When the allies landed their troops at the Old Fort, three plans were open for the consideration of the Russian general: 1st. To destroy or close the harbors of Balaklava, Kamiesch, Kazatch and Strelitzka, and, garrisoning Sebastopol with a strong force, to occupy with the rest of his army the strong plateau south of the city, and thus force the allies to besiege the strong works on the north. 2d. Having closed the harbors on the south, and secured Sebastopol from being carried by the assault of any detachment of the allies, to operate on their left flank, annoying and harassing them with his Cossacks, and thus delay them many days in the difficult and precarious position which they would have occupied. 3d. To advance with his whole force and offer them battle at the Alma. The last and least advantageous of these plans was adopted, and as the garrison of Sebastopol, during the battle, consisted of only four battalions and the sailors of the fleet, it might, considering the weakness of its works, have been easily carried by a detachment of the allied forces.
For the allies at the Alma two plans presented themselves: 1st. To turn the Russian left, cut him off from Sebastopol, and occupy that city in force. 2d. To turn the Russian right, and, throwing him back upon Sebastopol, cut him off from all external succor. Neither plan was fully carried out. The column of General Bosquet turned the Russian left and decided his retreat; but no strategic advantage was taken of the victory. The battle was fought on the 20th of September, and by noon of the 26th the allies had only advanced to the Balbeck, a distance of a little more than ten miles in six days! On the 27th they regained their communication with the fleet at Balaklava, without attempting to occupy Sebastopol, and having exposed themselves to destruction by an ill-conducted flank march. Fortunately for the allies, the Russians failed to avail themselves of the advantages which the enemy had thus gratuitously afforded. The fleet having entered the open harbor of Balaklava, the allies now commenced the labor of landing and moving up their siege material and of opening their trenches, while the Russians prepared their fortifications on the south of Sebastopol for resisting the operations of that gigantic siege which stands without a parallel in history.
NOTE TO CHAPTER III.—FORTIFICATIONS.
In the war between the United States and Mexico, the latter had no fortifications on her land frontiers, and, with the single exception of Vera Cruz, her harbors were entirely destitute of defensive works. The Americans, therefore, had no obstacles of this kind to overcome on three of their lines of operation; and, when Scott had reduced Vera Cruz, his line of march was open to the capital. Moreover, nearly every seaport on the Gulf and Pacific coast fell into our hands without a blow. Had the landing of Scott been properly opposed, and Vera Cruz been strongly fortified and well defended, it would have been taken only after a long and difficult siege. Moreover, had the invading army encountered strong and well-defended fortifications on the line of march to Mexico, the war would, necessarily, have been prolonged, and possibly with a different result.
The Russian fortifications in the Baltic prevented the allies from attempting any serious operations in that quarter, and those in the Black Sea confined the war to a single point of the Heracleidan Chersonese. Had Russia relied exclusively upon her fleet to prevent a maritime descent, and left Sebastopol entirely undefended by fortifications, how different had been the result of the Crimean war.
This subject will be alluded to again in the Notes on Sea-coast Defences, and Permanent Fortifications.
NOTE TO CHAPTER IV.—LOGISTICS.
The war in Mexico exhibited, in a striking manner, our superiority over the enemy in this branch of the military art. No army was better supplied than ours in all matters of subsistence, clothing, medical and hospital stores, and in means of transportation. Two points, however, are worthy of remark in this connection: 1st. The great waste of material, which resulted from the employment of raw troops under short enlistments, and commanded by officers appointed from civil life, who were without experience and destitute of military instruction; and, 2d. The immense expense of transportation, which was due in part to the above cause and in part to the employment, in the administrative departments, of civilians who were utterly ignorant of the rules and routine of military service. This war was conducted on the system of magazines and provisions carried in the train of the army, or purchased of the inhabitants and regularly paid for, forced requisitions being seldom resorted to, and then in very moderate quantities. The wisdom of this plan was proved by the general good order and discipline of our troops, and the general good-will of the non-combatant inhabitants of the country which was passed over or occupied by the army.
The war in the Crimea proved most conclusively the vast superiority of the French administrative system over that of the English—of the military over a civil organization of the administrative corps of an army. The French troops before Sebastopol were regularly, cheaply, and abundantly supplied with every requisite of provisions, clothing, munitions, medical stores, military utensils, and hospital and camp equipages; while the English army, notwithstanding an immense expenditure of money, was often paralyzed in its operations by the want of proper military material, and not unfrequently was destitute of even the necessaries of life.
Instead of profiting by this lesson, the recent tendency of our own government has been (especially in supplying the army in Utah) to imitate the sad example of the English, and to convert the supplying of our armies into a system of political patronage to be used for party purposes. If fully carried out, it must necessarily result in the ruin of the army, the robbery of the treasury, and the utter corruption of the government.