In the latter part of February General Stevens sent Captain Ralph Ely, of the 8th Michigan, with four officers and twenty-two men, in boats on a reconnoissance up the Combahee River. Captain Ely performed this duty with skill and success, was gone three days, and went entirely around some of the enemy’s posts without revealing his presence to them.
With the thorough knowledge of the enemy’s defenses he had so carefully gained, General Stevens conceived the plan of moving suddenly by land and water upon the railroad, breaking it up irremediably by destroying every bridge for thirty miles, thus cutting the communication between the cities and threatening both, and then rapidly to countermarch the whole force to the ferry, Beaufort, or Broad River, embark on transports, and, reinforced by every available man of Sherman’s command, to strike for Charleston by the inner waterways of the North Edisto, Wadmalaw, and Stono, thus completely turning the heavy harbor and sea defenses which protected the city against a front attack.
He worked out the details of this movement against the railroad with great pains, knowing that he would have it to execute. He counted largely upon the flotilla of launches and flatboats, by means of which he would be enabled to throw strong forces up the rivers, and cut off and isolate every position and bridge in turn. Port Royal Ferry had demonstrated the practicability of thus moving troops by water, and had given them the idea. He had plenty of flats, great numbers of negroes trained to the oar, and there was no lack of good boatmen among the soldiers.
The largest part of the attacking force was to be thrown directly on the railroad, moving simultaneously in two columns, one overland from Port Royal Ferry via Garden’s Corners, the other ascending Broad and Pocotaligo rivers in flatboats, supported by naval launches and light-draught gunboats. Strong detachments were boldly to press the enemy’s posts on the Coosawhatchie and Tulifiny, and be ready to join in the attack upon them later by the main force. A picked detachment was to ascend the Combahee in boats, carry the enemy’s posts on that river and on the Ashepoo, and destroy the railroad bridges, and then, proceeding along the railroad, join and coöperate with the main column in destroying the bridge over the Pocotaligo, when the united force were to press southward down the railroad towards Savannah, sweeping everything clear beyond the Coosawhatchie, and leaving the railroad in smoking ruins for thirty miles.
In connection with the siege of Pulaski, General Sherman desired to operate against Savannah. He complained that a combined movement in force upon that city planned by him in January was balked by the refusal of the navy to coöperate. Later, he was ordered by McClellan to abandon the design. Naturally impatient of delay, and anxious to achieve some success, he was ripe for new undertakings. As the fall of Pulaski was evidently impending, General Stevens unfolded his plan to General Sherman, and the two officers, in several long and confidential conferences, discussed it fully. General Sherman decided to adopt and carry it out as soon as the fall of Pulaski should free his whole force for the operation. Commodore Dupont also heartily entered into the plan, and was ready to give it all requisite naval support. Moreover, he proposed making a strong naval demonstration on Bull Bay, north of Charleston, in order still further to distract the enemy at the critical time.
The objective point to be seized as the key to Charleston—the turning-point of the campaign—was known as Church Flats, situated on the stream extending from the Wadmalaw to the Stono River. From this point a good road led to Charleston, fourteen miles distant. The gunboats could approach within two miles of it. The movement of Sherman’s entire force was to be so combined and timed that every effective man—Wright from Florida, Viele from Pulaski, Williams from Hilton Head, and Stevens’s flying column fresh from their attack on the railroad, leaving ruined bridges and a beaten, disconcerted enemy behind it—was to be transported by water and thrown upon Church Flats. True, the point was fortified and garrisoned, but the navy would cover the landing, and afford support in case of repulse. A successful dash might take Charleston at a blow. Or, if a foothold only were gained, the army could force its way by the Stono, turn all the defenses on James Island and the harbor, and reduce or destroy the city from the banks of the Ashley. This movement was taking the enemy by the throat. The subsequent attacks on the sea front were taking the bull by the horns, and met the usual fate of that performance.
Fort Pulaski fell April 11. With due allowance for preparation and delays, the railroad should have been destroyed and our army in possession of Church Flats by May 1. What means of defense had the enemy at this juncture? Lee had been sent to Virginia, and during the six weeks succeeding his departure Pemberton was stripped of regiment after regiment, dispatched to Richmond or to Corinth. About April 20 he withdrew all troops except the cavalry between the Ashepoo and Oketie for the defense of the two cities. “This,” he reports, “will leave the line of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad with no other protection than what the cavalry companies can afford, which is altogether insufficient.” At this time also he moved his headquarters from Pocotaligo to Charleston, and abandoned the defenses of Georgetown north of Charleston, removing the guns therefrom for the protection of the latter.
Only four thousand men, under Colonel P.H. Colquitt, 46th Georgia, guarded the long and exposed line south of the Ashepoo clear to Savannah. Colquitt’s headquarters, with his own regiment and two field batteries, were at Pocotaligo; the remainder of his force was scattered along the road.
There were no obstructions yet planted in the Stono, except possibly at Church Flats, where, as late as April 29, Pemberton orders Evans, “Sink the obstructions at Church Flats immediately.” The line of defenses across James Island was not commenced. The guns with which it was afterwards armed were in the exposed, advanced batteries on Cole and Battery islands, and must have been abandoned there.
The returns of Pemberton’s forces for May 11, 1862, give the effective force in his department:—