“After the arrival of the British armament the garrison of Fort Bowyer was not only continued but increased, though from its locality wholly unable to aid in any important purpose of the campaign. Nor was this the whole extent of the evil, for by the disposition made of this gallant corps it was not only subjected to present inaction, but ultimately ... to the perils of a siege and the humiliation of a surrender.”
Colonel Lawrence had no choice but to capitulate, which he did February 11. He had not even the opportunity to resist, for the British made regular approaches, and could not be prevented from capturing the place without the necessity of assault. Jackson reported to the Secretary of War[582] that this event was one which he “little expected to happen but after the most gallant resistance; that it should have taken place without even a fire from the enemy’s batteries is as astonishing as it is mortifying.” In truth, the military arrangements, not Lawrence’s defence, were responsible for the result; and Jackson had reason to fear that a greater disaster was at hand, for unless General Winchester should promptly evacuate Mobile, the disaster of the River Raisin was likely to be repeated on a larger scale.
END OF VOL. II.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Proclamation of Admiral Cochrane, April 25, 1814; Niles, vi. 182.
[2] Pickering to John Lowell, Nov. 7, 1814; New England Federalism, p. 404.
[3] Pickering to George Logan, July 4, 1813; New England Federalism, p. 391.
[4] Thoughts in Answer to a Question respecting the Division of the States; by a Massachusetts Farmer.
[5] The Palladium, Feb. 1, 1814.
[6] Pickering to Putnam, Feb. 4, 1814; New England Federalism, p. 391.