[785] “De servo arbitrio,” p. 786 = 366.
[786] “De servo arbitrio,” p. 670 = 199.
[787] Ibid., p. 635 = 157.
[788] “Sic humana voluntas in medio posita est, ceu iumentum. Si insederit Deus, vult et vadit quo vult Deus, ut psalmus (lxxiii. [lxxii.], 22) dicit: Factus sum sicut iumentum, et ego semper tecum. Si insederit Satan, vult et vadit quo vult Satan. Nec est in eius arbitrio ad utrum sessorem currere aut eum quærere, sed ipsi sessores certant ob ipsum obtinendum et possidendum” (p. 635 = 157). And yet it has recently been asserted by some Protestants, that, according to Luther, grace was “psychologically active,” whereas by the Schoolmen it was regarded as a “dead quality”; Luther’s “delicate psychological comprehension of God’s educational way” is at the same time extolled. N. Paulus rightly remarks (“Theol. Revue,” 1908, col. 344), “that the Schoolmen advocated a vital co-operation with grace is known to everyone who is at all acquainted with Scholasticism.” He quotes W. Köhler’s opinion of Luther’s system: Where man is impelled by God “every psychological factor must disappear.” “All actions become in the last instance something foreign to man” (“Theol. Literaturztng.,” 1903, col. 526). Paulus also refers to the following criticism by Köhler concerning the total depravity of man’s nature by the Fall, to which Luther ascribes our unfreedom: “Involuntarily we feel ourselves urged to ask, in view of this mass of sinfulness, how, given the total depravity of man, can redemption be possible unless by some gigantic, supernatural, mechanical means?” (“Ein Wort zu Denifles Luther,” 1904, p. 39).
F. Kattenbusch points out in his criticism of Luther’s doctrine of the enslaved will (“Luthers Lehre vom unfreien Willen,” p. 32 ff.) that Luther’s aim was certainly to humble and abase himself before the greatness of God’s grace, but that he went much too far; he wished to feel his salvation as the “result of God’s arbitrary act”; this sentiment was, however, not normal, nor “religiously healthy” (p. 35 f.). He also remarks (p. 10): “If according to this [the comparison with the saddle-horse] the process of regeneration is made to appear merely as a struggle between God and Satan in which God remains the victor, it is clear that the doctrine which Luther cherishes of the ethico-religious life is altogether mechanical and outward.” Kattenbusch was quite aware of the influence of the mediæval schools on Luther. The after-effects of Nominalism, he says, are not, indeed, so very prominent in the Reformer, “yet it seems to me we must admit, that alongside the principal religious current in Luther, runs a side-stream of religious feeling which can only spring from Nominalism and Mysticism.... In so far as they influence Luther’s doctrines, the latter may be said to spring from a polluted source. And, as regards the doctrine of the ‘servum arbitrium’ and of Predestination, the Church which takes its name from Luther has assuredly done well in improving upon the paths traced out for her by the great Reformer” (p. 94 f.). Cp. Albert Ritschl’s criticism of Luther’s denial of free-will, “Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung,” 34, pp. 280, 296 ff.
[789] P. 779 = 356: “Dum liberum arbitrium statuis, Christum evacuas.”
[790] Ibid.: “De libero arbitrio nihil dicere poteris, nisi quæ contraria sunt Christo, scilicet quod error, mors, Satan et omnia mala in ipso regnent.”
[791] Ibid., p. 625 = 143.
[792] Ibid.
[793] Ibid., p. 625 = 144.