We were both exceedingly fatigued with our exertions, and were glad to get a night’s rest at our quarters at San Augustin. Shortly after our return Captain Lee and Lieutenant Tower came in.
Captain Lee had made the most extraordinary exertions, having been on foot for two days and a night without a moment’s rest. It was almost the only instance in this war I have seen him fatigued. His services were of the most important character, not second to those of any individual in this army. Lieutenant Tower, in his night reconnoissance and subsequent services in leading Riley’s brigade against Valencia’s intrenched camp, exhibited great resolution and high military qualities.
It seemed to be conceded by the whole army that the engineers in these important operations had done their duty, and that every individual officer had shown a readiness to participate in the perils incident to their service. In truth, the whole army, officers and men, were gallant, and in several instances exhibited all the terrible energy of the Anglo-Saxon race.
The night attack by Smith, and the storming of the works at Churubusco by Worth and Twiggs, are unsurpassed in war. The former was a rare combination of science and force, the latter an instance of desperate valor.
I slept little that night. The picture was mingled sunshine and clouds. The mangled forms of Capron, Burke, Johnston, and others whom I personally knew and respected, I could not keep from my mind. The experience of war is saddening. The terrible scenes of the battlefield cannot be effaced from the memory. We realize the observation of Franklin, “I scarcely ever knew a good war or a bad peace.”
Lieutenant Stevens gained great reputation, both at headquarters and in the army generally, by the part he took in these brilliant operations. His reconnoissance of El Peñon was considered one of the most daring and complete of the war, and, as he modestly remarks, “General Scott was very much pleased with my reconnoissance, and I got more credit for it than I deserved.” General William H. French (commander of the third corps, Army of the Potomac, in 1863) writes of this reconnoissance, in which he participated as one of the covering party: “It brought Lieutenant Stevens conspicuously before the army. That night the reports of the different officers of engineers were made to the general-in-chief in person; that of Lieutenant Stevens was so full and clear, it in a great measure decided General Scott to take the route around Lake Chalco, and attack the City of Mexico in reverse. From this time the general-in-chief recognized his ability and talents.”
His exertions at El Peñon overtasked his strength, however, and in consequence he was obliged to ride for three days in an ambulance on the march around Lake Chalco as far as Rochimilco.
In the movement on the intrenched camp at Contreras, Lieutenant Stevens, advancing with the skirmishers to reconnoitre the position, saw at once that the decisive movement would be to turn the enemy’s left, and seize the road between the camp and the city, thus isolating the former and cutting it off from reinforcements. Hastening to General Twiggs, he urged this movement upon that officer in his earnest and forcible manner, saying, “The true point of attack is the enemy’s left. Attack his left, you cut him off from his reserves, and hurl him into the gorges of the mountains.” The movement was at once decided upon. Riley’s brigade was directed to the right (enemy’s left) over the pedregal, followed by Cadwallader, and later by Shields and Smith; San Geronimo was seized, and the dashing victory of Contreras was the result. Lieutenant Stevens was the first to see and urge this decisive movement, and his advice was immediately adopted by the veteran Twiggs.
The terrific conflict of Churubusco, which followed hard on Contreras, was brought on, or perhaps it may be said precipitated, by Lieutenant Stevens. From the church steeple in Coyoacan he discovered the enemy in full retreat down the San Antonio causeway, and on his report to that effect, General Scott at once ordered Twiggs forward, and Lieutenant Stevens to accompany him as his senior engineer officer. Leading the division with the engineer company, he discovered the fortified church, or convent, barring the road; the company became engaged, and, the action having thus commenced, General Twiggs adopted almost implicitly the suggestions of the ardent young officer, and gave free rein to his efforts “to make a bold and quick matter of it.” Lieutenant Stevens personally led and placed in position Taylor’s battery, the 1st artillery (infantry), and other troops, greatly exposing himself during the action. The position, however, proved much stronger than was expected, a strong earthwork and breastwork being screened and partially concealed by tall, waving corn, which covered the fields in front, and cost the bloody and protracted fight before it fell. Lieutenant Stevens did not altogether escape criticism for putting the battery where it was so badly cut up; indeed, seems to have reproached himself; but his superiors, the veteran Twiggs and Scott, found no fault, knowing full well that great boldness and exertion are the price of great achievements in war. General H.J. Hunt relates that, after entering the city, a party of wounded officers were talking over matters, and Lieutenant Stevens reproached himself for having too severely criticised Magruder at Contreras, and remarked: “The very next day at Churubusco I did worse myself, acting on my judgment and eyesight, which deceived me, for I had not a knowledge of all the facts bearing on the situation. It was therefore my fault that Taylor’s battery was knocked to pieces.”
“Here, again,” remarks General Hunt, “is his characteristic frankness and honesty, and sense of justice to others, breaking out, and carrying him further than was necessary, and into doing injustice to himself.”