Little as the President liked his Secretary of War, his antipathy was mild when compared with that of Monroe. The failure of the Canada campaign gave a serious blow to Armstrong; but he had still recovered Detroit, and was about to finish the Creek war. His hold upon the army was becoming strong. His enemies charged him with ambition; they said he was systematically engaged in strengthening his influence by seducing the young officers of talents into his personal support, teaching them to look for appreciation not to the President but to himself, and appointing to office only his own tools, or the sons of influential men. He was believed to favor a conscription, and to aim at the position of lieutenant-general. These stories were constantly brought to Monroe, and drove him to a condition of mind only to be described as rabid. He took the unusual step of communicating them to the President,[508] with confidential comments that, if known to Armstrong, could hardly have failed to break up the Cabinet.
“It is painful to me to make this communication to you,” wrote the Secretary of State Dec. 27, 1813;[509] “nor should I do it if I did not most conscientiously believe that this man, if continued in office, will ruin not you and the Administration only, but the whole Republican party and cause. He has already gone far to do it, and it is my opinion, if he is not promptly removed, he will soon accomplish it. Without repeating other objections to him, if the above facts are true, ... he wants a head fit for his station. Indolent except to improper purposes, he is incapable of that combination and activity which the times require. My advice to you, therefore, is to remove him at once. The near prospect of a conscription, adopted and acted on without your approbation or knowledge, is a sufficient reason. The burning of Newark, if done by his orders, is another. The failure to place troops at Fort George is another. In short there are abundant reasons for it. His removal for either of the three would revive the hopes of our party now desponding, and give a stimulus to measures. I do not however wish you to act on my advice,—consult any in whom you have confidence. Mr. A. has, as you may see, few friends, and some of them cling to him rather as I suspect from improper motives, or on a presumption that you support him.”
Armstrong’s faults were beyond dispute, but his abilities were very considerable; and the President justly thought that nothing would be gained by dismissing him, even to restore Monroe to the War Department. Armstrong, struggling with the load of incapable officers and insufficient means, for which Madison and Congress were responsible, required the firm support of his chief and his colleagues, as well as of the army and of Congress, to carry the burden of the war; but he had not a friend to depend upon. Secretary Jones was as hostile as Monroe. Pennsylvania and Virginia equally distrusted him, and the fate of any public man distrusted by Pennsylvania and Virginia was commonly fixed in advance. Armstrong was allowed to continue his preparations for the next campaign, but Monroe remained actively hostile. In a private letter to Crawford, written probably about the month of May, 1814, and preserved with a memorandum that it was not sent, Monroe said:[510]—
“There is now no officer free to command to whom the public looks with any sort of confidence or even hope. Izard stands next, but he is as you see otherwise engaged [on a court of inquiry on Wilkinson]. Thus the door is left open for some new pretender, and Mr. Armstrong is that pretender. This has been his object from the beginning.... The whole affair is beyond my control.”
Thus the elements of confusion surrounding Armstrong were many. A suspicious and hesitating President; a powerful and jealous Secretary of State; a South Carolinian major-general, educated in the French engineers, commanding on Lake Champlain; a Pennsylvania schoolmaster, of Quaker parentage, without military knowledge, commanding at Sackett’s Harbor and Niagara; a few young brigadiers eager to distinguish themselves, and an army of some thirty thousand men,—these were the elements with which Armstrong was to face the whole military power of England; for Paris capitulated March 31, and the war in Europe was ended.
In one respect, Armstrong’s conduct seemed inconsistent with the idea of selfishness or intrigue. The duty of organizing a court martial for the trial of William Hull fell necessarily upon him. Hull’s defence must inevitably impeach Hull’s superiors; his acquittal was possible only on the ground that the Government had been criminally negligent in supporting him. As far as Armstrong was interested in the result, he was concerned in proving the incapacity of his predecessor Eustis, and of the President, in their management of the war. He could have had no personal object to gain in procuring the conviction of Hull, but he might defend his own course by proving the imbecility of Dearborn.
The President ordered a court martial on Hull before Armstrong entered the War Department. A. J. Dallas drew up the specifications, and inserted, contrary to his own judgment, a charge of treason made by the Department. The other charges were cowardice, neglect of duty, and unofficer-like conduct. Monroe, while temporarily at the head of the Department, organized the first court to meet at Philadelphia Feb. 25, 1813. Major-General Wade Hampton was to preside.
Before the trial could be held, Armstrong came into office, and was obliged to order the members of the court to active service. Hampton was sent to Lake Champlain, and when his campaign ended in November, 1813, he returned under charges resembling those against Hull.[511] Finding that neither Wilkinson nor Armstrong cared to press them, and satisfied that no inquiry could be impartial, Hampton determined to settle the question by once more sending in his resignation,[512] which he did in March, 1814, when it was accepted. Armstrong in effect acquitted Hampton by accepting his resignation, and never publicly affirmed any charge against him until after Hampton’s death, when he attributed to the major-general “much professional error and great moral depravity.”[513] Hampton’s opinion of Armstrong could be gathered only from his conduct and his letters to the Secretary of War, but was not materially different from Armstrong’s opinion of Hampton.
Meanwhile Hull waited for trial. During the summer of 1813 he saw nearly all his possible judges disgraced and demanding courts martial like himself. Hampton was one; Wilkinson another; Dearborn a third. Dearborn had been removed from command of his army in face of the enemy, and loudly called for a court of inquiry. Instead of granting the request, the President again assigned him to duty in command of Military District No. 3, comprising the city of New York, and also made him President of the court martial upon General Hull.
The impropriety of such a selection could not be denied. Of all men in the United States, Dearborn was most deeply interested in the result of Hull’s trial, and the President, next to Dearborn, would be most deeply injured by Hull’s acquittal. The judgment of Dearborn, or of any court over which Dearborn presided, in a matter which affected both court and government so closely could not command respect. That Armstrong lent himself to such a measure was a new trait of character never explained; but that Madison either ordered or permitted it showed that he must have been unconscious either of Dearborn’s responsibility for Hull’s disaster, or of his own.