Thus the crowning glories of Chapultepec and of the gates of San Cosme and Belen placed us in the undisputed possession of the City and valley of Mexico. The public force of the enemy, dispirited and demoralized, paused two or three days at Guadalupe and divided: Santa Anna with a portion repairing to Puebla to try his fortunes against Childs, the governor of that place, and to watch his opportunity to fall upon our reinforcements coming up from Vera Cruz; the remainder, a disorderly rabble, repairing to Queretaro, where the government was to be temporarily established.
The casualties to the American arms in this valley have been immense,—2703 out of a force of 10,737, over one fourth, equal to the English loss at the siege of Badajos.
General Scott’s movement against Chapultepec was masterly, and in his plans he was well seconded by his generals. The removal of the depot to Mixcoac, the concentration of the troops at La Piedad, and the reconnoissances in that direction, impressed the enemy with the belief that that point of the city was to be attacked; nor were they undeceived till the very last moment, fully believing that the operations against Chapultepec were only a feint.
In the attack upon Chapultepec General Quitman’s arrangements are open to criticism. His select storming party intended for the assault of Chapultepec, and armed with ladders to scale and implements to break through the walls, were kept on the causeway; whereas the whole volunteer force was sent in that direction, wholly unprovided in every particular, and that, too, at too late a period to be of much essential assistance, and in a direction which made it necessary to fall in with Pillow’s command, already supported in great strength by the whole of Worth’s division. The consequence was that General Smith found himself too weak to break through the enemy’s force at the aqueduct and take him in flank and rear. Had Smith been preceded by the storming party provided with plank to cross the ditches, and supported by two of the volunteer regiments, the slaughter of the enemy must have been immense, and large numbers must have been taken prisoners. The marines with their storming party, the light battalion, and one of the volunteer regiments with Drum’s battery would have been in place to encounter the enemy on the causeway.
At the garita Drum’s battery and the Palmettoes were pushed forward under the guns of the citadel, and large numbers were uselessly sacrificed.
On the whole, however, General Quitman exercised good judgment, and gave proof of extraordinary vigor, intrepidity, and firmness. And he deserves the greatest credit for his perfect mastery of his command.
General Pillow’s dispositions were good and well executed, excepting that the storming party did not move in season, in consequence of which the supporting force, pressing onward, gained the brow of the hill in dense masses, and were there detained some little time awaiting the storming party with their ladders, who in their turn found great difficulty in pushing their way through to the front, which only a small portion succeeded perfectly in doing.
General Worth, in his attack upon the city, unnecessarily delayed his advance to succor Quitman. Quitman was to be most effectually relieved by the vigorous attack of Worth on his own line. On the arrival of the trains, however, he proceeded with great judgment and efficiency, and his attack alone, in consequence of being able to work from house to house, must have of itself put the city into our hands. Had it not been for Worth’s vigorous movement towards nightfall, bringing him well into the city, the enemy would not have abandoned the citadel to Quitman without a severe struggle. Twiggs’s command did not have the prominence as a division that it had at Contreras and Churubusco in consequence of the brigades being separated. Smith’s brigade did good service in conjunction with Quitman, and Riley at La Piedad kept the enemy in check during the storming of Chapultepec, and, afterwards joining Worth, did good service in the streets on the 14th.
The engineers did good service during all their operations at Molino del Rey. Captain Mason made a most daring and successful examination of the front of the enemy’s position, and in the attack on the 8th was signally gallant, but the result showed that the right of the enemy should have been more particularly examined. The character of his defenses at this point was never known till our troops, in the full tide of battle, were hurled against them, to be repulsed with the loss of nearly half their number.
Without shining talents, and without any remarkable decision or independence of character, Captain Lee has rendered signal service on this line. Laborious, constant, firm, of good judgment, patient, and guarded in his conduct, of popular manners and address, he has been a safe counselor, and always efficient in the discharge of duty. Distinguished at Vera Cruz, the Cerro Gordo, and in this valley, both before and subsequent to the armistice, he continued at his post to the last moment, even when oppressed with illness and great physical fatigue. After the storm of Chapultepec he received a severe contusion in the thigh, which disabled him for the day.