stooping down from his horse and jabbing me with his pistol. The reserve picket had formed a line across the road, just a little back of where I was sleeping and were firing on the enemy’s advancing skirmish line, the noise of which failed to awake me and it was only his prodding me with the end of his six-shooter that got me awake. I had just time enough to swing on to my horse and get out of there. Here Cochran’s prediction, frequently made, that he would bet Graber would wake up some fine morning with a Yankee bayonet sticking in him, came very near being verified. I merely mention this to give the reader a fair idea of our complete exhaustion for the want of sleep, continuous hunger and arduous duties.
CHAPTER XVIII
General Johnston’s Failure to Strike—Sherman
Recurring to my service in Captain Britton’s company, acting as escort to General Hood at Dalton, Georgia, where I described the meeting of the several generals with General Hood at his headquarters in the rear of Railroad Gap: On our return to camp that night after supper, Captain Britton suggested he should go up to headquarters and pump Major Sellars on the meaning of the meeting that morning. He reported on his return from a visit to headquarters that General Mower, commanding Hooker’s old corps, had moved down to Snake Creek Gap during the day, which was located about nineteen miles in our rear and about ten miles west of Dalton.
General Hood plead with General Johnston that morning for permission to move out of his works through Railroad and Rocky Face Gaps with his corps and defeat Sherman’s Army before Mower could return to reinforce them. Captain Britton said that he would bet our army would be in full retreat that night, falling back to Resaca, which prediction was verified, as, by daylight next morning, our infantry and artillery were engaged with the enemy at Resaca, where we came very near losing a large part of our army by having their retreat cut off.
Had General Johnston yielded to General Hood’s plan, there is no question but what he could have destroyed Sherman’s Army; here was a golden opportunity lost by General Johnston, and was the beginning of the downfall of the Confederacy.