| PAGE | |
| [CHAPTER I] | |
At the outbreak of war in Germany—The German "world-politicians"(Weltpolitiker)—German and English mentality—The"place in the sun"—England's declarationof war—German methods in Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine—Prussianarrogance—Militaristic journalism | [17] |
| [CHAPTER II] | |
To Constantinople—Pro-Turkish considerations—The dilemmaof a Gallipoli correspondent—Under German militarycontrol | [35] |
| [CHAPTER III] | |
The great Armenian persecutions—The system of Talaat andEnver—A denunciation of Germany as a cowardly andconscienceless accomplice | [42] |
| [CHAPTER IV] | |
The tide of war—Enver's offensive for the "liberation of theCaucasus"—The Dardanelles Campaign; the fate of Constantinopletwice hangs in the balance—Nervous tensionin international Pera—Bulgaria's attitude—Turkish rancouragainst her former enemy—German illusions of aseparate peace with Russia—King Ferdinand's time-serving—Lackof munitions in the Dardanelles—A mysteriousdeath: a political murder?—The evacuation ofGallipoli—The Turkish version of victory—Constantinopleunreleased—Kut-el-Amara—Propaganda for the "HolyWar"—A prisoner of repute—Loyalty of Anglo-Indianofficers—Turkish communiqués and their worth—The fallof Erzerum—Official lies—The treatment of prisoners—Politicalspeculation with prisoners of war—Treatmentof enemy subjects—Stagnation and lassitude in the summerof 1916—The Greeks in Turkey—Dread of Greekmassacres—Rumania's entry—Terrible disappointment—Thethree phases of the war for Turkey | [75] |
| [CHAPTER V] | |
The economic situation—Exaggerated Entente hopes—Hungerand suffering among the civil population—The system ofrequisitioning and the semi-official monopolists—Profiteeringon the part of the Government clique—Frivolity andcynicism—The "Djemiet"—The delegates of the GermanZentraleinkaufsgesellschaft (Central Purchases Commission)—Ahard battle between German and Turkish intrigue—Reformof the coinage—Paper money and its depreciation—Thehoarding of bullion—The Russian roublethe best investment | [107] |
| [CHAPTER VI] | |
German propaganda and ethics—The unsuccessful "HolyWar" and the German Government—"The Holy War"a crime against civilisation, a chimera, a farce—Underhanddealings—The German Embassy the dupe of adventurers—Themorality of German Press representatives—Atrusty servant of the German Embassy—Fine officialdistinctions of morality—The German conception of therights of individuals | [126] |
| [CHAPTER VII] | |
Young Turkish nationalism—One-sided abolition of capitulations—Anti-foreign efforts at emancipation—Abolition offoreign languages—German simplicity—The Turkificationof commercial life—Unmistakable intellectual improvementas a result of the war—Trade policy and customstariff—National production—The founding of new businessesin Turkey—Germany supplanted—German starvation—Capitulationsor full European control?—Thecolonisation and forcible Turkification of Anatolia—"Theproperties of people who have been dispatched elsewhere"—The"Mohadjirs"—Greek persecutions just before theGreat War—The "discovery" of Anatolia, the nucleus ofthe Ottoman Empire—Turkey finds herself at last—Anatoliandirt and decay—The "Greater Turkey" and thepurely Turkish Turkey—Cleavage or concentration? | [151] |
| [CHAPTER VIII] | |
Religion and race—The Islam policy of Abdul-Hamid and ofthe Young Turks—Turanism and Pan-Islamism as politicalprinciples—Turanism and the Quadruple Alliance—Greedand race-fanaticism—Religious traditions andmodern reforms—Reform in the law—A modern Sheikh-ul-Islam—Reformand nationalization—The Armenianand Greek Patriarchates—The failure of Pan-Islamism—Thealienation of the Arabs—Djemal Pasha's "hangman'spolicy" in Syria—Djemal as a "Pro-French"—Djemaland Enver—Djemal and Germany—His true character—Theattempts against the Suez Canal—Djemal's murderouswork nears completion—The great Arabian andSyrian Separatist movement—The defection of the Emirof Mecca and the great Arabian catastrophe | [176] |
| [CHAPTER IX] | |
Anti-war and pro-Entente feelings among the Turks—Turkishpessimism about the war—How would Abdul-Hamid haveacted?—A war of prevention against Russia—Russia anda neutral Turkey—The agreement about the Dardanelles—Apeaceful solution scorned—Alleged criminal intentionson the part of the Entente; the example of Greeceand Salonika—To be or not to be?—German influence—Turkeystakes on the wrong card—The results | [209] |
| [CHAPTER X] | |
