Resulting from a lack of previous experience, the Massachusetts regiments suffered during the first six months of their field service. Men were starving in the regiments, because unable to assimilate the Government ration, which, through a lack of experience in handling and preparing, was served to them in a form which did not properly nourish, and aggravated and perpetuated the ordinary intestinal troubles which recruits usually experience when first taking the field. Many men were improperly nourished, their vitality lowered, and their power of resisting disease impaired. So far as this resulted from a defect in their militia training, the State of Massachusetts was responsible.
For a number of years the Massachusetts Militia had been equipped for eye service. The men were supplied with the equipments they could carry on their person, and which contributed to the success of a parade, by giving it a ready-for-war appearance. Not much attention was paid to other equipments.
There was a limited supply of blankets, ponchos, buzzacotts and tentage, but not enough for all the troops. These were held at the Framingham Arsenal, and did duty for a mysterious field equipment, ready for instant use. There were no shelter tents or wagons. Some of the supplies were of a stage property kind. The shovels carried by an improvised pioneer corps in one of the Boston street parades, lasted two hours when used for digging by a detachment of the Eighth. The Militia of Massachusetts had never been properly equipped for field service.
The appropriation of $500,000 by the Legislature in April, enabled them to take the field better supplied than the Guard Regiments from many states, but they were never fully equipped by the State, or instructed in the A B C of a soldier's duty.
They had been assembled for years in brigade camps, and taught ceremonies and parades, but no attempt had been made to teach company commanders the important lesson of how to meet the requirements of the field, and care for their men under service conditions. The increasing sick list reported in all the camps, accentuated this absence of individual experience and trained company officers.
The War Department was as unprepared as the Militia of Massachusetts. The machinery for handling an army of 26,000 men in peace, was called upon to mobilize 275,000 men of war. It was altogether inadequate to meet the emergency. There were practically no reserve supplies. On April 23rd the Government had enough Springfield rifles to equip the volunteers, but that was all. The cloth of the uniforms first issued to some regiments at Chickamauga, was not manufactured when the regiments were mustered into service.
Large quantities of commissary supplies were purchased in the market, and rushed to the large camps for concentration. These supplies were uniformly of standard quality, and were accumulated in sufficient quantities at the depots, but were often delayed in distribution to the troops. Volunteer officers were at first unacquainted with the use of requisition blanks, and the red tape of Government issue, and the Commissary Department lacked facilities to make prompt and full deliveries. This was the earliest department, however, to get into working order, and subsequent complaints at Chickamauga were due to the inexperience of officers and men in handling the rations.
The Quartermaster's Department also made large purchases in the market, but were handicapped by having to wait for articles to be manufactured to fill orders. This department at Chickamauga was further handicapped by inefficiency and failure to appreciate the situation, and the necessary requirements of the troops.
As soon as wagon transportation was issued to the Eighth, they began to bring the water from the Blue Spring. This was a long haul, and required many barrels for transportation and storage in camp. The supply of barrels issued by the Quartermaster's Department to the regiment was inadequate. The Chief Quartermaster was repeatedly requested to furnish sufficient barrels for this purpose, and refused. The regiment subsequently purchased, at its own expense, at Chattanooga, sufficient receptacles.
The refusal of the Chief Quartermaster was reported to the Inspector General's Department, and was thus commented upon:—