In 1894 the Populist party of Idaho put a plank in its platform favoring the submission of a woman-suffrage amendment to the people. In 1896 the Free Silver Populist movement swept the State. A majority of the votes cast on the Suffrage question were cast in its favor, but not a majority of all the votes cast at the election. The supreme courts have generally held that, in so important a matter, a complete majority vote was required, but the Supreme Court of Idaho did not so hold, and woman suffrage is now established in that State. This, also, is hardly a success of sound democracy.
The subject of woman suffrage has lately been dealt with by two States that represent republican progress at its best. They are New York and Massachusetts. In the former State a Constitutional Convention in 1894 gave an impartial hearing to the subject, and decided not to submit to the people an amendment striking the word "male" from the State Constitution. Massachusetts at its State election in 1895 asked the people to vote upon the question of extending municipal suffrage to women, and the answer was given in a heavy adverse majority. Fewer than four in one hundred women qualified to vote on the subject voted in its favor, and half a million women declined to vote at all. A majority of over 100,000 votes was cast against it by men. Utah and New York, Wyoming and Massachusetts, which States do Americans hold up as nearest their model? In which have women made most progress, and showed themselves most likely to understand their rights, privileges and duties?
During the late Presidential election the issues passed the boundary that separates party politics from patriotic faith. For months preceding that struggle the Suffrage body had conducted the most efficient campaign in its history. When the test came, California voted for sound money against repudiation, for authority against anarchy, by a small majority, and threw its ballots heavily against woman suffrage. With the enthusiastic help of its woman voters, Colorado gave its electoral voice 16 to 1 against sound money and sound Americanism. Which State can claim that its action rings truest to the stroke of honest metal in finance and in defence of national honor?
A few States have extended municipal suffrage to woman. It is generally local and restricted Only in Kansas is there full municipal suffrage. Dr. Jacobi, in her "Common Sense," says: "Municipal suffrage in Kansas demands no property qualification, and its exercise therefore does not differ in the least from that required in a Presidential election." This is a mistake, for the difference is essential and illustrates the undemocratic character of woman suffrage. Municipal suffrage in Kansas, like the Territorial suffrage in Wyoming, was given by legislative act, and could be done away with by another legislative act without appeal to the people, or any change of the Constitution. It did not touch the vital question whether women, in a democracy, could form a component part of the government. Mrs. Stanton well understood that difference. Kansas had long possessed local municipal suffrage when, in 1894, the question of granting full suffrage, by constitutional amendment, was submitted to the people. Mrs. Stanton then wrote: "My hope now rests with Kansas. If that fails too, we must trust no longer to the Republican and Democratic parties, but henceforth give our money, our eloquence, our enthusiasm to a People's party that will recognize woman as an equal factor in a new civilization." There was enough leaven of republicanism working then to cause the old fighting-ground, the free-soil State, to reject the amendment by a popular majority of 35,000. To the "People's Party" in Kansas woman suffrage may look for the most striking illustration of its results. Where municipal suffrage could be secured only by constitutional enactment, and was so secured, it would differ merely in degree from presidential suffrage; but it never has been so secured in any State except those that give full constitutional suffrage. It is on a par with school suffrage, except that legislative enactment extends the vote to town and city matters.
The history of the school suffrage affords another proof of the incompatibility of republicanism and constitutional suffrage for woman. Dr. Jacobi recognizes the difference between constitutional and school suffrage when she says: "Women continually sign petitions for this privilege, till startled by the discovery that it also means something else. It means, however, in the State of New York, according to the decision of the Supreme Court, that woman can only enjoy this privilege thoroughly if empowered by constitutional amendment to vote for all officers as well as for school commissioners." The States that have refused to comply with the Suffragists' demand for the elective franchise, the most progressive States, have been first to grant school suffrage, under constitutional limits. The twenty-seven odd States that grant school suffrage have had different methods of dealing with the question, because their laws differ, but both the positive proof of its being granted, and the negative proof of its being withheld, tell the same story in regard to the fundamental principle involved. This is shown strikingly in the situation in Kansas. Women have full municipal suffrage, and the Supreme Court of that State decided that they could vote for school treasurer, which was a charter office, but could not vote for County Superintendent of Schools, because that office was provided for in the Constitution. The school suffrage may or may not have a property qualification attached. That makes no difference. The difference is the essential one between delegated power and sovereign power. The States differ so widely in their methods of dealing with municipal as well as school legislation, that only a study of the laws of each State will reveal the situation. In Ohio, in 1895, for instance, the Legislature passed a bill enabling women to vote on a municipal tax-levy, which the courts held was unconstitutional, while they granted votes on license and other local questions.
In answer to the question whether, in Massachusetts, a woman could be a member of a school committee, the Supreme Court returned the following decision in 1874: "The Constitution contains nothing relating to school committees; the office is created and regulated by statute; and the Constitution confers upon the General Court full power and authority to name and settle annually, or provide by fixed laws for naming and settling, all civil officers within the Commonwealth the election and constitution of whom are not in the Constitution otherwise provided for. The question is therefore answered in the affirmative." The Supreme Court of New York, in 1892, held that "School Commissioners are constitutional officers within Article II. part 1 of the Constitution, and consequently the law of 1892 giving women the right to vote for them is void." The case was that of Matilda Joslyn Gage. The office of School Commissioner was created after the adoption of the Constitution, and it was therefore urged that the Constitution did not bear upon it; but the Supreme Court further decided that the law gave the Legislature the right to appoint or to elect the Commissioner; and as they had decided that the office should be elective, the women could not vote for that office. They vote for district-school officers under various local permissions or limitations. In a case brought to decide the right of women to vote for County Superintendent of Schools the Supreme Court of Illinois, in 1893, held that, as the office was designated in the Constitution as elective, women could not vote for it. The decision further said. "The votes for State Superintendent of Instruction, and County Superintendent, are provided for by law, and the Legislature cannot change the law. It may be that it is competent for the Legislature to provide that women who are citizens of the United States and over twenty-one may vote at elections held for school directors and other school officers not mentioned in the Constitution." Later, the Supreme Court held that women were entitled to vote for school trustees, as "no officer of the school district is mentioned in the State Constitution."
The Supreme Court of Ohio, in 1894, held that the provision of the act of April 24, 1894, conferring upon women the right to vote at elections of certain school officers, is valid, such right being within the legislative power to provide for the establishment and maintenance of public schools, and not within Article V. part 1, of the Constitution, which limits the right to male citizens. Judge Shauck says: "The whole subject of the public schools is delegated to the Assembly. As the common-school organization is wholly a creation of the Legislature, it is in the power of the Legislature to determine the qualifications of an elector and office-holder in it." In upholding his ruling, he cited similar decisions from the Supreme Courts of Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Iowa.
This rapid survey suggests, it seems to me, that, instead of being "a legitimate outgrowth of the fundamental principles of our government," woman suffrage is really incompatible with true republican forms. Pre- civilized conditions, aristocratic tendencies, the forces that would destroy government—these appear to be its natural allies. We must study more closely its connection with representative government the better to comprehend this portentous truth.