“Nothing,” he writes from Merida, on the 25th August, to Castlereagh, “can be worse than the officers of the Spanish army; and it is extraordinary that when a nation has devoted itself to war, as this nation has, by the measures it has adopted in the last two years, so little progress has been made in any one branch of the military profession by any individual, and that the business of an army should be so little understood. They are really children in the art of war, and I cannot say that they do any thing as it ought to be done, with the exception of running away and assembling again in a state of nature.” In his opinion the Portuguese, under English officers, were better than the Spaniards, but both “want the habits and spirit of soldiers—the habits of command on one side, and of obedience on the other—mutual confidence between officers and men; and, above all, a determination in the superiors to obey the spirit of the orders they receive, let what will be the consequence, and the spirit to tell the true cause if they do not. In short, the fact is, there is so much trick in the Portuguese army....”
At the beginning of September he was at Badajoz, on the frontier, the advantage being, as Wellington says, “that the British army was centrically posted, in reference to all the objects which the enemy might have in view; and at any time, by a junction with a Spanish corps on its right, or a Portuguese or Spanish corps on its left, it could prevent the enemy from undertaking any thing, excepting with a much larger force than they could allot to any one object.” Here he heard that there was a likelihood of Soult attacking Ciudad Rodrigo. This information he obtained from an intercepted letter to Joseph. “The success of this scheme,” he avers, “would do them more good, and the allies more mischief, than any other they could attempt; and it is most likely of all others to be successful.” For this reason he ordered Wilson to stay north of the Tagus so as to watch Soult’s movements.
In the middle of the month the Spanish army of Estremadura, stationed at Deleytosa, was reduced to 6000 soldiers, the remainder, with Eguia, marching towards La Mancha. About the same time an army of some 13,000 men, under La Romana, whom Wellington describes as “more intelligent and reasonable” than most of his countrymen, moved from Galicia to the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. La Romana himself proceeded to Seville and was succeeded by the Duque del Parque, who marched towards Salamanca.
Wellington watched del Parque’s forward movements with dismay, and ordered magazines to be prepared upon the Douro and Mondego “to assist in providing for these vagabonds if they should retire into Portugal, which I hope they will do, as their only chance of salvation.”
On the 10th October Wellington was at Lisbon to arrange future operations, and where he studied “on the ground” the possibility of defending Portugal. This reconnaissance resulted in the defence known as the “Lines of Torres Vedras,” of which particulars will be given as the story proceeds.[55]
By the end of the month he was back at Badajoz, writing endless dispatches relative to the thousand and one concerns—military, political and financial—of the two armies. By the beginning of November del Parque was obliged to retire owing to the arrival from Estremadura of some 36,000 men under Mortier in Old Castile. Eguia’s entry into La Mancha from Estremadura two months before had been followed by the arrival of 30,000 of the enemy’s troops under Victor in that province, whereupon the Spanish commander had withdrawn to the Sierra Morena, and the French to the Tagus.
The Spanish Government now entertained the hope of gaining the complete possession of Madrid. Two forces were to be honoured with the carrying out of this ambitious project. The army of La Mancha, now under the inexperienced General Areizaga, joined by the greater part of the army of Estremadura, and consisting of 50,000 men, was to march from the Sierra Morena. Del Parque, with the army of Galicia, 20,000 strong, was to take Salamanca and then present himself before the capital. Areizaga met with some temporary success, but on the 19th November some 4000 of his men were either lying dead or wounded on the bloody field of Ocaña, within easy distance of Madrid. No fewer than 18,000 were taken prisoners by King Joseph’s troops. When the distressed General gathered together the fragments of his shattered army in the Sierra Morena, only a half of the original number were present, which means that 3000 had deserted. He must have been sadly deficient in cannon, for the French had captured over fifty pieces.
Del Parque was scarcely more successful. He was attacked at Tamames on the 19th October by troops under Marchand, whom he defeated. Thus encouraged, he advanced to Salamanca, which the French had occupied, and taken possession of. In the last week of November he was beaten at Alba de Tormes, to which he had retreated, with a loss of 3000 men. Some of his troops retired on Galicia, the remainder on Ciudad Rodrigo.[56]
With the object of giving the Spanish Government time to repair their losses in southern Spain, and surmising that whatever reinforcements the French might receive would be for use against the British now that the armies under Blake, Areizaga, and del Parque were scattered, Wellington prepared to move the greater part of his army north of the Tagus, towards the frontiers of Castile, but leaving a body of troops under Lieutenant-General Hill at Abrantes, so that the Lower Tagus might not be left unguarded. Early in January 1810, Wellington made his headquarters at Coimbra, on the Mondego, and within comparatively easy distance of the sea, conceivably a useful ally now that Napoleon was sending additional reinforcements, and Soult had 70,000 men at his disposal.
The passes of Despeña Perros, and Puerto del Rey through the Sierra Morena, but weakly defended by Spanish troops under Areizaga, were forced by the French without difficulty. On the last day of January 1810, Seville capitulated. That Wellington anticipated this is proved by a letter he wrote on that date to Lord Liverpool. Cadiz was saved from a similar fate by the Duke of Albuquerque, who reached the city in the nick of time, although Victor’s outposts had been seen on the banks of the Guadalquivir. Major-General the Hon. W. Stewart was sent to assist in the defence of the place, and arrived towards the end of February with some 5000 British and Portuguese troops, while a British fleet lay in the Bay.