Nothing exasperated Lucien more than any allusion to the part he took in the coup d’état of the 18th Brumaire, when he betrayed the Chamber over which he presided. He commanded himself for the moment; but when Napoleon went on to say with still more contempt, “I laugh at you and your national representation,” Lucien answered coldly, “I do not laugh at you, Citizen Consul, but I know well what I think about it.”
“Parbleu!” said Napoleon, “I am curious to know what you think of me: say it, quick!”
“I think, Citizen Consul, that having given your oath to the Constitution of the 18th Brumaire into my own hands as President of the Council of Five Hundred, seeing you despise it thus, if I were not your brother I would be your enemy.”
“My enemy! ah, I would advise you! My enemy! That is a trifle strong!” cried Napoleon, advancing as though to strike his younger brother. “You my enemy! I would break you, look, like this box!” And so saying he flung his snuff-box violently on the floor.
In these angry scenes both parties knew that Napoleon’s bravado was not altogether honest. For once, Lucien was in earnest; and had his brother left a few other men in France as determined as he and his friend Bernadotte, the First Consul would have defied public opinion less boldly. Joseph, too, although less obstinate than his brothers, was not easily managed. According to Lucien there were further scenes between them, at one of which Joseph burst into such violence that the First Consul took refuge in Josephine’s room. These stories contained nothing incredible. The sale of Louisiana was the turning-point in Napoleon’s career; no true Frenchman forgave it. A second betrayal of France, it announced to his fellow conspirators that henceforward he alone was to profit by the treason of the 18th Brumaire.
Livingston and Monroe knew nothing of all this; they even depended upon Joseph to help their negotiation. Monroe fell ill and could not act. Over the negotiation of the treaty has always hung a cloud of mystery such as belonged to no other measure of equal importance in American history. No official report showed that the commissioners ever met in formal conference; no protocol of their proceedings, no account of their discussions, no date when their agreement was made, was left on record. Both the treaty itself and the avowals of Livingston gave evidence that at the end all parties acted in haste. If it were not for a private memorandum by Monroe,—not sent to the Government, but preserved among his private papers,—the course of negotiation could not be followed.
A fortnight passed after Monroe’s arrival without advancing matters a step. This period of inaction seems to have been broken by the First Consul. April 23 he drew up a “Projet of a Secret Convention,”[35] which he gave to Marbois and which set forth that to prevent misunderstandings about the matters of discussion mentioned in Articles II. and V. of the Morfontaine treaty, and also to strengthen friendly relations, the French republic was to cede its rights over Louisiana; and “in consequence of the said cession, Louisiana, its territory, and its proper dependencies shall become part of the American Union, and shall form successively one or more States on the terms of the Federal Constitution;” in return the United States were to favor French commerce in Louisiana, and give it all the rights of American commerce, with perpetual entrepôts at six points on the Mississippi, and a corresponding perpetual right of navigation; further, they were to assume all debts due to American citizens under the treaty of Morfontaine; and, finally, were to pay a hundred million francs to France. With this projet Marbois went by appointment, at two o’clock, April 27, to Monroe’s lodgings, where the three gentlemen had an informal meeting, of which no other record is known to exist than Monroe’s memoranda.[36] Monroe himself was too unwell to sit at the table, and reclined on a sofa throughout the discussion. Marbois produced Bonaparte’s projet, and after admitting that it was hard and unreasonable, presented a substitute of his own which he thought the First Consul would accept.
Livingston tried to give precedence to the claims; he wanted to dispose of them first, in case the cession should fail; but after pressing the point as far as he could, he was overruled by Monroe, and Livingston took Marbois’s project for consideration. The two American commissioners passed a day in working over it. Livingston drafted a claims convention, and it was drawn, as he thought, “with particular attention.”[37] Monroe thought differently. “My colleague took Mr. Marbois’s project with him, and brought me one, very loosely drawn, founded on it.”[38] Monroe made a draft of his own which was certainly not creditable to his legal or diplomatic skill, and which began by adopting an oversight contained in Bonaparte’s draft, according to which the cancelled Article II. of the treaty of Morfontaine was made a foundation of the new convention.[39] “We called on Mr. Marbois the 29th, and gave him our project, which was read to him and discussed. We proposed to offer fifty millions to France, and twenty millions on account of her debt to the citizens of the United States, making seventy in the whole.” Marbois replied that he would proceed only on the condition that eighty millions were accepted as the price. Then at last the American commissioners gave way; and with this change Marbois took their projet for reference to the First Consul the next morning.
The 30th of April was taken by Marbois for consultation with the First Consul. May 1 Monroe was presented at the Tuileries, and dined there with Livingston; but Bonaparte said nothing of their business, except that it should be settled. The same evening the two envoys had a final discussion with Marbois. “May 2, we actually signed the treaty and convention for the sixty million francs to France, in the French language; but our copies in English not being made out, we could not sign in our language. They were however prepared, and signed in two or three days afterward. The convention respecting American claims took more time, and was not signed till about the 8th or 9th.” All these documents were antedated to the 30th April.[40]
The first object of remark in this treaty was the absence of any attempt to define the property thus bought and sold. “Louisiana with the same extent that is now in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it, and such as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other States,”—these words, taken from Berthier’s original treaty of retrocession, were convenient for France and Spain, whose governments might be supposed to know their own boundaries; but all that the United States government knew upon the subject was that Louisiana, as France possessed it, had included a part of Florida and the whole Ohio Valley as far as the Alleghany Mountains and Lake Erie. The American commissioners at first insisted upon defining the boundaries, and Marbois went to the First Consul with their request. He refused.[41] “If an obscurity did not already exist, it would perhaps be good policy to put one there.” He intentionally concealed the boundary he had himself defined, a knowledge of which would have prevented a long and mortifying dispute. Livingston went to Talleyrand for the orders given by Spain to the Marquis of Somoruelo, by France to Victor and Laussat. “What are the eastern bounds of Louisiana?” asked Livingston. “I do not know,” replied Talleyrand; “you must take it as we received it.” “But what did you mean to take?” urged Livingston. “I do not know,” repeated Talleyrand. “Then you mean that we shall construe it our own way?” “I can give you no direction. You have made a noble bargain for yourselves, and I suppose you will make the most of it,” was the final reply of Talleyrand. Had Livingston known that Victor’s instructions, which began by fixing the boundaries in question, were still in Talleyrand’s desk, the answer would have been the same.