Elements of Military Art and Science / Or, Course Of Instruction In Strategy, Fortification, Tactics Of Battles, &C.; Embracing The Duties Of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, And Engineers; Adapted To The Use Of Volunteers And Militia; Third Edition; With Critical Notes On The Mexican And Crimean Wars.

by H. W. Halleck

"'It seems almost incredible that three pieces should be able to accomplish fully that which eighty-seven pieces utterly failed to do, the distances from the object being alike—particularly when it is considered that many of the latter were of greater calibre, and most of them employed much heavier charges where the calibres were similar. The guns of the ship, if fired at the same rate as those of the battery, which was not unusually rapid (one round in two and three-fourth minutes), would have discharged some seven thousand seven hundred shot and shells in the course of the four hours, supposing no interruption; a number which, if properly applied, would appear, from the results of three guns, to have been sufficient to breach the wall of the fort in fourteen places; whereas they did not effect a single breach, which is abundant proof of the lack of accuracy. They must either have been dispersed over the surface of the fort, or else missed it altogether, and this could have been due only to a want of the precision which was attained by the battery. The constantly preferred complaint of motion in the ships was not to be urged, because on the day of cannonading Sebastopol, there was scarcely a breath of wind, and the ships were too large to be easily moved by the swell, unless very considerable. That the fort did no greater damage to the ships than it received from them, proves no more than that its fire was quite as illy directed, and the calibres too low. It is said that the Agamemnon was struck in the hull by two hundred and forty shot and shells, which must have been but a small portion of what was fired, though sufficient to be decisive, if, as already observed, the calibre had been heavier.'"

Here, then, a number of projectiles thrown from the ships, which were sufficient, had they been thrown from a land battery, according to the result at Bomarsund, to produce fourteen practicable breaches, failed not only to produce a single breach, but even "to impair the strength of the masonry."

The reason of this is obvious. That degree of precision of fire by which a breach is effected by a land battery is utterly unattainable from a floating structure, for the motion of the water, even in the calmest days, is quite sufficient to prevent accuracy of aim at an object at a distance, as in this case, of seven and eight hundred yards.

With respect to the action of the shot and shells upon the Agamemnon, it is to be remarked that we have as yet had no fair trial of the power of the fire of modern shell-guns of large calibre from land batteries against ships of war. The Russians had some of them in their fleet, and at Sinope, with their shell-guns, they blew up two Turkish frigates in fifteen minutes. It does not appear that in the Crimean war they had yet provided their fortifications with the modern armaments, for where shells were thrown from their sea-coast batteries, they were in every instance of inferior calibre.

With respect to the naval attack upon Kinburn, which has been referred to as showing the importance of floating batteries as an auxiliary to ships in reducing harbor defences, we have no official reports of the Russians from which to derive accurate information of the strength of the works attacked. Dahlgren, drawing his information from the official accounts of the "English and French admirals," describes the works and their location is follows:—

"The Boug and the Dnieper issue into a large basin, formed partly by the projection of the main shore, partly by a long narrow strip of Sand-beach, which continues from it and takes a north-westerly direction until it passes the promontory of Otchakov, where it terminates, and from which it is separated by the channel, whereby the waters of the estuary empty into the Black Sea."

"The distance between the spit or extremity of this tongue and the Point of Otchakov, or the main shore opposite, is about two miles; but the water is too shoal to admit of the passage of large vessels of war, except in the narrow channel that runs nearest to the spit and its northern shore. Here, therefore, are placed the works designed to command the entrance. They are three in number. Near the extreme point of the spit is a covered battery built of logs, which are filled in and overlaid with sand,—pierced for eighteen guns, but mounting only ten."

"Advancing further along the beach is a circular redoubt, connected with the spit battery by a covered way. This work, built of stone, and riveted with turf, is open, and said to be the most substantial of the three; it has eleven cannon, and within is a furnace for heating shot."

"Further on, and where the beach has widened considerably, is Fort Kinburn, a square bastioned work, extending to the sea on the south, and to the waters of the estuary on the north. It is casemated in part, though but few of these embrasures were armed,—its chief force being in the pieces en barbette, and some nine or ten mortars. The masonry, though solid, is represented by an eye-witness not to be bomb-proof, and so dilapidated by age that the mortar was falling out from the interstices, leaving the stone to disintegrate. The interior space was occupied by ranges of wooden buildings, slightly constructed and plastered over."

"This fort is said to be armed with sixty pieces. The English admiral states, that all three of the works mounted eighty-one guns and mortars. The calibres are not given officially, but stated in private letters to be 18-pounders and 32-pounders.'"