General Stevens states in a letter to General Hunter, written on July 8, soon after the battle:—
“I then proceeded to state with all possible emphasis my objections to this morning attack. I urged that it should be deferred to a much later period in the day; that we should first shake the morale of the garrison, and endeavor to weaken its defenses by a continuous fire of the battery and of our gunboats; that in the mean time we should carefully survey the ground and prepare our troops, and make the attack when the battery and gunboats had had the desired effect. I closed by saying that under such circumstances I could do more with two thousand men than I could with three thousand men in the way he proposed. General Wright, moreover, warned General Benham that his orders were in fact orders to fight a battle. In this General Williams and myself in express terms concurred. General Benham, however, overruled all our objections, and premptorily ordered the attack to be made.
“I assured him, as did the other gentlemen, that he should rely upon my promptitude and activity in obeying his orders, but I considered myself as obeying orders to which I had expressed the strongest possible objections, and I therefore determined there should not be the least want of energy or promptitude on my part.”
With this the conference broke up, and the officers hastened ashore to their respective commands to prepare for the arduous task of the morrow.
General Stevens at once ordered his troops to be in readiness at the advanced camps, two miles from the river, at two A.M., with sixty rounds of ammunition and twenty-four hours’ cooked rations. Captain Strahan’s company, I, 3d Rhode Island, was detailed from Wright’s division to relieve the detachment of Roundheads in the three-gun battery. Over three hundred of that regiment were out on the widely extended picket line. Ordered to assemble and join their regiment, only one hundred and thirty of the number succeeded in reaching it in time to take part in the action, and then only after it had come under fire, so scanty and inadequate was the time allowed for preparation. Two companies of the 28th Massachusetts were on fatigue duty and had to be left behind. The 7th Connecticut, moreover, had been on severe fatigue duty the three previous nights, and were much jaded.
At the hour fixed, the troops were at the appointed place. Before 3.30 A.M. the column was advanced two miles farther to the outer pickets, and was arranged in the following order:—
Lieutenant Benjamin R. Lyons, aide-de-camp, with a negro guide, led the storming party, which consisted of two companies of the 8th Michigan, commanded respectively by Captains Ralph Ely and Richard N. Doyle, followed by Captain Alfred F. Sears’s company, E, Serrell’s New York engineers.
Then followed Fenton’s first brigade, comprising the 8th Michigan, Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Graves; the 7th Connecticut, Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph R. Hawley; and the 28th Massachusetts, Lieutenant-Colonel McClellan Moore.
Then Rockwell’s battery of four guns.
Then Colonel Leasure’s second brigade, consisting of the Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel David Morrison; the Roundheads, Major David A. Lecky; and the 46th New York, Colonel Rudolph Rosa.