Joy lighted up his countenance, the war was forgotten, and Longstreet was at home once more at West Point.
Again we stood upon the same platform, in Washington, on May 30,—Memorial Day,—1902. Together we reviewed, with President Roosevelt, the magnificent column of Union veterans that marched past the President’s reviewing-stand. That evening Longstreet joined me in a visit to a thousand or more soldiers of the Third Army Corps, assembled in a tent near the White House. These veterans, with a multitude of their comrades, had come to Washington to commemorate another Memorial Day in the Capitol of the Nation. The welcome given him by this crowd of old soldiers, who had fought him with all their might again and again, on many battle-fields, could hardly have been more cordial if he had found himself in the midst of an equal number of his own command. His speech to the men was felicitous, and enthusiastically cheered. In an eloquent peroration he said, “I hope to live long enough to see my surviving comrades march side by side with the Union veterans along Pennsylvania Avenue, and then I will die happy.” This was the last time I met Longstreet.
Longstreet was unjustly blamed for not attacking earlier in the day, on July 2, 1863, at Gettysburg. I can answer that criticism, as I know more about the matter than the critics. If he had attacked in the morning, as it is said he should have done, he would have encountered Buford’s division of cavalry, five thousand sabres, on his flank, and my corps would have been in his front, as it was in the afternoon. In a word, all the troops that opposed Longstreet in the afternoon, including the Fifth Army Corps and Caldwell’s division of the Second Corps, would have been available on the left flank of the Union army in the morning. Every regiment and every battery that fired a shot in the afternoon was on the field in the morning, and would have resisted an assault in the morning as stubbornly as in the afternoon. Moreover, if the assault had been made in the morning, Law’s strong brigade of Alabamians could not have assisted in the attack, as they did not arrive on the field until noon. On the other hand, if Lee had waited an hour later, I would have been on Cemetery Ridge, in compliance with General Meade’s orders, and Longstreet could have marched, unresisted, from Seminary Ridge to the foot of Round Top, and might, perhaps, have unlimbered his guns on the summit.
General Meade’s telegram to Halleck, dated 3 P.M., July 2, does not indicate that Lee was then about to attack him. At the time that despatch was sent, a council of corps commanders was assembled at General Meade’s head-quarters. It was broken up by the sound of Longstreet’s artillery. The probability is that Longstreet’s attack held the Union army at Gettysburg. If Longstreet had waited until a later hour, the Union army might have been moving towards Pipe Creek, the position chosen by General Meade on June 30.
The best proof that Lee was not dissatisfied with Longstreet’s movements on July 2 is the fact that Longstreet was intrusted with the command of the column of attack on July 3,—Lee’s last hope at Gettysburg. Of the eleven brigades that assaulted the Union left centre on July 3, only three of them—Pickett’s division—belonged to Longstreet’s corps, the other eight brigades belonged to Hill’s corps. If Longstreet had disappointed Lee on July 2, why would Lee, on the next day, give Longstreet a command of supreme importance, of which more than two-thirds of the troops were taken from another corps commander?
Longstreet did not look for success on July 3. He told General Lee that “the fifteen thousand men who could make a successful assault over that field had never been arrayed for battle,” and yet the command was given to Longstreet. Why? Because the confidence of Lee in Longstreet was unshaken; because he regarded Longstreet as his most capable lieutenant.
Longstreet was never censured for the failure of the assault on July 3, although General Lee intimates, in his official report, that it was not made as early in the day as was expected. Why, then, is Longstreet blamed by them for the failure on July 2, when no fault was found by General Lee with Longstreet’s dispositions on that day? The failure of both assaults must be attributed to insurmountable obstacles, which no commander could have overcome with the force at Longstreet’s disposal,—seventeen thousand men on July 2, and fifteen thousand men on July 3, against thirty thousand adversaries!
In General Lee’s official report not a word appears about any delay in Longstreet’s movements on July 2, although, referring to the assault of July 3, General Lee says, “General Longstreet’s dispositions were not completed as early as was expected.” If General Lee did not hesitate to point out unlooked for delay on July 3, why was he silent about delay on July 2? His silence about delay on July 2 implies that there was none on July 2. Expresio unius exclusio alterius.
General Lee says, in his report, referring to July 3,—
“General Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the high, rocky hills on the enemy’s extreme left, from which his troops could be attacked in reverse as they advanced. His operations had been embarrassed the day previous by the same cause, and he now deemed it necessary to defend his flank and rear with the divisions of Hood and McLaws.”