480 yards."
Surely, this "naval attack," taken in connection with the true facts of the capture of Kinburn, the abortive attempt of the British fleet in the Pacific upon the Russian works of Petropauloski, is not calculated to affect the well established opinion of the ability of forts to resist maritime attacks.
Few are now disposed to dispute the general superiority of guns ashore over guns afloat; but some think that works of masonry are incapable of resisting the heavy and continuous fire which may now be brought against it by fleets and floating-batteries, and would therefore extend the area of the works and rely mainly upon earthen parapets, with guns in barbette. This conclusion they form from the results of the maritime attack on Kinburn, and of the land-batteries on Bomarsund.
Major Barnard, in his valuable work on "The Dangers and Defences of New York," draws a very different conclusion from these attacks, and contends that they abundantly prove the capability of well-constructed stone masonry to resist the fire of ships and floating-batteries, if the latter are opposed by proper armaments in the forts; moreover, that they proved the superiority of casemated forts over low open batteries, with guns in barbette, in covering the garrison from the effects of a vertical and ricochet fire. Unquestionably the masonry at Bomarsund was poorly constructed; nevertheless, the fire of the shipping produced very little effect upon it. It is also equally certain that Kinburn Was taken, not by a breaching fire, but mainly by the effects of vertical and ricochet fires.
With respect to our own system of sea-coast defences, it may be remarked, that, since this chapter was written, the works mentioned therein as having been commenced, have been gradually advanced towards completion, and that the acquisition of Texas and California, and the settlement of Oregon and Washington Territory, by greatly extending our line of maritime defence, have rendered necessary the fortification of other points. It should also be noted that while the value and necessity of these works are generally admitted, and while the general outline of the system is almost universally approved, many are of the opinion that the increased facilities for naval attacks, and the immense power of modern maritime expeditions, like that upon Sebastopol, render it necessary to more strongly fortify the great naval and commercial ports of New York and San Francisco—one the key point of the Atlantic, and the other of the Pacific coast. Perhaps the system adopted by our Boards of Engineers may be open to the objection that they have adopted too many points of defence, without giving sufficient prominence to our great seaports, which are necessarily the strategic points of coast defence. However this may have been at the time the system was adopted, there can be no question that the relative strength of the works designed for the different points of our coast does not correspond to the present relative importance of the places to be defended, and the relative temptations they offer to an enemy capable of organizing the means of maritime attack. On this subject we quote from the work of Major Barnard:—
"While the means of maritime attack have of late years assumed
a magnitude and formidableness not dreamed of when our defensive
system was planned, and our country has so increased in population,
wealth and military resources, that no enemy can hope to make any
impression by an invasion of our territory,—our great maritime places