“And what is this?” I said.
“Right opinion,” she replied; “which, as you know, being incapable of giving a reason, is not knowledge (for how could knowledge be devoid of reason? nor again, ignorance, for neither can ignorance attain the truth), but is clearly something which is a mean between ignorance and wisdom.”
“Quite true,” I replied.
“Do not then insist,” she said, “that what is not fair is of necessity foul, or what is not good evil; or infer that because love is not fair and good he is therefore foul and evil; for he is in a mean between them.”
“Well,” I said, “love is surely admitted by all to be a great god.”
“By those who know or by those who don’t know?”
“By all.”
“And how, Socrates,” she said with a smile, “can love be acknowledged to be a great god by those who say that he is not a god at all?”
“And who are they?” I said.
“You and I are two of them,” she replied.