| CHAPTER | PAGE | |
|---|---|---|
| I. | Rupture of the Peace of Amiens | [1] |
| II. | The Louisiana Treaty | [25] |
| III. | Claim to West Florida | [51] |
| IV. | Constitutional Difficulties | [74] |
| V. | The Louisiana Debate | [94] |
| VI. | Louisiana Legislation | [116] |
| VII. | Impeachments | [135] |
| VIII. | Conspiracy | [160] |
| IX. | The Yazoo Claims | [192] |
| X. | Trial of Justice Chase | [218] |
| XI. | Quarrel with Yrujo | [245] |
| XII. | Pinckney’s Diplomacy | [264] |
| XIII. | Monroe and Talleyrand | [288] |
| XIV. | Relations with England | [316] |
| XV. | Cordiality with England | [342] |
| XVI. | Anthony Merry | [360] |
| XVII. | Jefferson’s Enemies | [389] |
| XVIII. | England and Tripoli | [410] |
| Index to Vols. I. and II. | [439] | |
THE COAST OF
WEST FLORIDA
AND
LOUISIANA
(From Jeffery’s American Atlas. London, 1800.)
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES.
CHAPTER I.
Congress expired; Monroe set sail March 8, 1803; Washington relapsed into silence; and the President and his Cabinet waited alone in the empty village, triumphing for the moment over their difficulties. Although a French prefect was actually in New Orleans, and the delivery of Louisiana to Bonaparte might from day to day be expected, not an additional soldier stood on the banks of the Mississippi, and the States of Kentucky and Tennessee were as quiet as though their flat-boats still floated down to New Orleans. A month passed before Madison or Jefferson again moved. Then the President asked his Cabinet[1] what Monroe should do in case France, as he expressed it, “refused our rights.” He proposed an alliance with England, and suggested three inducements which might be offered to Great Britain: “1. Not to make a separate peace. 2. To let her take Louisiana. 3. Commercial privileges.” The Cabinet unanimously rejected the second and third concessions, but Dearborn and Lincoln were alone in opposing the first; and a majority agreed to instruct Monroe and Livingston, “as soon as they find that no arrangements can be made with France, to use all possible procrastination with them, and in the mean time enter into conferences with the British government, through their ambassador at Paris, to fix principles of alliance, and leave us in peace till Congress meets; and prevent war till next spring.”
Madison wrote the instructions. If the French government, he said,[2] should meditate hostilities against the United States, or force a war by closing the Mississippi, the two envoys were to invite England to an alliance, and were to negotiate a treaty stipulating that neither party should make peace or truce without consent of the other. Should France deny the right of deposit without disputing the navigation, the envoys were to make no positive engagement, but should let Congress decide between immediate war or further procrastination.
At no time in Talleyrand’s negotiations had the idea of war against the United States been suggested. Of his intentions in this respect alone he had given positive assurances.[3] Above all things both he and the First Consul feared a war with the United States. They had nothing to gain by it. Madison’s instructions therefore rested on an idea which had no foundation, and which in face of the latest news from Europe was not worth considering; yet even if intended only for use at home, the instructions were startling enough to warrant Virginians in doubting their authenticity. The late Administration, British in feeling as it was supposed to be, had never thought an alliance with England necessary even during actual hostilities with France, and had not hesitated to risk the chances of independent action. Had either of Jefferson’s predecessors instructed American ministers abroad, in case of war with France, to bind the United States to make no peace without England’s consent, the consequence would have been an impeachment of the President, or direct steps by Virginia, Kentucky, and North Carolina, as in 1798, tending to a dissolution of the Union. Such an alliance, offensive and defensive, with England contradicted every principle established by President Washington in power or professed by Jefferson in opposition. If it was not finesse, it was an act such as the Republicans of 1798 would have charged as a crime.
While Madison was writing these instructions, he was interrupted by the Marquis of Casa Yrujo,[4] who came in triumph to say that his Government had sent out a brigantine especially to tell the President that the right of deposit would be restored and continued till another agreement or equivalent place could be fixed upon.[5] Yrujo was instructed to thank the President for his friendly, prudent, and moderate conduct during the excitement. He sent to New Orleans the positive order of King Charles IV. to the Intendant Morales, that the right of deposit should be immediately restored; the western people were told that their produce might go down the river as before, and thus the last vestige of anxiety was removed. In face of this action by Godoy, and of the war evidently at hand between France and England, the success of the peace policy was assured. These events in some degree explained the extraordinary nature of the new instructions of April, 1803.