In regard to England, therefore, Madison had nothing to propose except negotiation without end. Having settled this point, he went on:—
“At Paris I think Armstrong ought to receive instructions to extinguish in the French government every hope of turning our controversy with Spain into a French job, public or private; to leave them under apprehensions of an eventual connection between the United States and Great Britain; and to take advantage of any change in the French Cabinet favorable to our objects with Spain.”
To leave Bonaparte “under apprehensions” was to be the object of Madison’s diplomacy at Paris,—a task which several European governments were then employing half a million armed men to accomplish, hitherto without success, but which Madison hoped to effect by civilities to Merry.
After this decision, nothing remained but to mark out a line of conduct in regard to Spain. In the course of the summer Bowdoin, the new minister, had sailed; but on arriving in Spain, and learning the failure of Monroe’s negotiation, he went to Paris and London without visiting Madrid.
“As to Spain herself,” continued Madison, “one question is, whether Bowdoin ought to proceed or not to Madrid. My opinion is that his trip to Great Britain was fortunate, and that the effect of it will be aided by his keeping aloof until occurrences shall invite him to Spain.... The nicest question, however, is whether any, or what, steps should be taken for a communication with the Spanish government on the points not embraced by the late negotiation. On this question my reflections disapprove of any step whatever other than such as may fall within the path to be marked out for Armstrong, or as may be within the sphere of Claiborne’s intercourse with the Marquis of Casa Calvo. Perhaps the last may be the best opportunity of all for conveying to Spain the impressions we wish, without committing the government in any respect more than may be advisable. In general it seems to me proper that Claiborne should hold a pretty strong language in all cases, and particularly that he should go every length the law will warrant against Morales and his project of selling lands. If Congress should be not indisposed, proceedings may be authorized that will be perfectly effectual on that as well as other points; but before their meeting there will be time to consider more fully what ought to be suggested for their consideration.”
Having brought the government face to face with the government of Spain, in the belief that Spain and France must yield to a peremptory demand,—finding that Spain not only refused every concession, but renewed depredations on American commerce and took an attitude of indifference to threats or entreaties,—Madison proposed no more vigorous measure than to “go every length the law will warrant” against certain Spanish land-grants.
Such a course pleased no one, and threatened to create new dangers. Monroe and Armstrong urged that a supposed devotion to peace on the part of the President weighed heavily against him with Spain and France. Jefferson approved their proposed aggressive policy, as he wrote to Madison, chiefly because it would “correct the dangerous error that we are a people whom no injuries can provoke to war.”[63] He shrank from war, except under the shield of England, and yet he feared England for an ally even more than Spain for an enemy. His perplexity ended in helplessness. The Cabinet meeting was held October 4; but he reported to Madison that nothing came of it:[64]
“The only questions which press on the Executive for decision are whether we shall enter into a provisional alliance with England, to come into force only in the event that during the present war we become engaged in war with France, leaving the declaration of the casus fœderis ultimately with us; whether we shall send away Yrujo, Casa Calvo, Morales; whether we shall instruct Bowdoin not to go to Madrid till further orders. But we are all of the opinion that the first of these questions is too important and too difficult to be decided but on the fullest consideration, in which your aid and counsel should be waited for.”
Again Madison wrote back his opinion. More than six months had elapsed since the President, March 23, despaired of Monroe’s mission; every alternative had been repeatedly discussed; every advice had been taken. Congress would soon meet; something must be decided,—in reality delay was itself a decision; yet the President and Secretary of State seemed no nearer a result than they had been six months before. Meanwhile the European packets brought news that put a different face on the problem. Sir William Scott’s decision in the case of the “Essex” arrived; seizures of American ships by England began; Pitt’s great coalition with Russia and Austria against Napoleon took the field, and August 27 Napoleon broke up the camp at Boulogne and began his long-intended movement across the Rhine. Upon Madison’s mind this European convulsion acted as an additional reason for doing nothing:[65]—
“Considering the probability of an extension of the war against France, and the influence that may have on her temper toward the United States, the uncertainty of effecting with England such a shape for an arrangement as alone would be admissible, and the possible effects elsewhere of abortive overtures to her, I think it very questionable whether a little delay may not be expedient, especially as in the mean time the English pulse will be somewhat felt by the discussions now on foot by Mr. Monroe.”