[346] “N. Lehrb. der Moral,” Göttingen, 1825, p. 354. Sodeur (“Luther und die Lüge”) says that in his teaching on lies Luther led the way to “a more profound understanding of the problem” (p. 2), he taught us “to act according to simple and fundamental principles”; “under certain conditions” it became “a duty to tell untruths, not merely on casuistic grounds as formerly [!], but on principle; Luther harked back to the all embracing duty of charity which constitutes the moral life of the Christian” (p. 30); he desired “falsehood to be used only to the advantage of our neighbour,” “referring our conduct in every instance to the underlying principle of charity” (p. 32 f.). Chr. Rogge, another Protestant, says of all this (“Türmer,” Jan., 1906, p. 491): “I wish Sodeur had adopted a more decided and less apologetic attitude.”
W. Walther, in the article quoted above (p. 81, n. 1), admits that Luther taught “in the clearest possible manner that cases might occur where a departure from truth became the Christian’s duty.... It is probable that many Evangelicals will strongly repudiate this thesis, but, in our opinion, almost everybody follows it in practice”; if charity led to untruth then the latter was no evil act, and it could not be said that Luther accepted the principle that the end justifies the means. It was not necessary for Walther, having made Luther’s views on lying his own, to assure us, “that they were not shared by every Christian, not even by every Evangelical.” As regards the end justifying the means, Walther should prove that the principle does not really underlie much of what Luther says (cp. also above, p. 94 f.). Cp. what A. Baur says, with praiseworthy frankness, in a work entitled “Johann Calvin” (“Religionsgeschichtl. Volksb.,” Reihe 4, Hft. 9), p. 29, concerning the reformer of Geneva whom he extols: “Consciously, or unconsciously, the principle that the end justifies the means became necessarily more and more deeply rooted in Calvin’s mind, viz. the principle that the holy purpose willed by God justifies the use of means—the employment of which would otherwise appear altogether repugnant and reprehensible to a refined moral sense—at least when no other way presents itself for the attainment of the end. To renounce the end on account of the means appeared to Calvin a betrayal of God’s honour and cause.” And yet it is clear that only a theory which “transcends good and evil” can approve the principle that the end justifies the means.
We may add that, according to Walther (“Die Sittlichkeit nach Luther,” 1909, p. 11 f.), Luther, in view of the exalted end towards which the means he used were directed, “gradually resolved” to set the law of charity above that of truth; he did not, however, do this in his practical writings, fearing its abuse; yet Luther still contends that Abraham was permitted to tell an untruth in order “to prevent the frustration of God’s Will,” i.e. from love of God (ibid., p. 13).
[347] “Opp. lat. exeg.,” 6, p. 289.
[348] “Opp. lat. exeg.,” 3, pp. 139-144.
[349] To Johann Lang, Aug. 18, 1520, above, p. 95, n. 3.
[350] See vol. ii., p. 384 ff.
[351] “Corp. ref.,” 20, p. 573.
[352] The document in “Corp. ref.,” 3, p. 578.
[353] “Die Stellung Kursachsens und des Landgrafen Philipp von Hessen zur Täuferbewegung,” Münster, 1910, p. 75.