Lee himself mentions no such order. In his final report, penned six months afterwards, he merely mentions that the “general plan was unchanged,” and Longstreet, reinforced, ordered to attack “next morning,” no definite hour being fixed. It is significant, however, that in his letter to Jefferson Davis from the field, dated July 4, Lee uses this language:
“Next day (July 3), the third division of General Longstreet’s corps having come up, a more extensive attack was made,” etc.
The “third division” was Pickett’s, which did not arrive from Chambersburg until 9 A.M. of the 3d. In the same report, Lee himself states that “Pickett, with three of his brigades, joined Longstreet the following morning.” There is no dispute, however, about the hour of Pickett’s arrival.
So that, as Pickett was selected by Lee to lead the charge, and as Lee knew exactly where Pickett was, it is morally impossible that it was fixed for daylight, five hours before Pickett’s troops were up.
In one place Lee remarks in his report: “The morning was occupied in necessary preparations, and the battle recommenced in the afternoon of the 3d.” Time was not an essential element in the problem of the 3d. The Federal army was then all up, whereas Pickett’s Confederate division was still absent. The delay of a few hours was therefore a distinct gain for the Confederates, and not prejudicial, as Gordon would have the world believe.
But Longstreet’s official report is decisive of the whole question. He says,—
“On the following morning (that is, after the fight of the 2d) our arrangements were made for renewing the attack by my right, with a view to pass round the hill occupied by the enemy’s left, and gain it by flank and reverse attack. A few moments after my orders for the execution of this plan were given, the commanding general joined me, and ordered a column of attack to be formed of Pickett’s, Heth’s, and part of Pender’s divisions, the assault to be made directly at the enemy’s main position, the Cemetery Hill.”
Clearly this shows that Longstreet had no orders for the morning of July 3. As Longstreet’s report passed through Lee’s hands, the superior would most certainly have returned it to the subordinate for correction if there were errors in it. This he did not do, neither did Lee indorse upon the document itself any dissent from its tenor.
As Pickett did not come up until 9 A.M., and as General Lee says “the morning was occupied in necessary preparations,” it was logistically and morally impossible to make an attack at daylight, and General Longstreet states that it could not have been delivered sooner than it was.
Finally, Longstreet emphatically denies that Lee ordered him to attack at daylight on the 3d. He says that he had no orders of any kind on that morning until Lee personally came over to his front and ordered the Pickett charge. No early attack was possible under the conditions imposed by Lee to use Pickett’s, Pettigrew’s, and Pender’s troops, widely separated.