The attack had simply for its object the destruction of the foundry (which did not exist; at least, no boring apparatus or furnaces could be found), and the position was finally abandoned. The battle was entirely without results; two or three additional victories of the same kind would annihilate our army. It has filled all hearts with sadness. Colonel Scott, Captain Merrill, Captain Ayres, Captain Armstrong, and others have fallen. Among those most lamented is the gallant Colonel Graham, who fell gallantly leading the 11th regiment to the charge. Lieutenant Burwell, wounded in the assault, was barbarously murdered by the enemy by a lance in the head.
Duncan’s efficiency was diminished in consequence of the precipitate charge of Clarke’s brigade on the Casa Mata, masking his fire. A well-directed fire of round-shot from his battery would have driven the enemy from that strong position, and thus saved us many valuable lives sacrificed in taking it by the bayonet. There was great difficulty in reconnoitring the position without bringing on a general action. More guns should have been brought into action. It was more a case for artillery than for the bayonet. An attempt should have been made to reconnoitre the enemy’s right, with a view of sending round a column and taking his line in flank and rear.
The loss to Worth’s division was greater in this action than the English loss at the assault of Badajos.
On the 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th, in consequence of the occupation of the church of Piedad by our troops, and the pushing of the reconnoissances in that direction, the enemy was exceedingly active in fortifying that front of the city from the gate of Belen to that of Las Vegas, and even prepared cuts in the road leading to Istacalco on the canal. On the 10th they had a very respectable battery in position, and were in expectation that the attack would be made in that direction.
CHAPULTEPEC.
At a council of war at La Piedad on the 11th, it was determined to establish batteries against Chapultepec, and carry it by assault, then to operate against the city as circumstances should dictate. This was General Scott’s proposition, and was concurred in generally by the officers present at the council. Accordingly, on the night of the 11th–12th batteries were commenced, one for two 18-pounders and one 8-inch howitzer on the road leading to Chapultepec, and one for one 24-pounder and one 8-inch howitzer near the foundry. These batteries opened their fire about eight A.M. on the 12th, Quitman’s division supporting on the right, Pillow’s on the left. About 2.30 P.M. a third battery, one 18-pounder, one 8-inch howitzer, and one mortar, was prepared also near the foundry.
The fire was returned with some spirit, and about eight A.M. on the 13th the order was given to commence the assault.
Chapultepec stands boldly out two miles from the City of Mexico, an eminence two hundred feet high, having on its summit an irregular work with a stone scarp ten feet high, the whole defended by the strong stone building used as a military college.
At the southwestern foot of the height is the venerable cypress grove of the age of Montezuma, extending to within four hundred yards of the mill whence Pillow was to direct the assault of his command. At its eastern base was a formidable battery sweeping the causeway of approach in the direction of Quitman’s command, the aqueduct and stone buildings affording cover to troops.
It was known, from a daring reconnoissance made by General Quitman on the afternoon of the 12th, that the enemy were in the occupancy of this base of Chapultepec, five thousand strong.