Having read Captain Humphrey’s note, Commodore Barron took up the enclosed order signed by Admiral Berkeley. This order, as the note mentioned, designated deserters from certain ships. Barron knew that he had on board three deserters from the “Melampus,” and that these three men had been the only deserters officially and regularly demanded by the British minister. His first thought was to look for the “Melampus” in the admiral’s list; and on seeing that Berkeley had omitted it, Barron inferred that his own assurance would satisfy Captain Humphreys, and that the demand of search, being meant as a mere formality, would not be pressed. He explained to the British lieutenant the circumstances relating to the three men from the “Melampus,” and after some consultation with Dr. Bullus, who was going out as consul to the Mediterranean, he wrote to Captain Humphreys the following reply:—
“I know of no such men as you describe. The officers that were on the recruiting service for this ship were particularly instructed by the Government, through me, not to enter any deserters from his Britannic Majesty’s ships, nor do I know of any being here. I am also instructed never to permit the crew of any ship that I command to be mustered by any other but their own officers. It is my disposition to preserve harmony, and I hope this answer to your despatch will prove satisfactory.”
Such an answer to such a demand was little suited to check the energy of a British officer in carrying out his positive orders. If Barron had wished to invite an attack, he could have done nothing more to the purpose than by receiving Berkeley’s orders without a movement of self-defence.
Meanwhile, at a quarter-past four the officer of the deck sent down word that the British frigate had a signal flying. The lieutenant understood it for a signal of recall, as he had been half an hour away, and as soon as the letter could be written he hurried with it to his boat. No sooner had he left the cabin than Barron sent for Gordon and showed him the letters which had passed. Although the commodore hoped that the matter was disposed of, and assumed that Captain Humphreys would give some notice in case of further action, he could not but feel a show of energy to be proper, and he directed Gordon to order the gun-deck to be cleared. Instantly the officers began to prepare the ship for action.
Had the British admiral sent the “Bellona” or some other seventy-four on this ugly errand, Barron’s error would have been less serious; for the captain of a seventy-four would have felt himself strong enough to allow delay. Sending the “Leopard” was arrogance of a kind that the British navy at that time frequently displayed. In 1804, when the Spanish treasure-ships were seized, the bitterest complaint of Spain was not that she had been made the unsuspecting victim of piracy, but that her squadron had been waylaid by one of only equal force, and could not in honor yield without a massacre which cost four ships and three hundred lives, besides the disgrace of submission to an enemy of not superior strength. The “Leopard” did indeed carry fifty-two guns, while the “Chesapeake” on this cruise carried only forty; but the “Chesapeake’s” twelve carronades threw heavier shot than the “Leopard’s” heaviest, and her broadside weighed 444 pounds, while that of the “Leopard” weighed 447. In tonnage the “Chesapeake” was a stronger ship and carried a larger crew than the “Leopard;” and a battle on fair terms would have been no certain victory. That Captain Humphreys felt it necessary to gain and retain every possible advantage was evident from his conduct. He could not afford to run the risk of defeat in such an undertaking; and knowing that the “Chesapeake” needed time to prepare for battle, he felt not strong enough to disregard her power of resistance, as he might have done had he commanded a ship of the line. To carry out his orders with as little loss as possible was his duty; for the consequences, not he but his admiral was to blame. Without a moment of delay, edging nearer, he hailed and cried: “Commodore Barron, you must be aware of the necessity I am under of complying with the orders of my commander-in-chief.”
Hardly more than five minutes passed between the moment when the British officer left Commodore Barron’s cabin and the time when Barron was hailed. To get the ship ready for action required fully half an hour. Barron, after giving the order to clear the guns, had come on deck and was standing in the gangway watching the “Leopard” with rapidly increasing anxiety, as he saw that the tompions were out of her guns and that her crew were evidently at quarters. He instantly repeated the order to prepare for battle, and told Gordon to hurry the men to their stations quietly without drum-beat. Gordon hastened down to the gun-deck with the keys of the magazine; the crew sprang to their quarters as soon as they understood the order. Barron, aware that his only chance was to gain time, remained at the gangway and replied through his trumpet: “I do not hear what you say.” Captain Humphreys repeated his hail, and Barron again replied that he did not understand. The “Leopard” immediately fired a shot across the “Chesapeake’s” bow;[9] a minute later another shot followed; and in two minutes more, at half-past four o’clock, the “Leopard” poured her whole broadside of solid shot and canister, at the distance of one hundred and fifty or two hundred feet, point-blank into the helpless American frigate. Before the gunner of the “Chesapeake” got to his magazine he heard the first gun from the “Leopard;” just as he opened and entered the magazine the “Leopard’s” broadside was fired.
