A council of war was held on the 23rd. On the following day Nelson wrote a lengthy letter to the Commander-in-chief detailing his opinion of what should be done, Vansittart’s latest report being to the effect that the Danish Government was hostile “in the greatest possible degree.” He urged that not a moment should be lost in attacking the enemy. He brings all the persuasiveness of which he was capable to bear on Parker. “Here you are,” he says, “with almost the safety, certainly with the honour of England more intrusted to you, than ever yet fell to the lot of any British Officer.” This is exaggerating somewhat, but doubtless the writer felt deeply the urgency of the matter. “On your decision depends,” he adds with nearer approach to truth, “whether our Country shall be degraded in the eyes of Europe, or whether she shall rear her head higher than ever: again do I repeat, never did our Country depend so much on the success of any Fleet as on this.” He then proceeds to sketch a plan of campaign, starting with the supposition that the fleet enters by the Passage of the Sound. He allows for a certain amount of damage “amongst our masts and yards” taking place before Cronenburg is reached. There the ships and Crown Island are attacked, “Ships crippled, and perhaps one or two lost.” This mode Nelson calls “taking the bull by the horns,” and does not prevent the ships from Revel, or the Swedish squadron, from joining their allies. He therefore proposes passing Cronenburg, “taking the risk of damage,” to “pass up the deepest and straightest Channel above the Middle Grounds; and coming down the Garbar or King’s Channel, to attack their Floating batteries, &c., &c., as we find it convenient. It must have the effect of preventing a junction between the Russians, Swedes, and Danes, and may give us an opportunity of bombarding Copenhagen.” He also suggests a passage to the northward of Southolm. An alternative mode of attack is by the passage of the Belt, an attack on Draco, thus preventing the junction of the Russians, and “with every probability of success against the Danish Floating batteries.” His concluding words are in the true Nelson spirit: “Supposing us through the Belt with the wind first westerly, would it not be possible to either go with the Fleet, or detach ten Ships of three and two decks, with one Bomb and two Fire-Ships, to Revel, to destroy the Russian Squadron at that place? I do not see the great risk of such a detachment, and with the remainder to attempt the business at Copenhagen. The measure may be thought bold, but I am of opinion the boldest measures are the safest; and our Country demands a most vigorous exertion of her force, directed with judgment.” Nelson concludes with the assurance that “no exertion of head or heart” shall be wanting on his part.

The proposed terms were definitely refused by Denmark, but Nelson’s “bold measure” of detaching part of the British fleet to attack the Russian squadron at Revel while the other attacked the Capital did not appeal to the unimaginative Parker. Copenhagen must first be overcome. The pilots also assured the Commander-in-chief that the passage of the Belt was the safest, which drew from Nelson the abrupt but thoroughly characteristic reply, “Let it be by the Sound, by the Belt, or any how, only lose not an hour!” Eventually the Sound was chosen.

Having shifted his flag from the St George to the Elephant (74), a more serviceable ship for the difficult passage, the British fleet, in order of battle, slowly threaded its way through the shoals on the 30th March, Nelson commanding the van, Parker the centre, and Graves the rear. The guns of Cronenburg Castle, dominating the Sound, blazed away, as did those on the armed hulks with which the Danes had hoped to defend the narrow channel, but the Swedish guns maintained a stolid silence. The fleet then anchored a few miles below Copenhagen. Parker, Nelson, and several other officers boarded a lugger to reconnoitre the enemy’s defences. Various soundings were made to the accompaniment of gun-firing, and it was found that the enemy had placed a formidable flotilla, including two 70-gun ships, a frigate, and two dismasted 64-gun ships, in the front of the harbour and arsenal. The Trekroner Battery had also been strengthened. A second council of war was held on the 31st, some interesting particulars of which are furnished by Colonel William Stewart, who was in command of some of the troops. After some difficulties had been stated anent “the three Powers we should either have to engage, in succession or united, in those seas,” Stewart tells us that “Lord Nelson kept pacing the cabin, mortified at everything that savoured either of alarm or irresolution. When the above remark was applied to the Swedes, he sharply observed, ‘The more numerous the better’; and when to the Russians, he repeatedly said, ‘So much the better, I wish they were twice as many, the easier the victory, depend on it.’”

“At the battle of Copenhagen,” writes Mr Ferguson, surgeon of the Elephant, “I was amongst the companions of the hero. The attempt was arduous in the extreme: no common mind would have dared to conceive it; but it was suited to the exalted enterprise of Lord Nelson. As his was the invigorating spirit of the council that planned the attack, so in the execution he only could have commanded success. During the interval that preceded the battle, I could only silently admire when I saw the first man in all the world spend the hours of the day and night in boats, amid floating ice, and in the severest weather; and wonder when the light shewed me a path marked by buoys, which had been trackless the preceding evening.

“On the first day of April, in the afternoon, we took our departure with twelve sail-of-the-line, and a proportionate number of smaller vessels, from the main body of the fleet, then lying about four miles below Copenhagen; and coasted along the outer edge of the shoal called the middle ground, until we doubled its farthest extremities, when the fleet cast anchor. This shoal, of the same extent as the sea front of the town, lies exactly before it, at about three-quarters of a mile in distance; the interval between it and the shore had deep water, and is called the King’s Channel.

“In this channel the Danes had arranged their defence, as near the town as possible. It consisted of nineteen ships and floating batteries, flanked at the town’s extremity by two artificial islands at the mouth of the harbour, called the Crown batteries, and extending for a mile along the whole front of the town, leaving intervals for the batteries on shore to play.

“As our anchor dropped at eight in the evening, Nelson emphatically called out, ‘I will fight them the moment I have a fair wind.’ He spent the whole night in consultation.

“About half-past nine a.m. of the 2nd of April, the signals of the different ships having been made, repeated, and answered, we had the mortification to see the Agamemnon get upon the shoal on the first attempt to leave her anchorage, where she remained immovable. A similar misfortune followed in succession to the Russell and Polyphemus; and in addition to all this, the Jamaica frigate, with a convoy of gunboats and the small craft having fallen in with the counter current, and being unable to stem it, made the signal of inability to proceed. A mind less invincible than Nelson’s might have been discouraged: though the battle had not commenced, yet he had approached the enemy; and he felt that he could not retreat or wait for reinforcements, without compromising the glory of his country. The signal to bear down was still kept flying. His agitation during these moments was extreme; I shall never forget the impression it made on me. It was not, however, the agitation of indecision, but of ardent animated patriotism, panting for glory, which had appeared within his reach, and was vanishing from his grasp.”