The outlook for the future—The consequences of trustingGermany—The Entente's death sentence on Turkey—Thesocial necessity for this deliverance—Anatolia, thenew Turkey after the war; forecasts about the Turkishrace—The Turkish element in the lost territory—Russiaand Constantinople; international guarantees—Germany,at peace, benefits too—Farewell to the German "WorldPoliticians"—German interests in a victorious and in adefeated Turkey—The German-Turkish treaty—A paradiseon earth—The Russian commercial impulse—Thenew Armenia—Western Anatolia, the old Greek centre ofcivilisation—Great Arabia and Syria—The reconciliationof Germany | [258] |
| Appendix | [283] |
TWO WAR YEARS IN CONSTANTINOPLE
At the outbreak of war in Germany—The German "world-politicians" (Weltpolitiker)—German and English mentality—The "place in the sun"—England's declaration of war—German methods in Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine—Prussian arrogance—Militaristic journalism.
Anyone who, like myself, set foot on German soil for the first time after years of sojourn in foreign lands, and more particularly in the colonies, just at the moment that Germany was mobilising for the great European war, must surely have been filled, as I was, with a certain feeling of melancholy, a slight uneasiness with regard to the state of mind of his fellow-countrymen as it showed itself in these dramatic days of August in conversations in the street, in cafés and restaurants, and in the articles appearing in the Press. We Germans have never learnt to think soundly on political subjects. Bismarck's political heritage, although set forth in most popular form in his Thoughts and Recollections, a book that anyone opposing this war from the point of view rather of prudence than of ethics might utilise as an unending source of propaganda, has not descended to our rulers in any sort of living form. But an unbounded political naïveté, an incredible lack of judgment and of understanding of the point of view of other peoples, who have their raison d'être just as much as we have, their vital interests, their standpoint of honour—have not prevented us from trying to carry on a grand system of Weltpolitik (world politics). The average everyday German has never really understood the English—either before or during the war; in the latter's colonial policy, which, according to pan-German ideas, has no other aim than to snatch from us our "place in the sun"; in their conception of liberty and civilisation, which has entailed such mighty sacrifices for them on behalf of their Allies; when we trod Belgian neutrality underfoot and thought England would stand and look on; at the time of the debates about universal service, when practically every German, even in the highest political circles, was ready to wager that there would be a revolution in England sooner than any general acceptance of Conscription; and coming down to more recent events, when the latest huge British war loan provided the only fit and proper answer to German frightfulness at sea.
Let me here say a word on the subject of colonial policy, on which I may perhaps be allowed to speak with a certain amount of authority after extended travel in the farthest corners of Africa, and from an intimate, personal knowledge of German as well as English and French colonies. Germany has less colonial territory than the older colonists, it is true. It is also true that the German struggle for the most widespread, the most intensive and lucrative employment of the energies and capabilities of our highly developed commercial land is justified. But at the risk of being dubbed as absolutely lacking in patriotism, I should like to point out that in the first place the resources we had at our disposal in our own colonial territory in tropical and sub-tropical Africa, little exploited as they then were, would have amply sufficed for our commercial needs and colonising capacities—though possibly not for our aspirations after world power! And secondly, the very liberal character of England's trade and colonial policy did not hinder us in any way from reaching the top of the commercial tree even in foreign colonies.
Anyone who knows English colonies knows that the British Government, wherever it has been possible to do so politically, that is, in all her colonies which are already properly organised and firmly established as British, has always met in a most generous and sympathetic way German, and indeed any foreign, trade or other enterprises. New firms, with German capital, were received with open arms, their excellence and value for the young country heartily recognised and ungrudgingly encouraged; not the slightest shadow of any jealousy of foreign undertakings could ever exist in a British colony, and every German could be as sure as an Englishman himself of being justly treated in every way and encouraged in the most generous fashion in his work.