The first act of Sir Edward Pakenham gave the Americans at least three days for preparation. Even veteran soldiers, who were accustomed to storming mountain fortresses held by French armies, were annoyed at exposing their flank to the fire of fifteen or twenty heavy guns, which hampered not only every military movement but also every motion beyond cover of the bank. Pakenham sent instantly to the fleet for cannon to drive the ships away. In reality he could not so relieve himself, for the American commodore soon placed one twenty-four-pound gun and two twelve-pounders in battery on the opposite bank of the river, where they answered every purpose of annoyance, while the ships after December 28 took little part in action.[528] Pakenham gained nothing by waiting; but he would not advance without artillery, and the sailors, with much labor, brought up a number of light guns,—nine field-pieces, it was said,[529] two howitzers, and a mortar. Pakenham passed two days, December 25 and 26, organizing his force and preparing the battery. At daylight, December 27, the guns were ready. Five pieces suddenly opened with hot shot and shell on the “Carolina,” and in half an hour obliged the crew to abandon her.[530] The “Louisiana,” by extreme exertion, was hauled beyond range while the British battery was occupied in destroying the “Carolina.”
Nothing then prevented Pakenham’s advance, and the next morning, December 28, the whole army moved forward.
“On we went,” said the Subaltern, “for about three miles, without any halt or hindrance, either from man or inanimate nature coming in our way. But all at once a spectacle was presented to us, such indeed as we ought to have looked for, but such as manifestly took our leaders by surprise. The enemy’s army became visible. It was posted about forty yards in rear of a canal, and covered, though most imperfectly, by an unfinished breastwork.”
The British left, coming under the fire of the “Louisiana,” was immediately halted and placed as far as possible under cover. The skirmishers in the swamp were recalled. In the evening the whole army was ordered to retire beyond cannon-shot and hut themselves.[531] They obeyed; but “there was not a man among us who failed to experience both shame and indignation.”[532]
Beyond doubt, such caution was not expected from Sir Edward Pakenham. Sir George Prevost at Sackett’s Harbor and Plattsburg, and Colonel Brooke at Baltimore had retired before American works; but those works had been finished forts, strongly held and situated on elevated points. Even with such excuses, and after suffering severe losses, Prevost was discredited for his retreats. Pakenham did not live to make a report, and his reasons remained unavowed; but Admiral Cochrane reported that it was “thought necessary to bring heavy artillery against this work, and also against the ship which had cannonaded the army when advancing.”[533] The decision implied that Pakenham considered the chances unfavorable for storming the American line.
In effect, Pakenham’s withdrawal December 28 was equivalent to admitting weakness in his infantry, and to calling on the artillery as his strongest arm. The experiment showed little self-confidence. Not only must he sacrifice two or three days in establishing batteries, but he must challenge a contest with cannon,—weapons which the Americans were famous for using, both afloat and ashore, with especial skill. Jackson could also mount heavy guns and allow Pakenham to batter indefinite lines. Sooner or later Pakenham must storm, unless he could turn the American position.
Sketch of the Position of the British and American Forces
NEAR NEW ORLEANS, FROM THE 23rd OF DECEMBER TO THE 8th OF JANUARY, 1815.
From original by John Peddie, D. A. Q. M. Genl., endorsed “Enclosure in M. Genl. Lambert’s of 29 Jany., 1815.”—British Archives.