“Your Lordship,” he adds, “may depend that the Squadron under my command shall never fall into the hands of the Enemy; and before we are destroyed, I have little doubt but the Enemy will have their wings so completely clipped that they may be easily overtaken.”
On the 28th May, Nelson heard from the Commander-in-chief that Bruix and the French fleet had been sighted off Cadiz on the 4th inst. by Keith’s blockading squadron, the intention being to form a junction with the Spanish fleet. In reply to Lord St Vincent’s despatch, Nelson was able to tell his senior officer that “we are completely on our guard,” that he had determined to go to Palermo to get provisions and wine for six months, and to hold his vessels “in momentary readiness to act as you may order or the circumstances call for. My reason for remaining in Sicily is the covering the blockade of Naples, and the certainty of preserving Sicily in case of an attack, for if we were to withdraw our Ships, it would throw such a damp on the people that I am sure there would be no resistance. But from the favourable aspect of affairs in Italy, I am sure no attack will be made here, whilst the French know we have such a force to act against them. If Captain Ball has not entirely given up the blockade of Malta, and the poor Islanders have not given up to the French, I intend to continue the blockade...; for as the danger from your happy arrival is not so great, I will run the risk of the Ships for a short time. The Russians will, I am told, be off there in a week or fortnight. In all this plan I am subject to your Lordship’s more able judgment. I shall send a Frigate off Cape Corse, in case the French Fleet should come to be eastward of Corsica, and if I can find a small craft, one shall be on the west side of Sardinia, but the Bay of Naples draws me dry.” Two days later, in writing to the same correspondent to announce the safe arrival of the Vanguard at Palermo, Nelson makes his usual acknowledgments of the services of those under his command: “I have our dear Troubridge for my assistant; in everything we are brothers. Hood and Hallowell are as active and kind as ever: not that I mean to say any are otherwise; but you know these are men of resources. Hardy was bred in the old school, and I can assure you, that I never have been better satisfied with the real good discipline of a Ship than the Vanguard’s. I hope from my heart that you will meet the Dons alone: if the two Fleets join, I am ready, and with some of my Ships in as high order as ever went to sea.”
As it happened, Keith was able to prevent the junction of the enemy’s fleets. His position was between them—between “the devil and the deep sea,” as he termed it. When the look-out frigates of the French fleet were sighted between Corsica and Genoa, orders were received from Lord St Vincent for Keith to return to Port Mahon, which the former thought might be the object of attack. Further despatches came to hand a little later, urging Keith to proceed to Minorca. The Commander-in-chief and Keith were really playing at cross-purposes, for while St Vincent was acting only on supposition, Keith was in touch with the enemy. It is probable in such a case that Nelson would have led his squadron into action, but Keith was not the type of man to risk acting on his own initiative to any great extent, and left the Frenchmen to proceed to Spezia.
On the 8th June, Nelson vacated the Vanguard, hoisted his flag on the Foudroyant (80), and was strengthened by the arrival of two ships from Lord St Vincent’s fleet. He also heard of the impending resignation of the Commander-in-chief, his indifferent health making him “literally incapable of any service,” as he afterwards wrote to Nelson. The unexpected news considerably distressed the Admiral. He felt sincere admiration and regard for the gallant old sailor, who had served his King so long and so faithfully, sentiments recorded in a letter dated from Palermo, the 10th June 1799, as follows:—
“We have a report that you are going home. This distresses us most exceedingly, and myself in particular; so much so, that I have serious thoughts of returning, if that event should take place. But for the sake of our Country, do not quit us at this serious moment. I wish not to detract from the merit of whoever may be your successor; but it must take a length of time, which I hope the war will not give, to be in any manner a St Vincent. We look up to you, as we have always found you, as to our Father, under whose fostering care we have been led to fame. If, my dear Lord, I have any weight in your friendship, let me entreat you to rouse the sleeping lion. Give not up a particle of your authority to any one; be again our St Vincent, and we shall be happy. Your affectionate
Nelson.”
