Wellington and his men then went into cantonments, the former making his headquarters at Freneda. Much was done to improve the morale of the troops, who had got into a very insubordinate state. Reinforcements came to hand, and Wellington worked hard to reorganize the Spanish army, of which he had been appointed Generalissimo after the battle of Salamanca. He had also been raised to the rank of Marquis, thanked by both Houses of Parliament, and presented with £100,000. He paid a visit to the Cortes, made a speech, and wrote a long letter to one of the Deputies in which he criticized “the powers that be” in no uncertain way, adding, however, a number of measures which would “give your Government some chance of standing, and your country some chance of avoiding farther revolutions.” The whole communication must be studied to be fully appreciated.[75] “The Government and the Assembly,” he says in one passage, “instead of drawing together, are like two independent powers, jealous and afraid of each other; and the consequence is, that the machine of Government is at a stand. To this add that the whole system is governed by little local views, as propounded by the daily press of Cadiz, of all others the least enlightened and the most licentious.” “I will fight for Spain as long as she is the enemy of France, whatever may be her system of government,” he adds, “but I cannot avoid seeing and lamenting the evils which await the country if you do not retrace your steps, let what will be the result of the military operations of the war....”
He advised the establishment of a permanent Regency, “with all the powers allotted by the constitution to the King, in the hands of one person.” He, or she, should be aided by a Council, whose five members should superintend the Department de Estado, the Interior and Ultramar, Gracia y Justicia, Hacienda, and of War and of Marine respectively, each being responsible for the department under his superintendence. He suggested either turning “the Council of State into a House of Lords,” or making “a House of Lords of the Grandees, giving then concurrent powers of legislation with the Cortes; and you should leave the patronage now in the hands of the Council of State in the hands of the Crown.”
In these days of Socialism the following remarks, which occur in the same letter, are of more than passing interest. “The theory of all legislation,” he says, “is founded in justice; and, if we could be certain that legislative assemblies would on all occasions act according to the principles of justice, there would be no occasion for those checks and guards which we have seen established under the best systems. Unfortunately, however, we have seen that legislative assemblies are swayed by the fears and passions of individuals; when unchecked, they are tyrannical and unjust; nay, more: it unfortunately happens too frequently that the most tyrannical and unjust measures are the most popular. Those measures are particularly popular which deprive rich and powerful individuals of their properties under the pretence of the public advantage; and I tremble for a country in which, as in Spain, there is no barrier for the preservation of private property, excepting the justice of a legislative assembly possessing supreme powers.”
In summing up the result of his operations in the field during 1812, Wellington tells the Earl of Liverpool on the 23rd November, that notwithstanding adverse criticism in the newspapers, “it is in fact the most successful campaign in all its circumstances, and has produced for the cause more important results than any campaign in which a British army has been engaged for the last century. We have taken by siege Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and Salamanca; and the Retiro surrendered. In the meantime the Allies have taken Astorga, Guadalaxara, and Consuegra, besides other places taken by Duran and Sir H. Popham. In the months elapsed since January this army has sent to England little short of 20,000 prisoners, and they have taken and destroyed or have themselves the use of the enemy’s arsenals in Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, Valladolid, Madrid, Astorga, Seville, the line before Cadiz, etc.; and upon the whole we have taken and destroyed, or we now possess, little short of 3000 pieces of artillery. The siege of Cadiz has been raised, and all the countries south of the Tagus have been cleared of the enemy.
“We should have retained still greater advantages, I think, and should have remained in possession of Castile and Madrid during the winter, if I could have taken Burgos, as I ought early in October, or if Ballasteros had moved upon Alcarez as he was ordered, instead of intriguing for his own aggrandizement.
“The fault of which I was guilty in the expedition to Burgos was, not that I undertook the operation with inadequate means, but that I took there the most inexperienced instead of the best troops.... I see that a disposition already exists to blame the Government for the failure of the siege of Burgos. The Government had nothing to say to the siege. It was entirely my own act. In regard to means, there were ample means both at Madrid and at Santander for the siege of the strongest fortress. That which was wanting at both places was means of transporting ordnance and military stores to the place where it was desirable to use them.
“The people of England, so happy as they are in every respect, so rich in resources of every description, having the use of such excellent roads, etc., will not readily believe that important results here frequently depend upon 50 or 60 mules more or less, or a few bundles of straw to feed them; but the fact is so, notwithstanding their incredulity....”
When Wellington was ready for his 1813 campaign he had 75,000 British and Portuguese at his disposal, and some 60,000 Spaniards, in addition to the irregular bands which were the bane of the enemy. The different French armies totalled some 200,000 troops, but it was deemed necessary to send 40,000 of these, under Clausel and Foy, to exterminate the guerilleros, which was to Wellington’s advantage, especially as it was impossible for Napoleon, now deeply involved owing to the disastrous Russian campaign, to send further reinforcements. Soult was withdrawn, with 20,000 men, to oppose the Russian advance. By way of further encouragement, Andalusia, Estremadura, Galacia, and the Asturias no longer sheltered the enemy. The British left was under Graham, the right under Hill, and the centre under the Commander-in-Chief. The first marched upon Valladolid, the French retreating before him, and was joined near Zamora on the 1st June 1813 by Wellington, followed two days later by Hill. The French were deceived by these movements, for they expected the main attack to be made from Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida with the object of occupying Madrid. This was far from Wellington’s purpose, which was to carry on the war in the northern provinces, sever the French communications with the homeland, and force them to withdraw to the Pyrenees. King Joseph hastily retired from Valladolid and reached Burgos. On the approach of Wellington to that town, the fortifications were blown up and the enemy fell back beyond the Ebro.
“When I heard and saw this explosion (for I was within a few miles, and the effect was tremendous),” Wellington remarks, “I made a sudden resolution forthwith—instanter to cross the Ebro, and endeavour to push the French to the Pyrenees. We had heard of the battles of Lützen and Bautzen and of the armistice,[76] and the affairs of the Allies looked very ill. Some of my officers remonstrated with me about the impudence of crossing the Ebro, and advised me to take up the line of the Ebro, etc. I asked them what they meant by taking up the line of the Ebro, a river 300 miles long, and what good I was to do along that line? In short, I would not listen to the advice; and that very evening (or the very next morning) I crossed the river and pushed the French till I afterwards beat them at Vittoria.”
“We continued to advance,” writes a soldier of the 71st Regiment who fought in the battle, “until the 20th of June; when reaching the neighbourhood of Vittoria, we encamped upon the face of a hill. Provisions were very scarce. We had not a bit of tobacco, and were smoking leaves and herbs. Colonel Cadogan rode away, and got us half a pound of tobacco a man, which was most welcome.