The question of a sea-level canal was again agitated and became so insistent that the President appointed an international board of engineers, consisting of thirteen members, to assemble in Washington September 1, 1905 to consider the various plans for the construction of the canal submitted to it. The board consisted of five foreign and five United States engineers, three of the latter having formerly served on the canal commission. The Board visited the Isthmus on September 28, had some examinations made for its enlightenment and in November submitted a majority report signed by the five foreign engineers and the three former members of the commission, and a minority report, the former advocating a sea-level canal and the latter a lock canal with the summit level 85’ above the sea. The Isthmian Canal Commission with but one dissenting voice recommended the adoption of the lock type proposed by the minority.
On June 29, 1906 Congress in opposition to the majority report of the engineers, provided that the 85-foot lock type of canal be constructed across the Isthmus; and work has since continued on that plan. This final decision, however, was made with reluctance by many congressmen and some of them are regretting it today.
This Congress also decided that all materials used in building the canal should be purchased in the United States.
Early in 1909 a special body of engineers appointed by the President accompanied W. H. Taft on an inspection trip to Panama particularly with a view to determining the feasibility of the Gatun dam project. In a report made February 16 they unanimously approved the plans for the various changes in the original project made by the engineer. This included the widening of the locks to 110 feet and constructing the Pacific dams at Miraflores instead of at La Boca.
IV. TYPE OF CANAL
The controversy over the relative merits of a lock and a sea-level canal at Panama is as old as the question of building the canal itself. Supporters of the lock canal now in process of construction have sought to silence the storm of protest occasioned by its adoption; but in spite of their precautions reports have reached the American public which have created a lack of faith in the present engineers and their methods.
It is, of course, impossible for a layman to decide arbitrarily in favor of the lock or sea-level type. The only reasonable way to arrive at a conclusion is to examine carefully the arguments of both factions and reach a decision therefrom. The writer has found it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain an accurate presentation of the facts. Engineers high in their profession make contradictory statements. Presumably they honestly express their convictions but their failure to agree is strong evidence that there is a large element of uncertainty in the whole proposition. If they, acknowledged authorities, not only cannot arrive at a common decision in this matter, but consider it necessary to ridicule each other’s plans, there is certainly cause to doubt the wisdom of the present project. It is the intention of the writer to state the principal arguments both for and against the two types of canals as presented by their most ardent advocates.
It is generally conceded that a lock canal at Panama would cost less than an efficient sea-level canal. Engineers on the Isthmus make an estimate of over $100,000,000 as the minimum excess of cost of a sea-level canal over the lock canal for construction alone. This estimate does not include the cost of carrying on the work of government and sanitation during the additional years which would be required to build a sea-level canal. Furthermore, it is true that there are many problems in connection with a sea-level canal, in spite of its apparent simplicity, which have never been solved and consequently no engineer can say how many millions would be required for its completion. Experience has shown, however, that the same unsolved problems were also true of the lock type. In their report to the President and to Congress, the minority of the board of consulting engineers pledged their professional reputations that if the lock type of canal were adopted the aggregate cost of completing the canal, exclusive of sanitation and zone government, would not exceed $139,705,200. Not four years have passed since that report was made yet $120,064,468.58 have already been appropriated and the great dams and locks are only fairly begun. In the last session of Congress it was proposed to increase the limit of the cost of construction of the Panama Canal to $500,000,000. Senator Teller in a speech said, “I have said again and again on the floor and I repeat it now — that if we get the canal built for $500,000,000, whether a lock or a sea-level canal, we shall do very well. In my judgment, we will never get that canal, in either form, except at a cost of more than $500,000,000.” These figures are sufficient evidence that the engineers who made the original estimate were dealing with a subject too big for them.
At the time Congress voted to adopt a lock canal the estimated cost of a sea-level canal, excluding the cost of sanitation, civil government, the purchase price and interest on the investment (which seem unnecessary refinement in view of later developments) was given by the Board of Consulting Engineers as $247,021,000. The project on which this estimate was made provided for a waterway 40 feet deep at mean sea-level, 150 feet wide at the bottom in earth and 200 feet wide in rock, with a length of 49.14 miles. On the basis of this estimate advocates of the sea-level canal argue that on grounds of economy alone the lock type should be abandoned in favor of the sea-level type. It stands to reason, however, that some of the causes which have led to an increase in cost over the original estimates for the lock canal, such as the increase in the wage scale and the cost of material, and the adoption of the eight-hour day, would affect equally the sea-level project if it were undertaken.