“I look forward with full confidence,” he wrote to his brother,[160] “for a full approbation of what I have done. Ministers cannot disapprove of though they may be sorry for it; and if they are sorry, it must be for the trouble it occasions them, for as I have told them there is no loss of any adjustment of difficulties, that being impracticable with this country upon the principles of my instructions. I hope they are adopting the line that I recommended to them,—that of procrastinating any decision whatever; but they might as well have told me so for my own guidance and information, instead of leaving me a prey to all the lies and misrepresentations which the Democrats have found it necessary to propagate on the subject for election purposes. It would be an absolute disgrace to the country, and would produce an impression never to be got over here,—the ill effects of which in all future transactions we should not fail to be made sensible of,—if another minister were to be sent out without some sort of satisfaction being taken or received for the treatment I have experienced. They ought to insist on my being reinstated.”
The British government held a different opinion; and accordingly, at the expiration of his stipulated twelve months, Sept. 16, 1810, Jackson set sail for Europe, leaving J. P. Morier in charge of the British legation at Washington.
CHAPTER XI.
If the Non-intercourse Act of March 1, 1809, irritated Napoleon, Macon’s Act of May 1, 1810, might be expected to work in a manner still more active.
The story has shown that Napoleon, toward the end of the year 1809, felt many difficulties in giving new shape to his American policy after it had been ruined by the Non-intercourse Act. His fixed idea required the seizure of every American ship in Europe beyond the borders of France, as he had for years seized American ships in his own ports. In part this wish sprang from the Continental system, and was excused to some extent by the plea that American commerce could be carried on only under British protection; in part the seizure of American ships was a punishment for defying the Emperor’s orders; and in part it was due to his necessities of finance.
December 19, 1809, Napoleon wrote a brief order to Berthier, ordering the seizure of all American vessels in the Spanish ports within his control;[161] vessels and cargoes, he said, were to be considered good prize. Having taken this measure, he called a council of ministers for the next day, and ordered Maret to bring there “everything relating to the judgments of the prize-court; to the merchandise sequestered in the ports, which is spoiling. If you have not all the information, ask the Minister of Finance.”[162]
The meaning of this preparation was to be sought in the Cabinet itself, and in the Emperor’s surroundings. Peace with Austria left many vexations in Napoleon’s path. Perhaps the unhappy situation of his brother Joseph at Madrid troubled him less than the difficulty of reconciling the Empress Josephine to a divorce, or the mortifications of negotiating for a wife among Russian, German, and Austrian princesses; but annoyances like these, though serious for ordinary men, could not be compared with the constant trouble created by the Continental system of commercial restrictions and the want of money it caused. Threatened with financial difficulties, and obliged to study economies as well as to press contributions of war, the Emperor found himself met by something resembling opposition among his own ministers. As was his habit, he yielded at first to the advice he disliked, and promised to do something for French industry. In November he appointed a new Minister of the Interior, Montalivet, and lectured him on the slowness of his bureaus in acting for the good of commerce.[163] From such a mouth such a lesson startled the hearer, and Montalivet threw himself with zeal into the prescribed work. To Fouché the Emperor read another lecture compared with which the discourse to Montalivet was commonplace. Fouché, a pronounced opponent of Napoleon’s commercial restrictions, during the Emperor’s absence in Austria distributed too freely his licenses for foreign trade: “I recognize always the same course in your acts,” Napoleon wrote him. “You have not enough legality in your head.”[164]
While thus teaching one minister to cherish commerce, and another to respect legality, the Emperor listened to Champagny, who lost no chance of advising the encouragement of neutral trade; and these three ministers—Champagny, Fouché, and Montalivet—found a strong ally in the Minister of the Treasury, Mollien, who has left the recorded opinion that the Imperial system of commercial restriction was “the most disastrous and the most false of fiscal inventions.”[165] The bias of Decrès, the Minister of Marine, may be inferred from a story told by Marshal Marmont,[166] who, coming to Paris at the close of 1809, called on his old friend and talked with the enthusiasm of a successful soldier about the Emperor. “Well, Marmont,” replied Decrès, “you are pleased at being made a marshal; you see everything in bright colors. Do you want me to tell you the truth and to unveil the future? The Emperor is mad—absolutely mad! He will upset us all, and everything will end in a terrible disaster.” Taken in connection with King Louis’ attitude in Holland, the Cabinet opposition of December, 1809, amounted to rebellion against Napoleon’s authority.
At the Cabinet council of December 20 Montalivet made a written report on the subject of American cotton, which threw so much blame on the Imperial policy as to call a written contradiction from Napoleon. “An American vessel,” the Emperor replied the next day,[167] “coming from Louisiana to France will be well received here, no act of the government forbidding the admission of American ships into French ports.” The Americans, he explained, had prohibited commerce with France while permitting it with Holland, Spain, and Naples; and in consequence “his Majesty has used his right of influence over his neighbors because he was unwilling that they should be treated differently from France, and he has sequestered the ships destined for their ports;” but no such provision had been made against American ships entering French ports.
Naturally piqued at an Imperial assertion that he had shown ignorance of facts that deeply concerned his department, Montalivet sent to the Treasury for information, with which, a few days afterward, he routed the Emperor from the field. Unable to answer him, Napoleon referred his report to Gaudin, Minister of Finance, with a curious marginal note, which showed—what his ministers evidently believed—that the Emperor understood neither the workings of his own system nor the laws of the United States:—