At length at noon Pope issued an order, the most astonishing in its fatuity ever given on a battlefield:—
Headquarters near Groveton, August 30, 1862, 12 M.
Special Orders, No. —. The following forces will be immediately thrown forward and in pursuit of the enemy, and press him vigorously during the whole day. Major-General McDowell is assigned to the command of the pursuit.
Major-General Porter’s corps will push forward on the Warrenton turnpike, followed by the divisions of Brigadier-Generals King and Reynolds. The division of Brigadier-General Ricketts will pursue the Haymarket road, followed by the corps of Major General Heintzelman. The necessary cavalry will be assigned to these columns by Major-General McDowell, to whom regular and frequent reports will be made. The general headquarters will be somewhere on the Warrenton turnpike.
By command of Major-General Pope,
George D. Ruggles,
Colonel and Chief of Staff.
The enemy he thus ordered pursued were at that moment, as they had been since noon the previous day, all up, posted in strong position, flushed with success, confident in themselves, well rested, and not inferior in numbers. And their skillful leader was only waiting the opportune moment to launch the mighty thunderbolt of war he so ably wielded. Such was the situation. But nothing had any effect upon the mind of the infatuated commander; the bloody repulses of the previous day, the loss of ground on both wings, the information thrust upon him by McDowell, Porter, Ricketts, and Reynolds that Longstreet’s advance had passed Gainesville before nine o’clock the previous morning, over twenty-four hours before, and that his forces had confronted Porter and Reynolds all the afternoon before,—all, all was disregarded, and Pope, impervious alike to reason and to facts, without a reconnoissance save the spirited push of the hundred Highlanders, gave the fatal order fraught with disaster to his army, and the acme of his own fatuity and incompetence.
But the officers charged with the execution of the order never attempted to carry it out according to its terms. With the exception perhaps of McDowell, they knew too well that it was an order impossible to execute. Ricketts, already in contact with the hostile line, reported that the enemy had no intention of retreating, and was ordered to hold his position. Porter made no effort to “push up the Warrenton turnpike, followed by the divisions of King and Reynolds.” The pursuit feature of the order was ignored by all, and instead of it a strong column of attack was organized against Jackson’s centre. This was composed of Porter’s troops and King’s division, under Porter’s command, and was slowly formed behind the screen of woods in advance of the right centre of the Union lines. Stevens’s division, two brigades of Ricketts’s division, and Kearny held the lines on the right. In rear of Porter and King, and in rear of the centre, were placed Hooker’s, Reno’s, and two brigades of Ricketts’s division, and all of Sigel’s corps except McLean’s brigade, which held the left, south of the pike, in front of the Chinn Hill. Reynolds with his small division extended the line on McLean’s left. Extending from Rosefield for a long distance toward the right, on the crest of the ridge, was planted a long row of artillery,—forty guns at least,—as near together as they could be handled, while other batteries were in rear, unable to find a place in the line. A few batteries occupied positions in advance of this ridge, and exchanged incessant fire with the enemy’s guns across the wide, open ground. Thus Pope bunched nearly his whole army in the centre, leaving his right weak, and his left wing a mere handful.
SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN, SECOND DAY, AUGUST 30, 1862
Positions at 4 P.M., and successive positions on left