As the summer of 1802 approached, President Jefferson drew into closer and more confidential relations with Thornton. During the Federalist rule the two countries were never on more affectionate terms. At London Rufus King and Christopher Gore received courteous attention from Lord Hawkesbury. At Washington, Thornton’s intimacy at the White House roused the jealousy and alarm of Pichon. As Bonaparte’s projects against Louisiana disclosed themselves, and as Leclerc’s first successes at St. Domingo opened the French path to New Orleans, Jefferson began to pay sudden and almost eager court to Thornton, who was a little embarrassed by the freedom with which the President denounced the First Consul. The preliminary articles of peace between France and England had been signed Oct. 1, 1801; but the treaty of Amiens, which made these articles definitive, was signed only March 25, 1802. Addington was naturally anxious that the peace should be maintained; indeed, no one could doubt that the existence of his Ministry depended on maintaining it. Thornton had no instructions which warranted him in intriguing against the First Consul, or in making preparations for a new war; and yet hardly was the treaty of Amiens made public, when President Jefferson began to talk as though England were still at war, and it were only a question of time when the United States must become her ally. The Louisiana question excited him. In April he wrote his letters to Dupont and Livingston. At about the same time he took Thornton into his confidence.
“I have had many occasions since it was first started,” wrote Thornton,[242] “of conversing freely with Mr. Jefferson on this topic, which is indeed peculiarly interesting to him, and his reflections on which he utters with perhaps too little caution to persons who are not disposed to think very favorably of any change of sentiments with respect to France. He not only regards the cession of Louisiana and New Orleans as a certain cause of future war between the two countries, but makes no scruple to say that if the force of the United States should be unable to expel the French from those settlements, they must have recourse to the assistance of other Powers, meaning unquestionably Great Britain. With regard to France and the person who is at the head of its government, whether in consequence of the projected cession of Louisiana or of the little account which seems to be made of the United States as well at Paris as by French officers in other parts of the world, Mr. Jefferson speaks in very unqualified terms of the usurpation of Bonaparte, of the arbitrary nature and spirit of his government, of his love of flattery and vain pomp,—features, according to Mr. Jefferson, which indicate the frivolous character of his mind rather than a condescension to the taste of the French people. The presses in America devoted to the President’s Administration make use of the same language; and without pretending to say that this party is cured of its bitterness against Great Britain, I can safely venture to assure your Lordship that its predilection for France scarcely exists even in name.”
After the stoppage of the entrepôt at New Orleans, when public opinion seemed intent on driving Jefferson into the war with France which he had predicted, Thornton found himself and his government in favor at Washington. The Republicans were even better disposed than the Federalists. Jefferson was willing to abolish between England and America the discriminating duties on shipping which the New England Federalists had imposed, and which they still wished to maintain for use in the disputed West Indian trade. He told Thornton that he could no doubt carry the repeal of these countervailing duties through Congress over the heads of the opposition,[243] “but he wished it to be adopted in consequence of their own conviction, rather than by a contrary conduct to afford them the least ground for asserting that the Southern States were carrying into execution their scheme of ruin against the navigation and commerce of their Eastern brethren.” Jefferson was rapidly becoming the friend and confidant of England. Thornton, naturally delighted with his own success, and with the mortifications and anxieties of Yrujo and Pichon, went so far as to urge his government to help the views of the United States against Louisiana:[244]—
“I should hope, my Lord, that by having some share in the delivery of this Island of New Orleans to the United States, which it will be impossible to keep from them whenever they choose to employ force, his Majesty’s government may hereafter attach still more this country to our interests, and derive all the advantage possible from the intercourse with that important part of the world. A very great change has gradually taken place in the opinions of all ranks in this government in favor of Great Britain, which has struck observers more likely to be impartial than myself. A sense of a common interest has a great share in the change; but the conduct of France in all her relations has not failed to produce its full effect; and I find men, formerly the most vehement in their politics, asserting in the most unqualified terms the necessity of a union among all the members of the civilized world to check her encroachments and to assure the general tranquillity.”
A few days later the President nominated Monroe to act with Livingston and Pinckney in an attempt to purchase New Orleans. This step, which was openly avowed to be the alternative and perhaps the antecedent of war with France, brought Thornton into still more confidential relations with the Government. Finding that the Secretary of State was as cautious as the President was talkative, Thornton carried on an active intercourse with the latter. He first offered to detain the British government packet for Monroe’s use; but it was found that a month or two of delay would be necessary. Then, without instructions from his Government, Thornton took a bolder step:[245]—
“This state of things has naturally excited a sentiment of common interest, and has encouraged me to enter with more freedom into the subject, as well with the President as with Mr. Madison, than I should otherwise have thought right, without being acquainted with the views of his Majesty’s government. Under this impression, I ventured, immediately after the nomination and before the first arrival of Mr. Monroe, to inquire of the President whether it was his intention to let him pass over to England, and hold any conversation with his Majesty’s ministers upon the general question of the free navigation of the Mississippi. The inquiry was somewhat premature, and I made it with some apology. Mr. Jefferson replied, however, unaffectedly, that at so early a stage of the business he had scarcely thought himself what it might be proper to do; ... that, on the whole, he thought it very probable that Mr. Monroe might cross the Channel.... Some time after Mr. Monroe’s arrival, actuated by the same view, I mentioned to Mr. Jefferson that it would give me pleasure to furnish the former with an introduction to his Majesty’s ambassador at Paris, as it would afford me the occasion of making Lord Whitworth acquainted with the nature of the object in dispute between this country, France, and Spain, and would give to Mr. Monroe, if he were disposed of himself, or were instructed by his Government to seek it, a more ready pretext for opening himself to his Lordship, and of keeping him apprised of the progress and turn of the negotiation. Mr. Jefferson seemed pleased with this offer, and said he was sure Mr. Monroe would accept it with great thankfulness.”
Madison talked less freely than his chief, and contented himself with explaining to the British representative that the views of the Government in sending Monroe to France were limited to the hope of inducing the First Consul by money, or other means of persuasion, to cede in Louisiana a place of deposit over which the United States might have absolute jurisdiction. He did not tell Thornton of the decision made by the Cabinet, and the instructions given to Monroe, April 18, 1803, to offer terms of alliance with England in case the First Consul should make war;[246] but the tone of cordiality in Government and people, both in public and private, in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, as in the South and West, was gratifying to British pride, and would have been still more so had not the community somewhat too openly avowed the intention of leaving England, if possible, to fight alone. At the first news of the approaching rupture between France and England, this wish began to appear so plainly that Thornton was staggered by it. The Americans took no trouble to conceal the hope that England would have to fight their battles for them.[247]
“The manifest advantage that such a state of things is calculated to give to their negotiation with France, and which is already sensibly felt in the altered tone and conduct of the French government, ... will sufficiently account for their wishes and for this belief. But possessing the same opinion of the encroachments of France, and of the barrier which Great Britain alone places between her and the United States, and actuated, as I really believe they are, by sincere wishes for our success, I am afraid they begin to see more clearly that in a state of war we are effectually fighting their battles, without the necessity of their active interference; and they recur once more to the flattering prospect of peace and a lucrative neutrality.”
In this state of doubt President Jefferson continued his intimate relations with Thornton.
“He expressed himself very freely,” wrote Thornton, May 30, 1803, “on the contemptible and frivolous conduct, as he termed it, of a Government that could alter its language so entirely on the prospect of an approaching rupture with another nation,—which he acknowledged instantly, on my mention of it, had been the case toward Mr. Livingston.”