To the Admiral’s supreme disgust his own claims to the appointment were disregarded. Lord St Vincent’s command was given to Lord Keith, who had the additional good fortune to find that the French fleet was in Vado Bay. Nelson, urged on by Ferdinand and perhaps by Lady Hamilton, was on his voyage to Naples with a body of troops to render assistance to the royalists, when two British sail-of-the-line hove in sight. One of them bore an important despatch from Keith, to the effect that not only was the enemy at sea but likely to be bound towards Nelson. The latter immediately returned to Palermo, disembarked the soldiers and their munitions, and cruised off Maritimo. Here he hoped to be joined by the Alexander and Goliath, which he had ordered to proceed from Malta some days before. Provided they arrived his force would be raised to eighteen battleships, including three Portuguese—four less than the enemy. “I shall wait off Maritimo,” he says, in reply to Keith, “anxiously expecting such a reinforcement as may enable me to go in search of the Enemy’s fleet, when not one moment shall be lost in bringing them to battle; for I consider the best defence for his Sicilian Majesty’s Dominions, is to place myself alongside the French.” No further ships arrived, and Nelson therefore returned to Palermo. Keith’s neglect aroused Nelson’s wrath to such an extent, that while he was at sea he sent a copy of the above letter to the Earl of St Vincent, complaining that the Commander-in-chief had not sent him “a force fit to face the Enemy: but, as we are, I shall not get out of their way; although, as I am, I cannot think myself justified in exposing the world (I may almost say), to be plundered by these miscreants. I trust your Lordship will not think me wrong in the painful determination I conceived myself forced to make, for agonized indeed was the mind of your Lordship’s faithful and affectionate servant.”
Mahan remarks that Nelson’s station off Maritimo was strategically sound, enabling him to intercept the approach of the enemy “to either Naples or Sicily,” and it was while he was cruising here that he received a despatch from his former Commander-in-chief to the effect that Keith was searching for the French, and that reinforcements were making their way to Port Mahon. Nelson was convinced that the enemy was steering for Naples. After a brief visit to the King at Palermo and receiving Sir William and Lady Hamilton on board the Foudroyant, he sailed for the capital.
On Troubridge’s withdrawal from Naples, the blockade had been placed in the hands of Captain Foote of the Seahorse, a frigate of thirty-eight guns, who concerted with Ruffo and his Russian and Turkish allies to rid the city of the insurgents. Fort St Elmo, garrisoned by the few remaining French, and the castles of Uovo and Nuovo, held by the rebels, alone held out. The Cardinal arranged an armistice with the insurgents, and although there was further trouble, the matter was patched up and negotiations were again begun. Subsequently a capitulation was signed on the 23rd June. Nelson received the news before his squadron anchored in the Bay of Naples on the following day, and, not knowing the exact terms on which it had been granted, characterised them as “infamous.”
The main conditions were that the forts Nuovo and Uovo should be delivered up with their effects; that the troops should keep possession of the places until the ships which were to be provided for those who wished to proceed to Toulon were ready to sail; that the garrisons should march out with the honours of war; that “Persons and Property, both movable and immovable, of every individual of the two Garrisons, shall be respected and guaranteed,” a clause applicable also to prisoners which the allies had made during the blockade of the forts; and that “All the other hostages and State prisoners, confined in the two Forts, shall be set at liberty, immediately after the present Capitulation is signed.” Nelson at once ordered Foote to haul down the flag of truce flying from the Seahorse. Sufficient of his story has been told to show that the Admiral had little or no pity for rebels. So far back as the 6th June, he had written to Foote that the intelligence sent to him by that officer of the hanging of thirteen Jacobins “gave us great pleasure,” and he also expressed the hope that three priests who had been condemned would “dangle on the tree best adapted to their weight of sins.” Without further ado he sent a declaration to “the Rebellious Subjects” in the two forts that “They must surrender themselves to His Majesty’s Royal mercy,” and addressed a summons to the Commanding Officer of the French at the Castle of St Elmo, that he must either accede to the terms made by Ruffo and the Russian Commander, or “take the consequences, as I shall not agree to any other.” A paper signed by Nelson and explained to Ruffo, but rejected by him, announced that “the British Admiral proposes to the Cardinal to send, in their joint names, to the French and Rebels, that the arrival of the British fleet has completely destroyed the compact, as would that of the French if they had had the power (which, thank God, they have not) to come to Naples.... That as to Rebels and Traitors, no power on earth has a right to stand between their gracious King and them: they must instantly throw themselves on the clemency of their Sovereign, for no other terms will be allowed them; nor will the French be allowed even to name them in any capitulation. If these terms are not complied with, in the time ... viz., two hours for the French, and instant submission on the part of the Rebels—such very favourable conditions will never be again offered.”
Nelson knew the man with whom he was dealing, and as the following characteristic letter to Rear-Admiral Duckworth shows, he was quite prepared for any eventuality. With insurgents on land and the possibility of a French fleet at sea in the near vicinity, it was incumbent on the British Admiral not to run unnecessary risks:—