Wellington lost 4600 killed and wounded at Quatre Bras, but although he remained in possession of the field, Ney’s grim determination had precluded him from sending reinforcements to Blücher, who had been contesting Napoleon at Ligny, eight miles distant. On the other hand, the Emperor had ordered his Marshal to assist him at Ligny after having dispersed the troops at Quatre Bras, which he was far too heavily engaged all day to do, although it is conceivable that had he begun his attack earlier he might have carried out his Chief’s instructions. Napoleon himself delayed his attack because some of his soldiers had not arrived, and when he was ready to open fire he totalled 20,000 men less than the Prussian commander. D’Erlon’s troops, forming Ney’s reserve, were sent for, but before they were pressed into service were ordered back by Ney to assist him. Had D’Erlon remained, Napoleon would have won a decisive victory. As it was, Blücher’s losses reached over 20,000, and he narrowly averted capture. He was thrown during a cavalry charge and badly injured. The Prussians abandoned the field, retiring towards Wavre, which enabled them to be in touch with Wellington, and where they later formed a junction with the fresh corps of Bülow. Napoleon, who had 11,000 men killed or wounded, was convinced that the enemy would fall back on Namur and Liége, which would enable him to deal with Wellington alone on the morrow.
Napoleon was unusually lethargic on the following day, and squandered much precious time until noon in various useless ways. He then ordered Grouchy, with 33,000 men, to ascertain the position occupied by the Prussians, while he joined Ney. Wellington, hearing of Blücher’s defeat and realizing that every moment was of value, had evacuated Quatre Bras almost without interference, although Napoleon’s cavalry came up with the British rear and the situation was saved by a propitious downpour of rain which soon transformed road and field alike into a quagmire. Still, Napoleon chased in pursuit to the ridge of Waterloo, where a heavy cannonade put an end to his advance. The Emperor made his headquarters at the Caillou farm, retiring to rest only after he had seen that Wellington’s army was not retreating from the position it had taken up at Mont St Jean. Unable to sleep, he again satisfied himself that the army he was bent on shattering had not stolen a march on him, and when the 18th June dawned he was still gazing in the direction of Wellington and his men.
CHAPTER XIX
Waterloo (1815)
“The history of a battle is not unlike the history of a ball. Some individuals may recollect all the little events of which the great result is the battle lost or won; but no individual can recollect the order in which, or the exact moment at which they occurred, which makes all the difference as to their value or importance.”
Wellington.
The British General had already sent word to Blücher that he was prepared to fight Napoleon if the Prussian Commander could see his way to send him one army-corps, the assistance of which he deemed imperative. He did not receive a reply until the early hours of the 18th, and it was in the affirmative. He promised Bülow’s corps, which would march at daybreak against Napoleon’s right, followed by that of Pirch. Those of Thielmann and Ziethen would also be sent provided the presence of Grouchy did not prevent. As events turned out, Thielmann’s corps was sufficient for this purpose of defending the Dyle against the French Marshal. The first report from Grouchy received by Napoleon on the 18th was sent from Gembloux, and contained news up to 10 o’clock on the previous night, namely, that part of the Prussians had retired towards Wavre, that Blücher with their centre had fallen back on Perwez, and a column with artillery had moved in the direction of Namur.[92]
From another source Napoleon gathered that three bodies of the Prussians were concentrating at Wavre, vital information which, for some inexplicable reason, he did not dispatch to Grouchy until 10 a.m. We have it on the authority of Foy, who had fought in Spain, that at daybreak Napoleon was told that the junction of Wellington and Blücher was possible. This he refused to believe, stating that such an event could not take place before the 20th. Grouchy was ordered to keep up his communications with Napoleon, pushing before him “those bodies of Prussians which have taken this direction and which may have stopped at Wavre.” In addition, he was to “follow those columns which have gone to your right.” Dr Holland Rose pronounces these instructions as far from clear: “Grouchy was not bidden to throw all his efforts on the side of Wavre; and he was not told whether he must attack the enemy at that town, or interpose a wedge between them and Wellington, or support Napoleon’s right. Now Napoleon would certainly have prescribed an immediate concentration of Grouchy’s force towards the north-west for one of the last two objects, had he believed Blücher about to attempt a flank march against the chief French army. Obviously it had not yet entered his thoughts that so daring a step would be taken by a foe whom he pictured as scattered and demoralized by defeat.”[93]