No situation could be more trying to officers and crew than to be thus stationed at their guns without a chance to return a fire. The guns of the “Chesapeake” were loaded, but could not be discharged for want of lighted matches or heated loggerheads; and even if discharged, they could not be reloaded until ammunition should be handed from the magazine. Time was required both to clear the guns and to fire them; but the “Leopard’s” first broadside was thrown just as the crew were beginning to clear the deck. The crew were fresh and untrained; but no complaint was made on this account,—all were willing enough to fight. The confusion was little greater than might have occurred under the same circumstances in the best-drilled crew afloat; and the harshest subsequent scrutiny discovered no want of discipline, except that toward the end a few men left their guns, declaring that they were ready to fight but, not to be shot down like sheep. About the magazine the confusion was greatest, for a crowd of men and boys were clamoring for matches, powder-flasks, and loggerheads, while the gunner and his mates were doing their utmost to pass up what was needed; but in reasonable time all wants could have been supplied. On the upper deck both officers and men behaved well. Barron, though naturally much excited, showed both sense and courage. Standing in the open gangway fully exposed to the “Leopard’s” guns, he was wounded by the first broadside, but remained either there or on the quarter-deck without noticing his wound, while he repeatedly hailed the “Leopard” in the hope of gaining a moment’s time, and sent officer after officer below to hurry the men at the guns. Neither among the officers nor among the crew was courage the resource that failed them. Many of the men on the upper deck exposed themselves unnecessarily to the flying grapeshot by standing on the guns and looking over the hammocks, till Barron ordered them down. Careful subsequent inquiry could detect no lack of gallantry except in the pilot, who when questioned as to the commodore’s behavior had the manliness to confess his alarm,—“I was too bad scared myself to observe him very particularly.”
The British account, which was very exact, said that the “Leopard’s” fire lasted fifteen minutes,—from 4.30 to 4.45 P.M.,—during which time three full broadsides were discharged without return. No one could demand that Commodore Barron should subject his crew and ship to a longer trial when he had no hope of success. The time in which the “Leopard” could have sunk the “Chesapeake” might be a matter of doubt; but in the next battle between similar ships, five years afterward, the “Constitution,” with about the “Leopard’s” armament, totally disabled the “Guerriere” in less than thirty minutes, so that she sank within twenty-four hours,—though at the time of the action a heavy sea was running, and the “Guerriere” fought desperately with her whole broadside of twenty-five guns. June 22, 1807, the sea was calm; the “Leopard” lay quietly within pistol-shot; the “Chesapeake” could not injure her; and if the “Leopard” was as well fought as the “Constitution” she should have done at least equal damage. If she did not succeed, it was not for want of trying. The official survey, taken the next day, showed twenty-two round-shot in the “Chesapeake’s” hull, ten shot-holes in the sails, all three masts badly injured, the rigging much cut by grape, three men killed, eight severely and ten slightly wounded, including Commodore Barron,—which proved that of the seventy or eighty discharges from the “Leopard’s” guns a large proportion took effect.
After enduring this massacre for fifteen minutes, while trying to fire back at least one gun for the honor of the ship, Commodore Barron ordered the flag to be struck. It was hauled down; and as it touched the taffrail one gun was discharged from the gun-deck sending a shot into the “Leopard.” This single gun was fired by the third lieutenant, Allen, by means of a live coal which he brought in his fingers from the galley.
The boats of the “Leopard” then came on board, bringing several British officers, who mustered the ship’s company. They selected the three Americans who had deserted from the “Melampus,” and were therefore not included in Berkeley’s order. Twelve or fifteen others were pointed out as English deserters, but these men were not taken. After a search of the ship, Jenkin Ratford was dragged out of the coal-hole; and this discovery alone saved Captain Humphreys from the blame of committing an outrage not only lawless but purposeless. At about seven o’clock the British officers left the ship, taking with them the three Americans and Jenkin Ratford. Immediately afterward Commodore Barron sent Lieutenant Allen on board the “Leopard” with a brief letter to Captain Humphreys:—