Nevertheless, the fact remains that this great column of over twenty thousand troops was kept out of the ring completely. The orders given and objects to be gained were perfectly plain and simple. They were, first, to fall upon the enemy, supposed to be Jackson, and, second, to effect a junction with the right wing. McDowell and Porter did neither.
Granting that an attack was ill judged, why was not a brigade brought up and deployed athwart the railroad, and a regiment pushed through the woods northward to locate and connect with the force on the pike, whose artillery was distinctly heard? Traversing only three quarters of a mile of intervening woods, such a column would have reached open fields, and come in sight of Reynolds’s troops. But, more surprising still, why was no one sent up the roads which fork both from the road and railroad only half a mile back of the head of Porter’s column, traverse the woods in a northerly direction, and lead to Groveton? A staff officer sent up this road would have come in sight of Reynolds’s skirmishers in a ride of only a mile.
Unable longer to control his impatience, General Pope began about four P.M. sending peremptory orders to attack, first to one command, then to another, as he could get hold of them, accompanying the orders with assurances that the enemy was being driven by some other command, and that Porter was about to fall, or was falling, on his flank and rear, and using him up.
The first victim of this plan of beating a corps in strong position by attacking it with a brigade at a time was General Cuvier Grover’s brigade, first of Hooker’s division, comprising five regiments,—1st, 11th, and 16th Massachusetts, 2d New Hampshire, and 26th Pennsylvania,—which was already supporting Schurz. With muskets loaded and bayonets fixed, ordered to close on the enemy, fire one volley, and charge with the bayonet, they struck him where the railroad emerged from the woods and crossed the hollow on an embankment, broke the first line, carried the embankment, swept eighty yards beyond it and broke a second line, only to be forced back by overpowering numbers, with a loss of four hundred and eighty-six, for this gallant charge was entirely unsupported. Reports General Grover:—
“We rapidly and firmly pressed upon the embankment, and here occurred a short, sharp, and obstinate hand-to-hand conflict with bayonets and clubbed muskets. Many of the enemy were bayoneted in their tracks, others struck down with the butts of pieces, and onward pressed our line. In a few yards more it met a terrible fire from a second line, which in its turn broke. The enemy’s third line now bore down upon our thinned ranks in close order, and swept back the right centre and a portion of the left. With the gallant 16th Massachusetts on our left I tried to turn his flank, but the breaking of our right and centre and the weight of the enemy’s lines caused the necessity of falling back, first to the embankment and then to our first position, behind which we rallied to our colors.”
One is not surprised to find the following in the report of Colonel William Blaisdell, 11th Massachusetts:—
“I was greatly amazed to find that the regiment had been sent to engage a force of more than five times its numbers, strongly posted in thick woods and behind heavy embankments, and not a soldier to support it in case of disaster.”
Hooker’s third brigade, under Colonel Joseph B. Carr, earlier in the day had relieved part of Schurz’s troops, and after, as he reports, fighting two hours and expending most of his ammunition, was in turn relieved by the second brigade, under General Nelson Taylor. When Grover was driven back, Taylor’s left regiment was broken by the rush of fugitives; the enemy poured through the gap, giving an enfilade and reverse fire, and taking many prisoners, among them General Taylor’s aides, Lieutenants Tremain and Dwight.
“Finding my line,” says Taylor, “completely flanked and turned, and in danger of being entirely cut off, I gave the order to fall back, which was done in as good order as could be, situated as we were. The loss on this occasion was not as large as I had reason to apprehend, yet it was considerable.”
Scarce had these broken troops emerged from the woods and reformed in the open ground in rear, when General Reno led up his first brigade, under Colonel James Nagle, to a second attack on the same position from which Grover had been repulsed. This consisted of only three regiments,—48th Pennsylvania, 6th New Hampshire, and 2d Maryland. This also was a gallant and determined assault. Again the enemy was forced back from the railroad, but again his rear lines rushed forward, flanked Nagle on the left, and drove him back with a loss of five hundred and thirty-one.