At the same moment Randolph wrote to Monroe that the Republican party was broken in pieces, and that the “old Republicans” were united in the support of Monroe against Madison for the Presidency.[131] Randolph complained bitterly of the atmosphere of intrigue which surrounded the Administration; but as regarded him at least, Jefferson’s retort was plausible that he had never found fault with intrigue so long as he had a share in it. After challenging the contest with Madison, he had only himself to blame if the President, who was a master of intrigue, used the weapon freely to defend his favorite and himself.
To detach Randolph’s friends from their leader was an object which the President pursued with zeal and success. He was a little disposed to overawe Monroe; but he was glad to conciliate Joseph Nicholson, next to Randolph the most formidable “old Republican” in public life. Nicholson was torn by conflicting sympathies; he loved Randolph, and he did not love Madison. On the other hand he was attached to Gallatin by marriage and respect. A poor man, with a large family, Nicholson found the life of a Congressman unprofitable; and when he was offered a seat on the Bench as Judge of the Sixth Maryland Circuit, he accepted the appointment. April 9, 1806, his letter of resignation was read to the House, and the democrats knew that Randolph had lost his strongest friend.
The Speaker remained to be dealt with. To overawe Macon was impossible; to buy him was out of the question; to crush him was only a last resort; no other resource was left than to coax him.
“Some enemy, whom we know not, is sowing tares between us,” wrote the President to the Speaker, at the moment when he was warning Monroe and Nicholson escaped to the bench.[132] “Between you and myself nothing but opportunities of explanation can be necessary to defeat these endeavors. At least, on my part, my confidence in you is so unqualified that nothing further is necessary for my satisfaction.”
Jefferson never was more sincere than in making this advance to a friend from whom the course of events threatened to part him: but unfortunately the point of doubt was not so much Jefferson’s confidence in Macon as it was Macon’s confidence in Jefferson. At bottom remained the unpleasant thought that Jefferson had ceased to be either a Virginian or a Republican; had chosen other friends and advisers than Macon, other objects and ambitions than Macon pursued.
Even Randolph was treated with delicacy. Jefferson would gladly have won him back, had Randolph admitted a hope that he would accept Madison’s candidacy; but on that point no compromise could be conceived. Madison’s fate was trembling in the balance. Sacrifice of Madison was impossible to the President, and nothing short of sacrifice would satisfy Randolph. The “old Republican” schism must therefore be left to itself; the schismatics were too honest and respectable to be dealt with. The President exhausted his power when he won back the wavering, fixed Gallatin in allegiance to Madison, and carried Nicholson out of the arena; but although gentle and forbearing in regard to these honest, and as he thought, misguided men, Jefferson did not think it necessary to show equal deference to the merely selfish interests which had made use of this moment of confusion in order to exact terms from the Government. He showed that he could punish, by making an example of General and Senator Samuel Smith.
Robert Smith in the Cabinet was so near to his brother Samuel in the Senate that Jefferson could no longer trust his secrets to the Cabinet itself. After crushing in the House Randolph’s opposition to the Spanish policy, and after yielding to Smith and the Senate in regard to a special English mission, the President was required to make certain appointments, one of which was that of a new minister to aid and succeed Monroe in London, whence it was supposed that Monroe wished to return. General Smith’s wider plan assumed that Monroe was on his way home, and would be succeeded by a regular minister, assisted, for commercial negotiations, by a special envoy. The special envoy was to be himself; the permanent minister was to be his brother-in-law Wilson Cary Nicholas. He had even written to assure Nicholas of the appointment, when his project was defeated by the secret and unexpected interference of the President.
April 1, 1806, Samuel Smith wrote to his brother-in-law an account of his hopes and disappointment:[133]
“Monroe had written that he would leave Great Britain in November; therefore a mission of two,—one to remain as minister, the other a merchant of some distinction and of general information to go as envoy extraordinary,—was desired by all; and here, this proposal generally—I may say universally—meant S. S. Two only exceptions: As Monroe will remain until the whole business shall be settled, many wish now an able merchant to join him; in either case to make a commercial treaty with Great Britain. To such a treaty there is a rooted aversion in the mind of the President and Mr. Madison. I ought to apologize for leading you into error. I still do believe that you were originally intended for London. A good Federalist is to succeed Monroe, and has been privately written to by the President without the knowledge of any of his Cabinet; they appeared astonished when he mentioned what he had done.”
The good Federalist thus put over Smith’s head was William Pinkney, a prominent lawyer of Smith’s city of Baltimore. Such a step without consulting the Smiths, and against their personal interests, was a strong measure on the part of Jefferson, quite out of keeping with his ordinary practice. Offence of tried friends in order to conciliate Federalists was little to his taste; but General Smith’s conduct had become so factious as to warrant reproof. Smith was reduced to submission. He had not shared in Randolph’s bitterness against the Spanish policy, but he had attempted to make use of the old Republican schism for his personal objects; and after Randolph’s overthrow, Smith could no longer venture upon open opposition. Though beaten by only one vote in his attack on Armstrong’s nomination, Smith felt that his defeat was made final by the collapse of Randolph’s rebellion. He admitted to Nicholas that no effective resistance could be made to the Florida purchase, and that nothing remained but obedience to the President’s will:—