Our merchant marine on the lakes secures to us a naval superiority in that quarter at the beginning of a war; and our facilities for ship-building are there equal if not superior to any possessed by the enemy. The only way, therefore, in which our ascendency on the lakes can be lost, is by the introduction of steam craft from the Atlantic. The canals and locks constructed for this object will pass vessels of small dimensions and drawing not over eight and a half feet water.
How are we to prevent the introduction of these Atlantic steamers into our lakes? Shall we, at the first opening of hostilities, march with armed forces upon the enemy's line of artificial communication and blow up the locks of their ship-canals, thus meeting the enemy's marine at the very threshold of its introduction into the interior seas; or shall we build opposition steam-navies at Pittsburg and Memphis, some two thousand miles distant, and then expend some forty or fifty millions[[27]] in opening an artificial channel to enable them to reach Lake Ontario, after its borders have been laid waste by the hostile forces? Very few disinterested judges would hesitate in forming their opinion on this question.[[28]]
The construction of the Illinois ship-canal, for vessels of eight and a half feet draught, is estimated at fifteen millions; to give the same draught to the Mississippi and lower Illinois, would require at least ten millions more; a ship canal of the corresponding draught around Niagara Falls, will cost, say, ten millions; the navy yard at Memphis, with docks, storehouses, &c., will cost about two millions, and steamers sent thence to the lakes will cost about fifty thousand dollars per gun. On the other hand, the military defences which it is deemed necessary to erect in time of peace for the security of the Champlain frontier, will cost only about two thousand dollars per gun; the whole expenditure not exceeding, at most, two millions of dollars!
It is not to be denied that a water communication between the Mississippi and the northern lakes will have great commercial advantages, and that, in case of a protracted war, auxiliary troops and military stores may be drawn from the valley of the Mississippi to assist the North and East in preventing any great accessions to the British military forces in the Canadas. We speak only of the policy of expending vast sums of money on this military (?) project, to the neglect of matters of more immediate and pressing want. We have nothing to say of its character as a commercial project, or of the ultimate military advantages that might accrue from such a work. We speak only of the present condition and wants of the country, and not of what that condition and those wants may be generations hence!
There are no books devoted exclusively to the subjects embraced in this chapter; but the reader will find many remarks on the northern frontier defences in the histories of the war of 1812, in congressional reports, (vide House Doc. 206, XXVIth Congress, 2d session; and Senate Doc., No. 85, XXVIIIth Congress, 2d session,) and in numerous pamphlets and essays that have appeared from the press within the last few years.