Positions, nine P.M., August 26, 1862.
When this blow fell, Pope had his troops well in hand: McDowell and Sigel’s corps grouped about Warrenton; the four divisions of Stevens, Reno, Kearny and Hooker near Warrenton Junction; while Porter at Bealton and Banks at Fayetteville were within an easy march of the Junction. Pope, having made up his mind that the enemy would fall upon his right, was loath to believe that he had gotten into his rear in heavy force, but he embarked a regiment on a train of cars and sent it down the road towards Bristoe that night to find out. This reconnoissance reported the enemy in force; but even yet Pope was not convinced, still clinging to his opinion that his right, the line from Warrenton to Gainesville, was most exposed to Lee’s attack. Therefore, instead of throwing upon Bristoe, at daylight the next morning, the overwhelming force he had at hand near the Junction, he sent only Hooker’s division down the railroad to brush away the supposed raiding party, moved the other three (Stevens, Reno, and Kearny) to Greenwich, and ordered McDowell and Sigel to Gainesville; the former to take command of both corps, for he was not satisfied with Sigel’s dilatoriness in marching and obeying orders.
Positions of Troops, Sunset, August 27, 1862.
Hooker encountered Ewell in front of Bristoe, and, in a sharp action in the afternoon, pushed him across Broad Run, from which, after destroying the bridge, he retreated unmolested to Manassas. As the result of Hooker’s fight, Pope now knew that Jackson with his whole corps was at Bristoe that very morning, and had just marched—his rear division was even then marching—down the railroad to Manassas. He supposed that Longstreet was far to the westward, beyond supporting distance to Jackson. Confident that the great flanker was at last within his power, he issued vigorous orders for the morrow’s movements, designed to throw his whole army upon him at Manassas and crush him. To this end he ordered Hooker to push down the railroad towards Manassas; Porter to hasten from Warrenton Junction to support Hooker, starting at one in the morning; Kearny to Bristoe; and Stevens and Reno directly on Manassas,—the three to move at daylight; McDowell to advance his whole force from Gainesville also on Manassas, with Sigel resting his right on the Manassas Gap Railroad, and McDowell’s divisions following in echelon extended on his left, so that this great force would sweep a wide scope of country,—practically the whole region between the Manassas Gap Railroad and the Warrenton pike,—and would intercept Jackson’s retreat by that thoroughfare. This plan was well plotted to overwhelm the wolf at Manassas, if the wolf would only wait there until the toils closed around him. A day, or even half a day, would suffice. But Jackson was not the man to wait anywhere long enough to give his adversary the initiative. That night and early the next morning he moved to the field of Bull Run, and took up a position admirable for defense, and from which with equal facility he could attack any force moving along the pike, or fall back westward by good roads to meet Longstreet, now rapidly approaching.
It is a high, undulating country west of Bull Run upon which on June 21, 1861, and August 28, 29, and 30, 1862, were fought the battles of Bull Run, Gainesville, and second Bull Run, or, as known to the Confederates, Bull Run, Groveton, and Manassas. Long, broad ridges stretch across the country, sloping down in successive rolls of ground to wide hollows. Open fields cover two thirds of the surface of hill and dale, alternating with tracts of woods, which clothe the remaining third. These are of oak and other deciduous trees, and are tolerably open and free from underbrush.
The Alexandria and Warrenton pike, running nearly west (west 15° south), bisects the field, and was the most important line of communication upon it. Crossing Bull Run by a stone bridge, the pike follows up the valley of a tributary, Young’s Branch, gently and gradually ascending for two miles, and then passes over several ridges and high ground on to Gainesville, five miles farther. Young’s Branch has worn a deep and narrow valley through the first ridge, a mile from the stone bridge, and to the traveler passing up the pike the abutting ends of the ridge present the appearance of quite steep and high hills. The first hill on the left, separated from the next by a hollow down which a dirt road descends, is the Henry Hill, the scene of the fiercest fighting of the first battle, where Bee and Bartow, the Southern generals, fell, and where Ricketts and his gallant battery were all but destroyed and were captured. The next hill is the Chinn House, termed in some of the reports the Bald Hill. Opposite these, and on the right or north side of the road, are Buck Hill and Rosefield or Dogan House. The tops of these hills are not peaked but flat, being simply the general level of the plateau or ridge.