But, on Thursday morning, when they started out again, the pilot who had bombed Medishe the day before was forced to descend, and the planes that went on again failed to locate Medishe, for the very good reason, I believe, that it had only been fixed approximately (on native information) on the maps supplied to the expedition.
At this stage the wireless communications between the King's African Rifles, the O.C. Somaliland Field Force, and the R.A.F. at El-dur-Elan broke down, or were working badly. It was an anxious time, and when three aeroplanes, which went out in the afternoon, returned to report that they had located, and heavily bombed, the Mullah's stronghold, there was general rejoicing.
On Saturday the aeroplanes again visited Medishe, which they believed had been severely dealt with, went on and bombed Jidali.
On the same day I left by aeroplane for Al Afweina, where I assumed command of the transport and dismounted column, marched on Sunday for Jidali, which we reached on Thursday, the 29th, after a hard trek.
An incident during this trek, though it was not amusing at the moment, is not without its humorous side. The camel transport, consisting of fourteen companies, was able to march in fairly good formation—line of companies in single file—but, at one point, whilst crossing a narrow neck, was thrown into some confusion on the rough narrow track it was forced to converge upon, so that it looked not unlike a mob of dervish pack-camels. At this particular moment an aeroplane glided over the hills on our right, and began to take some interest in our movements. It had been arranged that all troops should carry several pieces of white cloth which, when spread on the ground, would convey to the pilots of the R.A.F. who it was they were observing from the air. But, as so often happens with such arrangements, I found that, when we wanted our signalling apparatus, it was mixed up with the transport. The aeroplane, swooping right across us, had turned, and was coming up again for what appeared to our nervous minds might strike the pilot as the target of a lifetime. The 101st Grenadiers had brought a "Very Light" pistol with them. This weapon was hastily loaded, but before it could be discharged the observer dropped—not a bomb—but a letter containing orders from the O.C., Somaliland Field Force.
As the coloured post-bag with its gay streamers floated through the air, the semi-savage camel attendants, who had heard of the awful effect of bombs, stood rooted to the ground with terror. There was a gasp of relief when the bag harmlessly struck the earth without exploding. I believe we should have fired a green light, but just for luck, and to show our independence, we fired two red lights at the plane, which answered with a green as it circled away. Speaking for myself, I realised for the first time what "wind up" really means. I had it!
At Jidali we were met by the O.C. Somaliland Field Force, Colonel Summers, in person, who showed us into camp and made us au courant with the situation. Jidali had been attacked by the Camel Corps. The three-inch Stokes guns were brought into play, and shells dropped on the roof of the fort in the late evening. Early next morning it was found that the enemy had disappeared.
Soon after our arrival orders were issued for a move on Medishe, to be followed by a drive through the hills, but, about midday, on Friday, the 30th January, as I was standing in our lines, the Colonel walked quietly up to me and stated that he had information which led him to believe the Mullah had escaped South towards Tale, and that he was launching the Camel Corps in pursuit. As he was accompanying them for a certain distance, until he was in a more central position owing to the change of situation, I was to command at Jidali until the arrival of the K.A.R., which had been ordered up from Baran. I could see that, though he was not going to commit himself as to the position at Jidali, he believed the dervish power on the Las Khorai escarpment was broken.
That evening the Camel Corps marched on what was to end up in one of the finest rides, and most successful operations, in its history.
The next morning, following a consultation with the O.C. 101st Grenadiers, I decided to occupy Medishe. Accordingly, Captain Cross marched with a party of the Grenadiers, and about two hours later we received a helio message stating that he had entered the place, without much opposition, and captured vast quantities of stores. Meanwhile I busied myself with the prisoners left behind by the Camel Corps, from whom I learned the following facts:—