The Saxon lawyer, Matthias Coler (†1587), taught in his “Decisiones Germaniæ,” that, according to the laws of Saxony those were to be punished by death at the stake (“de iure saxonico cremandi veniunt”) who openly denied either the Divinity of Christ, or other important truths of faith; before being burnt they were, however, to be questioned under torture concerning their confederates in order that the land might be purged of such wicked men.[901]
In thus interfering the sovereigns were well aware that they had the warm official approval of Luther and his fellows. To this, for instance, the Elector Johann Frederick appealed in 1533 when milder measures were suggested. He referred to the memorandum which his father had obtained from the Wittenberg theologians and lawyers concerning the execution of the Anabaptists; their decision had been, “that His Highness might with a good conscience cause those charged with Anabaptism to be punished by death,” and, soon after, several of them were executed.[902] The person who had thought otherwise, and to whom this vindication was accordingly addressed, was no less a man than Landgrave Philip of Hesse.
Luther himself, too, had been obliged on various occasions to justify the severity of his opinions.
Luther’s Self-justification and Excuses
Philip of Hesse, though he treated Catholics with the utmost intolerance, refused to hear of punishing the Anabaptists with death unless indeed they were the cause of public disturbances. “We cannot find it in our conscience to put anyone to death by the sword on account of religion unless we have sufficient proof of other crimes as well.” Such was the declaration he made in 1532 to Elector Johann of Saxony, and which he emphasised in 1545 to the latter’s successor: “Were all those to be executed who are not of our faith what then should we do to the Papists, to say nothing of the Jews, who err even more greatly than the Anabaptists?”[903]
Luther was apparently far surer of his case. He is as confident, subsequent to 1530, in drawing from Scripture the principles for the treatment of the heretics as he is in defending them against the obvious objections so often brought against them.
Luther had it that the line of action for which he stood was not coercion to any definite religious practices. “Our Princes,” so he sought to reassure himself as early as 1525, “do not force people to the faith and to the Evangel but merely set a term to outward abominations.”[904]
The Elector, as was to be expected, expressed himself likewise: “Though it is not our intention to prescribe to anyone what he must hold or believe, yet, in order to guard against harmful uprisings and other disorders, we refuse to recognise or permit any sects or schisms within our Princedom.”[905]
Many a one amongst the new Doctors had begun, as a Protestant historian of Saxony points out,[906] “to claim for his conscience the same right” (as Luther), while “following other paths than Luther had trodden” (in his search after God). May not, indeed, must not, such a one, so ran the objection, follow his conscience, seeing that Luther himself tells us to consult our conscience? Yes, he may, is Luther’s reply, but, if he be truthful, then he will admit my plain interpretation of the Bible as the right one, for “I have floored and overcome all my foes on the sure groundwork of Holy Scripture.”[907]
Moreover, might not the Princes holding Popish views seize on the coercion taught by the Lutherans as a pretext for similar measures against the Lutherans in their territories?