“The French had a ravine to pass before they could reach the enemy. They had to advance over ground much intersected, very rugged and unequal, obliging them frequently to break their line; and the positions they attacked had been previously fortified. The left could not see the right, or know what was passing there, for the rising ground between them. Every corps of the army fought apart, with unparalleled bravery, and ability too, but there was no co-operation in their efforts. The French were not then commanded by a General-in-chief, the resources of whose genius might have compensated for the advantages which the nature of the ground denied them and yielded to their enemies.
“The division of Lapisse first passed the ravine, attacked the fortified eminence, ascended it in defiance of a fire of grape-shot which mowed down its ranks, but was repulsed with the loss of its General and a great number of officers and soldiers. In retreating, it left the right of the fourth corps uncovered, which the British artillery took in flank, and forced for a moment to retire. The left of General Sebastiani’s corps advanced under a most intense fire of artillery to the fort of a redoubt on the right of the English, and between the combined armies. It was too far advanced, and too soon forward—it was encountered and driven back by the united corps of the English right and the Spanish left. Assistance came, and the combat was renewed. In the centre, Marshal Victor rallied the division of Lapisse at the foot of the hill, and abandoned all further attempt to gain possession of it. The French then tried to turn it either by the right or left. Villatte’s division advanced in the valley, and Ruffin’s moved to the right of this by the foot of the Castilian mountains. The cavalry, forming a second line, were in readiness to debouch into the plain in the rear of the enemy whenever the infantry could open a passage.
“Just as the French began to move, the English, with two regiments of cavalry, made a charge against their masses. They engaged in the valley, passed onwards regardless of the fire of several battalions of infantry, between the divisions of Villatte and Ruffin, and fell with impetuosity never surpassed on the 10th and 26th regiments of our chasseurs. The 10th could not resist the charge. They opened their ranks, but rallied immediately, and nearly the whole of the 23rd regiment of light dragoons at the head of the English cavalry was either destroyed or taken captive.
“A division of the English Royal Guards, stationed on the left and centre of their army, being charged by the French, at first repulsed them vigorously; but one of its brigades, being too far advanced, was in its turn taken in flank by the fire of the French artillery and infantry, sustained considerable loss, and retreated with difficulty behind their second line. The French took advantage of this success; they again moved forward, and but one other effort was necessary to break through into the plain, and combat on equal ground. But King Joseph thought it was too late to advance with the reserve, and the attack was delayed till the following day.[52] Night again closed over us, and the conflict ceased from exhaustion, without either side having won such a decided advantage as to entitle it to claim the victory.
“The corps of Marshals Victor and Sebastiani withdrew successively during the night towards the reserve, leaving an advanced guard of cavalry on the scene of the engagement, to take care of the wounded. The English, who expected a new attack in the morning, were greatly surprised when day dawned to see that their enemies, leaving twenty pieces of cannon, had retreated to their old position on the Alberche. The English and Spaniards, according to their own accounts, lost 6,616 men.[53] The French had nearly 10,000 slain.”
Wellesley characterizes the battle as “a most desperate one ... we had about two to one against us; fearful odds! but we maintained all our positions, and gave the enemy a terrible beating.” Very few of the Spanish troops were engaged in any real sense, although those who took an active part behaved well, and one of the cavalry regiments “made an excellent and well-timed charge.” The majority of them were in a “miserable state of discipline” and “entirely incapable of performing any manœuvre, however simple.” There was a sad lack of morale, qualified officers were few, and seemed either unable or unwilling to follow their allies in the matter of subjecting their men to definite regulations. When the British soldiers were engaged in removing the wounded and in burying the dead after Talavera, “the arms and accoutrements of both were collected and carried away by the Spanish troops.”
The exhausted condition of his army prevented Wellesley from following the enemy, but as Venegas was on the move and threatening Madrid, this was not regarded as of consummate importance. Of more immediate concern was the alarming intelligence received by the Commander-in-Chief a few hours later that Soult’s army was no longer in Galicia, but marching to intercept the British communications with Portugal.