It is of course difficult to say, in this connection, just how accurately the figures given portray the real self-estimation of the different individuals, and to what degree they indicate merely what the individual will do with her own name in the case of such an experiment. Natural modesty might easily lead one to place her own name lower in the scale for a given trait than she really believed herself to belong. If this were the case, we might then infer that the figures we have presented, although qualitatively suggestive, were not quantitatively reliable. They would, in other words, express smaller degrees of overestimation and underestimation than were really present in the consciousness of our observers. Here, as in all the results of this investigation, the figures are given only as indicating what individuals actually do when asked to rank themselves among their associates. Our conclusion on this point is that they tend to overestimate or to underestimate themselves, according to the "desirableness" or "undesirableness" of the trait in question. Individual differences in these tendencies are everywhere apparent. Thus, in neatness, individuals S and H stand about equally high (S being ninth and H being thirteenth), but S underestimates herself by thirteen places, while H overestimates herself by ten places.
In a third experiment of this same kind another group of twenty-five college seniors, in the same school and during the preceding year, had judged each other, including themselves, for the traits, efficiency, energy, kindliness and originality. The data from this experiment are not given here in full, since the method was precisely that of the two investigations we have just described, and since all of the results must be held as only suggestive of what may be expected to happen in the long run. These seniors also showed a general tendency to rate themselves somewhat higher than they were rated by their associates. The amount of overestimation varied with the trait, all the traits in this case being of the "desirable" sort. Since the conditions of this third experiment were quite the same as those of the investigation just described in greater detail, except that a different group of individuals were concerned, it is perhaps fair to treat the results as comparable, and to include the measures of constant error along with the preceding records. The results from all the groups are included in the following table, which shows the constant tendency in the case of thirteen traits.
TABLE 4
Constant Tendencies of Self-estimation in Thirteen Traits
| Trait | Constant Error | Trait | Constant Error | |
| Refinement | +6.3 | Neatness | +1.8 | |
| Humor | +5.2 | Originality | +1.2 | |
| Kindliness | +4.0 | Beauty | +0.2 | |
| Energy | +3.8 | Conceit | -1.7 | |
| Intelligence | +3.0 | Snobbishness | -2.0 | |
| Sociability | +2.2 | Vulgarity | -4.2 | |
| Efficiency | +2.1 |
Data from certain other investigations also tell us something about these tendencies in judging ourselves and others. Thus, in an investigation by the writer,[10] a number of persons were set to work at the continuous performance of a series of mental and physical tests. After each trial the performer was required to judge whether he had done better or worse than usual on this occasion. In each case another person was required to watch the performer, and to judge, in the capacity of witness, whether the performance had been better or worse than usual for the individual who was doing the work.
The data showed that although an observer is no more "sensitive" to gain in efficiency than he is to loss, he is predisposed to judge both himself and another performer whom he is watching as having done "better than usual" rather than "worse than usual." The consequence is that smaller degrees of superiority tend to be judged as better with higher degrees of confidence, and that a certain slight degree of inferiority tends to be incorrectly judged as "better." We seem predisposed to judge "better" rather than "worse," and in this experiment the observers were, furthermore, predisposed in favor of the other person, somewhat more than in favor of themselves. They were disinclined to judge any trial as "worse than usual," and this disinclination was stronger when judging as witness than when judging as performer. This results in a combination of altruism and optimism which, if found to be a common occurrence, would seem to have interesting implications. Further investigation will perhaps show that these attitudes are conditioned, under different circumstances, by a variety of factors, such as competition, education, motive, age or sex of performer and witness, and perhaps by individual differences of a temperamental sort.
When Cattell had scientific men arrange their colleagues and themselves on the basis of scientific merit, he found no constant tendency either to overestimate or to underestimate oneself. He remarks, concerning this result: "It thus appears that there is no constant error in judging ourselves—we are about as likely to overestimate as to underestimate ourselves, and we can judge ourselves slightly more accurately than we are likely to be judged by one of our colleagues. We can only know ourselves from the reflected opinion of others, but it seems that we are able to estimate these more correctly than can those who are less interested. There are, however, wide individual differences; several observers overestimate themselves decidedly, while others underestimate themselves to an equal degree."[11]
Since these individual differences, in all the investigations that have been reported, are so conspicuous, we may next inquire whether the individual who possesses a given trait in high degree is a better or worse judge of that trait in himself and in others, than is a person in whom the trait itself is less marked.
III. Is one who possesses a given trait in high degree a better or worse judge of that trait than is an individual in whom the trait is less conspicuous? On the basis of the combined judgments of the group we have secured a final position for each individual, which indicates her most probable standing in the various traits. Since each individual judged all the others of the group, we can, by correlating[12] the judgments of each individual with the combined judgments of the group, secure a coefficient of correlation which will indicate the "judicial capacity" of the given individual. This figure will be a measure of the correctness or representative character of her judgments of her friends. If the figure is low, it will mean that her own judgments do not agree closely with the combined or true judgments. If the figure is high it will indicate that there is close correspondence, and that the individual's judgments of her friends agree closely with the combined judgment. Having secured these measures of judicial capacity, and having also measures of the degree to which each individual possesses the various traits, we may by correlating these two measures determine whether or not any relation exists between possession of the trait and ability to judge others with respect to that trait. In the same way we may determine the relation between possession of the trait and ability to judge oneself in that trait. The table on page 160 gives these coefficients of correlation in the case of all the traits.