The seamen were once more set to work, and “with incredible labor” rowed their boats, laden with heavy guns, from the fleet to the bayou, and dragged the guns through three miles of bog to the British headquarters. The Americans also prepared batteries. From the lines one thirty-two-pounder, three twenty-four-pounders, and one eighteen-pounder commanded the plain in their front. Besides these heavy guns, three twelve-pounders, three six-pounders, a six-inch howitzer or mortar, and a brass carronade, useless from its bad condition,[534]—in all, twelve or thirteen guns, capable of replying to the British batteries, were mounted along the American lines. On the west bank of the river, three quarters of a mile away, Commodore Patterson established, December 30 and 31, a battery of one twenty-four-pounder and two long twelve-pounders, which took the British batteries in flank.[535] Thus the Americans possessed fifteen effective guns, six of which were heavy pieces of long range. They were worked partly by regular artillerists, partly by sailors, partly by New Orleans militia, and partly by the “hellish banditti” of Barataria, who to the number of twenty or thirty were received by General Jackson into the service and given the care of two twenty-four-pounders.
The number and position of the British guns were given in Lieutenant Peddie’s sketch of the field. Before the reconnaissance of December 28, field-pieces had been placed in battery on the river-side to destroy the “Carolina” and “Louisiana.” Canon Gleig said that “nine field-pieces, two howitzers, and one mortar” were placed in battery on the river-side during the night of December 25.[536] Captain Henley of the “Carolina” reported that five guns opened upon him on the morning of December 26.[537] Captain Peddie’s sketch marked seven pieces mounted in battery on the river-side, bearing on Commodore Patterson’s battery opposite, besides four pieces in two batteries below. Their range was sufficient to destroy the “Carolina” and pierce the breastwork across the river,[538] and therefore they were probably twelve and nine pounders.
Besides these lighter long-range guns, the British constructed three batteries in the night of December 31.
“Four eighteen-pounders,” reported Major Forrest,[539] British assistant-quartermaster-general, “were placed in a battery formed of hogsheads of sugar, on the main road, to fire upon the ship if she dropped down. Preparations were also made to establish batteries,—one of six eighteen-pounders, and one of four twenty-four-pound carronades; also batteries for the field-pieces and howitzers, the latter to keep the fire of the enemy under, while the troops were to be moved forward in readiness to storm the works as soon as a practicable breach was effected.”
According to Peddie’s sketch the Battery No. 6, on the road or new levee, contained not four but two guns. Battery No. 5, some fifty yards from No. 6, contained six guns, as Major Forrest reported. Battery No. 4, to the left of the old levee, contained four guns, probably the carronades. Battery No. 3, to the right of the old levee, contained five guns, probably the field-pieces and howitzers. In all, seventeen guns bore on the American lines,—besides seven, in Batteries No. 7 and No. 8, bearing on Commodore Patterson’s three-gun battery across the river. According to Gleig,[540] the British had thirty guns; but in any case they used not less than twenty-four guns, throwing a heavier weight of metal than was thrown by the fifteen pieces used by the Americans. The British artillery was served by regular artillerists.
These details were particularly interesting, because the artillery battle of Jan. 1, 1815, offered the best test furnished during the war of relative skill in the use of that arm. The attack had every advantage over the defence. The British could concentrate their fire to effect a breach for their troops to enter; the Americans were obliged to disperse their fire on eight points. The American platforms being elevated, offered a better target than was afforded by the low British batteries, and certainly were no better protected. Three of the American guns were in battery across the river, three quarters of a mile from the main British battery of six eighteen-pounders, while the “Louisiana’s” carronades were beyond range, and the “Louisiana” herself was not brought into action.[541] On the American side the battle was fought entirely by the guns in Jackson’s lines and in Patterson’s battery across the river,—one thirty-two-pounder, four twenty-four-pounders, one eighteen-pounder, five twelve-pounders, three six-pounders, and a howitzer,—fifteen American guns in all, matched against ten British eighteen-pounders, four twenty-four-pound carronades, and ten field-pieces and howitzers,—twenty-four guns in all. If the British field-pieces were twelves and nines, the weight of metal was at least three hundred and fifty pounds on the British side against two hundred and twenty-four pounds on the American side, besides two howitzers against one.
The main British batteries were about seven hundred yards distant from Jackson’s line. Opposite to the battery of six eighteen-pounders were the American thirty-two and three twenty-four-pounders. Behind the British batteries the British army waited for the order to assault. Toward eight o’clock on the morning of Jan. 1, 1815, the British opened a hot fire accompanied by a shower of rockets. The American guns answered, and the firing continued without intermission until toward noon, when the British fire slackened, and at one o’clock the British artillerists abandoned their batteries, leaving the guns deserted.
During the entire war, no other battle was fought in which the defeated party had not some excuse to offer for inferiority. Usually the excuse ascribed greater force to the victor than to the vanquished, or dwelt upon some accident or oversight which affected the result. For the defeat of the British artillery, Jan. 1, 1815, no excuse was ever suggested.[542] The British army and navy frankly admitted that the misfortune was due to American superiority in the use of artillery. British evidence on that point was ample, for their surprise and mortification were extreme; while the Americans seemed never fully to appreciate the extraordinary character of the feat they performed. The most detailed British account was also the most outspoken.
“Never was any failure more remarkable or unlooked-for than this,” said Gleig....[543] “The sun, as if ashamed to shine upon our disgrace, was slow of making its appearance; a heavy mist obscured him, and the morning was far advanced before it cleared away. At last, however, the American lines were visible, and then began a fire from our batteries, so brisk and so steadily kept up that we who were behind made not the smallest doubt of its effect. It was answered for a while faintly, and with seeming difficulty. By and by, however, the enemy’s salutation became more spirited, till it gradually surpassed our own, both in rapidity and precision. We were a good deal alarmed at this, and the more that a rumor got abroad that our batteries were not proof against the amazing force of the American shot. We had, it may be stated, imprudently rolled into the parapets barrels filled with sugar, under the impression that sugar would prove as effectual as sand in checking the progress of cannon-balls. But the event showed that we had been completely mistaken. The enemy’s shot penetrated these sugar-hogsheads as if they had been so many empty casks, dismounting our guns and killing our artillery-men in the very centre of their works. There could be small doubt, as soon as these facts were established, how the cannonading would end. Our fire slackened every moment; that of the Americans became every moment more terrible, till at length, after not more than two hours and a half of firing, our batteries were all silenced. The American works, on the other hand, remained as little injured as ever, and we were completely foiled.”
Admiral Codrington, writing from the British headquarters three days after the battle, expressed equal astonishment and annoyance:[544]—