CHAPTER X
Talavera (1809)
“The battle of Talavera was the hardest fought of modern times.”
Wellington.
The potentialities of the new project were distinctly promising. After uniting with Cuesta, Wellesley was to follow the course of the Tagus and cut off Victor’s army of 33,000 troops while the attention of Sebastiani and Joseph Bonaparte, who had but 17,000 men all told, was occupied by Venegas.
When last heard of Soult and Ney were in Galicia busily engaged in suppressing an insurrection, so no opposition was anticipated from them. In this matter after events proved the facts to be far different from the surmise. There seemed every likelihood of a successful issue provided there was no snapping of individual links of the chain of operations. Wellesley did not find Cuesta a particularly affable colleague, but he was not the man to assert his own opinion unless he thought it imperative. He characterized him as having “no military genius,” which is certainly more favourable than “that deformed-looking lump of pride, ignorance, and treachery,” which is the description given to us by Costello. “He was,” the latter adds, “the most murderous-looking old man I ever saw.” They came together at Oropesa on the 20th July, their forces totalling 55,000, of which 35,000 were Spanish. It was the task of Venegas and his 26,000 men to approach Madrid from the south, and, by a demonstration in force, distract the attention of Sebastiani. He proved far too slow, and ere he was able to interfere, Victor, Sebastiani, and Joseph concentrated in the neighbourhood of Toledo. On the 26th July the last batch of their 50,000 troops came together.
Had Wellesley been allowed to attack on the 23rd July, as he wished, it is probable that he would have crushed Victor, whose reinforcements did not begin to arrive until the following day. Cuesta had already shown his incompetency, and some of his advanced guard had been roughly handled by a French cavalry division. It was Wellesley’s opinion that the psychological moment had arrived, but the Spanish commander objected. “Had we fought then,” Wellesley afterwards averred, “it would have been as great a battle as Waterloo, and would have cleared Spain of the French for that time.” The formidable task before him was not made lighter by the knowledge that the commissariat and transport arrangements had utterly broken down.
At Talavera, evacuated by Victor, who moved a few miles to the east, Wellesley was obliged to halt, and even threatened to withdraw from Spain because of the ill-treatment accorded his famishing troops. “I have never seen an army,” he says, “so ill-treated in any country, or, considering that all depends upon its operations, one which deserved good treatment so much. It is ridiculous to pretend that the country cannot supply our wants. The French army is well fed, and the soldiers who are taken in good health, and well supplied with bread, of which indeed they left a small magazine behind them. This is a rich country in corn, in comparison with Portugal, and yet, during the whole of my operations in that country, we never wanted bread but on one day on the frontiers of Galicia. In the Vera de Plasencia there are means to supply this army for 4 months, as I am informed, and yet the alcaldes have not performed their engagements with me. The Spanish army has plenty of every thing, and we alone, upon whom every thing depends, are actually starving.”
After considerable trouble Cuesta consented to Wellesley assuming supreme command of the combined forces. On the afternoon of the 27th the British General mounted his horse and, accompanied by his staff, rode out of the town to an old château, known as the Casa de Salinas. His object was to obtain a bird’s-eye view from the roof of the movements of the enemy on the Alberche. He apprehended no danger, because Spanish troops occupied the adjacent woods. In this he was deceived, for a number of French tirailleurs suddenly appearing, the troops beat a hasty retreat. The Commander-in-Chief jumped from the wall and regained his horse not a moment too soon. Had it not been for the near presence of a body of English infantry, who immediately opened fire, it is extremely probable that Wellington and his staff would have been captured.
At five o’clock the opposing forces were within touch, the French having crossed the river and driven in the British piquets, who lost about 400 men.