Sun, Sand and Somals / Leaves from the note-book of a District Commissioner in British Somaliland

by Henry A. Rayne

It was in the West, and in the month of October, 1919, that I found myself deeply involved in nothing more exciting than the hearing of divorce cases, marriage disputes, petty loots, and homicides. In fact occupied with the thousand and one affairs, the settlement of which goes to make up the greater part of the routine work in the daily life of a District Commissioner in the Zeila District of British Somaliland.

Into the midst of all this came a mail, and in the mail a letter addressed to me from the Officer Commanding Troops (also, at that moment, administering the Government) asking if I would take over the organisation of the supply and transport for certain contemplated operations against the "Mad Mullah." My reply, though couched in more official language, can be summed up briefly as, "Rather!"

In the course of this narrative, and after having thus explained my rôle in the expedition, I do not propose to do any more than set forth such events and happenings as came to my personal notice, or with which I naturally became conversant as being in close touch with the officers, or units, of whom I write. This is not a disquisition or treatise on how to run Supply and Transport in Somaliland, though a by-no-means unexciting subject.

On the 3rd of November there was landed at Berbera the first consignment of aerial bombs. These were followed, on the 13th of November, by Colonel R. Gordon, C.M.G., commanding No. 2 Unit, Royal Air Force, and Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrell, D.S.O., who was responsible for the R.A.F. medical arrangements. Shortly afterwards the first contingent of the 6th King's African Rifles, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkinson, D.S.O., landed at Las Khorai, where they were joined later by the remainder of the battalion; about eight hundred and fifty rifles all told. The temporary garrison at Las Khorai, composed of four hundred and forty rifles—the 101st Grenadiers, Indian Army—evacuated Las Khorai and proceeded by sea to Berbera, thence to Las Dureh. It had at first been decided to use Las Khorai as the base from which the R.A.F. should commence operations, but, owing to the prevalence of wind and dust storms at that port, this plan was given up, and the base was fixed on—much to my regret as it meant land transport—at El-dur-Elan. By Christmas-time preparations were well advanced, and, in spite of the lack of facilities, the R.A.F. were well up to time in their preparations for the attack, planned to take place early in January.

BERBERA TOWN.

On the 12th of January it was certain that the aeroplanes would be ready to commence operations on the 21st. The position was then as follows:—the Mullah was reported at Medishe, about eight miles North West of Jidali. The country he held can very roughly be summarised as that in the vicinity of his more important fortified posts, namely Garabghari, Jidali, Medishe and Baran, with a clear run to the East, water, which is scarce, permitting: and a clear run to the South, to Tale, the largest and most strongly fortified position of all. There were many other minor forts, but I believe I have mentioned the principal ones.

Up to this time the Military Policy had been to make preparations as unostentatiously as possible, so that the Mullah would not take fright and move off from Medishe. His doing so would have necessitated a complete rearrangement of plans, so telling heavily on the transport arrangements—an important consideration. The assembling of the aeroplanes at Berbera was nearing completion, and trial flights to the West were being made. The reason why the planes were not tried to the Eastward is obvious, but the native population believed they were prevented from doing so by the supernatural power of the Mullah, who had, they said, cast a spell over the machines, so barring them from using the aerial route over the town of Berbera (East of the R.A.F. Camp) or above the hills to the South-East. As a proof of what the Mullah could do in this direction I have heard intelligent natives state that on a certain occasion the old man pointed out three crows, high in the air, to his followers, directing them to watch that which was about to happen. The three crows fell dead to the ground. A holy man, who could bring down birds by reciting a verse from the Koran, the method employed, was not likely to be troubled by aeroplanes. But to return to the disposition of the military forces on the 12th of January.

The 101st Grenadiers had occupied El-dur-Elan, where a dump of stores for all arms had been established. The Somaliland Camel Corps, leaving a small dismounted detachment at headquarters, Burao, was moving on the same point, where a detachment of R.A.F. was busily preparing the aerodrome, workshops and camp necessary for their Corps. The Somaliland Field Force Field Hospital, and the R.A.F. Field Hospital, were likewise established at the same point. The King's African Rifles had established their base at Musha Aled, and, in spite of the fact that, owing to lack of steamer transport, great difficulty was experienced in supplying them with transport camels, they were practically ready to move.