[(Larger)]

EAST END
OF
LAKE ONTARIO

STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S., N.Y.

At dawn of May 28, under command of Colonel Baynes, the British grenadiers of the One Hundredth regiment landed gallantly under “so heavy and galling a fire from a numerous but almost invisible foe, as to render it impossible to halt for the artillery to come up.”[197] Pressing rapidly forward, without stopping to fire, the British regulars routed the militia and forced the second line back until they reached a block-house at the edge of the village, where a thirty-two pound gun was in position, flanked by log barracks and fallen timber. While Brown with difficulty held his own at the military barracks, the naval lieutenant in charge of the ship-yard, being told that the battle was lost, set fire to the naval barracks, shipping, and store-houses. Brown’s indignation at this act was intense.

“The burning of the marine barracks was as infamous a transaction as ever occurred among military men,” he wrote to Dearborn.[198] “The fire was set as our regulars met the enemy upon the main line; and if anything could have appalled these gallant men it would have been the flames in their rear. We have all, I presume, suffered in the public estimation in consequence of this disgraceful burning. The fact is, however, that the army is entitled to much higher praise than though it had not occurred. The navy are alone responsible for what happened on Navy Point, and it is fortunate for them that they have reputations sufficient to sustain the shock.”

Brown’s second line stood firm at the barracks, and the British attack found advance impossible. Sir George Prevost’s report admitted his inability to go farther:[199]—

“A heavier fire than that of musketry having become necessary in order to force their last position, I had the mortification to learn that the continuation of light and adverse winds had prevented the co-operation of the ships, and that the gunboats were unequal to silence the enemy’s elevated batteries, or to produce any effect on their block houses. Considering it therefore impracticable without such assistance to carry the strong works by which the post was defended, I reluctantly ordered the troops to leave a beaten enemy whom they had driven before them for upwards of three hours, and who did not venture to offer the slightest opposition to the re-embarkation, which was effected with proper deliberation and in perfect order.”

If Sir George was correct in regarding the Americans as “a beaten enemy,” his order of retreat to his own troops seemed improper; but his language showed that he used the words in a sense of his own, and Colonel Baynes’s report gave no warrant for the British claim of a victory.[200]

“At this point,” said Baynes,[201] “the further energies of the troops became unavailing. Their [American] block-houses and stockaded battery could not be carried by assault, nor reduced by field-pieces had we been provided with them.... Seeing no object within our reach to attain that could compensate for the loss we were momentarily sustaining from the heavy fire of the enemy’s cannon, I directed the troops to take up the position we had charged from. From this position we were ordered to re-embark, which was performed at our leisure and in perfect order, the enemy not presuming to show a single soldier without the limits of his fortress.”

Another and confidential report was written by E. B. Brenton of Prevost’s staff to the governor’s military secretary, Noah Freer.[202] After describing the progress of the battle until the British advance was stopped, Brenton said that Colonel Baynes came to Sir George to tell him that the men could not approach nearer the works with any prospect of success:—