Lands of the Slave and the Free; Or, Cuba, the United States, and Canada

by Henry A. Murray

The following article in the Constitution regulates the terms upon which alone any change may be made, and which is of so peculiar and conservative a character that I insert it in full:—

The foregoing article is a remarkable instance of prudence and forethought, and acts as the strongest safeguard against hasty measures, which in times of great excitement may sometimes obtain a majority that would afterwards be regretted by all parties. If the principle involved in any question is really felt to be of vital importance, the majority can dissolve the Union if they consider the object in view worth the sacrifice.

The salary of the Chief Justice is about 1050l. a-year. This court is, I believe, invariably composed of men of the highest talent and integrity; their appointment is from the President, and endorsed by the Senate, and their tenure of office is "during good behaviour."[^[CD]] There has, fortunately, been no change in the manner or term of these appointments; but, in the different States, the democratic mania has removed the old landmarks of prudence bequeathed to them by their fathers. Mr. Tremenheere tells, that in 1833 only 5 States out of the 24 had adopted the principle of electing Judges, and appointing them for a term of years; in 1844, 12 States out of the 29 had adopted the principle; and in 1853, 22 out of the 31 States had come to the same resolution. We surely have in these facts a most important warning of the danger of introducing too much of the democratic element into the constitution of any country. Reflect, if but for a moment, on the danger to the community, where the selection of the Judges of the land may be guided by political rancour or public clamour; the bare knowledge that such may be the case, even if the purity of the masses be so great as not to admit of such sinister influence, the bare possibility, I say, is calculated to lower the respect in which it is most desirable the judiciary should ever be held,[^[CE]] and to deter the most pure and high-minded citizens from offering their services. The salaries of the Judges range from 250l. to 400l. a-year.

The next point to which I would call attention, is to be found in Art. I., sect. 6, of the Constitution of the United States, the last clause of which runs thus:—"No person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office." This was probably one of the most extraordinary blunders such an able body of men as the framers of the Constitution ever made; and if their object was to guard against corruption, and the undue influence of the leading men of the country, it has most signally failed, as the Act before referred to, of February, 1853, fully testifies. Only conceive the effect of excluding all the Cabinet and high functionaries from seats in the Lords and Commons; conceive the great statesmen of this country being obliged to hand over the introduction of most important measures, and the defence and explanation of them, to other hands. On this point, Mr. Justice Story remarks: "Thus, that open and public responsibility for measures, which properly belongs to the executive in all governments, especially in a republican government, as its greatest security and strength, is completely done away. The executive is compelled to resort to secret and unseen influence,—to private interviews and private arrangements,—to accomplish its own appropriate purposes, instead of proposing and sustaining its own duties and measures by a bold and manly appeal to the nation in the face of its representatives. One consequence of this state of things is, that there never can be traced home to the executive any responsibility for the measures which are planned and carried at its suggestion. Another consequence will be—if it has not yet been—that measures will be adopted or defeated by private intrigues, political combinations, irresponsible recommendations, by all the blandishments of office, and all the deadening weight of silent patronage; ... ministers may conceal or evade any expression of their opinions."

In charity it should be presumed that in all nations which possess anything worthy of the name of free institutions, the ablest men of the political majority constitute the Cabinet; and, by the enactment we are considering, all this talent is excluded from the councils of the nation, whereas all the talent of the Opposition may be there arrayed against their measures. I confess it is beyond my penetration, to see how this can be reconciled to justice or common sense; in no one principle of their Government did they more completely ignore the wisdom and experience of the mother country, and in the object they had in view they appear to have most completely failed. It is but fair to the democrats to say it is no act of theirs; they inherited the misfortune, and are likely to keep it, as it is one of the fundamental principles of their Constitution, and they have a salutary dread—much to their praise—of tinkering up any flaw they find in that document, lest in mending one hole they make two. They have, as a nation, so greatly prospered under its combined enactments, and possess such an unlimited independence in their individual States, that although the exclusion of the Cabinet is now very generally admitted to be an error, I saw no inclination to moot the question; probably, lest other questions affecting the slave and non-slave-holding States might be brought on the boards, and again disturb the bonds of union.

Another very remarkable—and in a Republic anomalous—feature in the government, is the power of the President, who, by the Constitution, is enabled during his four years' tenure of office to rule in total opposition to the majority, obstructing all the measures they may bring forward, unless the majority amounts to two-thirds in both Houses of Congress.

Article I., section 7, clause 2, runs thus:—"Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approves, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to re-consider it. If after such re-consideration two-thirds of that House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be re-considered, and if approved by two-thirds of that House, it shall become a law," &c.

This power of the President has been used by Washington, Jackson, Tyler, and Polk; particularly by Tyler, who opposed the wishes of the majority even when those wishes were backed by his own ministry. During the discussions on the Constitution, many of the wisest heads at that eventful period desired to establish the Presidency for life, but eventually the term of four years was agreed upon; and if such powers of obstructing the wishes of a majority were to accompany the office, it certainly was a prudent conclusion they arrived at. In a densely populated community like Great Britain, such powers, whether in the hands of the sovereign or the ministers, would produce a revolution in much less time than four years. It may, however, be questioned, whether these powers are not productive of evil, by rendering necessary such frequent elections for the Presidency. On this point, Mr. Justice Story states: "The inconvenience of such frequently recurring elections of the chief magistrate, by generating factions, combining intrigues, and agitating the public mind, seems not hitherto to have attracted as much attention, as it deserves." And Chancellor Kent remarks, that "the election of a supreme executive magistrate for a whole nation affects so many interests, addresses itself so strongly to popular passions, and holds out such powerful temptations to ambition, that it necessarily becomes a strong trial to public virtue, and even hazardous to public tranquillity."

There is another evil which attends these frequent elections of the chief magistrate—namely, the enormous patronage at his disposal, and the mass of jobbery and corruption to which the exercise of it almost invariably leads. Besides the appointment of nearly ever military, naval, civil, judicial, and revenue-collecting official—some of these subject, it is true to the approval of the Senate—Mr. Justice Story remarks, that with regard to inferior offices "his patronage probably includes ninety-nine out of every hundred of the lucrative offices of the government." His great rival in patronage is the Postmaster-General, who has power to appoint and remove all deputy-postmasters, which, as the number of post-offices is 22,688, amounts to something considerable.

This power was doubtless intended for the public good, and in order that incompetent or inefficient persons should be removed. To the honour of Washington, it is recorded that during his eight years' Presidency only nine removals took place. To President Jackson they are indebted, as I have before remarked, for the introduction of the present corrupt system. According to Justice Story, on his entering office he removed 233 employés; since then, the snowball has been steadily increasing till the present moment; it has now reached an amount which it would require Mr. Babbage's machine to calculate. Who can doubt that such vast patronage, has far more influence in the selection of a President, than any personal qualification for the high and important post? Nothing could prove more clearly that such influences are paramount to all others than the last election. There were eight candidates on the democratic side, of whom General Pierce was not one; all the eight had their special friends, and each party was loth to lose the chance of patronage which their friend's election might reasonably lead them to hope for. Thus they fought so vigorously that there was no chance of any one having the requisite number of votes, i.e., a majority of the whole number polled.