1809.
... Never was I so overwhelmed with public business. That would be nothing if we went right. But a great confusion and perplexity reign in Congress. Mr. Madison is, as I always knew him, slow in taking his ground, but firm when the storm arises. What I had foreseen has taken place. A majority will not adhere to the embargo much longer, and if war be not speedily determined on, submission will soon ensue. This entirely between us. When will you be here? We expect you, and the sooner the better. Exclusively of the pleasure we always have in seeing you, rely upon it that your presence will at this crisis be useful. I actually want time to give you more details, but I will only state that it is intended by the Essex Junto to prevail on the Massachusetts Legislature, who meet in two or three weeks, to call a convention of the five New England States, to which they will try to add New York; and that something must be done to anticipate and defeat that nefarious plan.
Mr. Jefferson’s private letters tell the story of Mr. Madison’s failure to control his party, and of the collapse of his war policy. On the 19th January, 1809, he wrote to Thomas Lomax:[93] “I think Congress, although they have not passed any bill indicative of their intentions, except the new embargo law, have evidently made up their minds to let that continue only till their meeting in May, and then to issue letters of marque and reprisal against such powers as shall not then have repealed their illegal decrees. Some circumstances have taken place which render it very possible that Great Britain may revoke her orders of council. This will be known before May.” Two days later, Mr. Jefferson wrote to Mr. Leiper:[94] “The House of Representatives passed last night a bill for the meeting of Congress on the 22d of May. This substantially decides the course they mean to pursue,—that is, to let the embargo continue till then, when it will cease, and letters of marque and reprisal be issued against such nations as shall not then have repealed their obnoxious edicts. The great majority seem to have made up their minds on this, while there is considerable diversity of opinion on the details of preparation, to wit: naval force, volunteers, army, non-intercourse, &c.” But on the 7th February Mr. Jefferson wrote:[95] “I thought Congress had taken their ground firmly for continuing their embargo till June, and then war. But a sudden and unaccountable revolution of opinion took place the last week, chiefly among the New England and New York members, and in a kind of panic they voted the 4th of March for removing the embargo, and by such a majority as gave all reason to believe they would not agree either to war or non-intercourse. This, too, was after we had become satisfied that the Essex Junto had found their expectation desperate of inducing the people there to either separation or forcible opposition. The majority of Congress, however, has now rallied to removing the embargo on the 4th of March, non-intercourse with France and Great Britain, trade everywhere else, and continuing war preparations.” The defeat of the Administration on the crucial point of fixing the 1st June, 1809, for removing the embargo, took place on February 2, by a vote of 73 to 40. The substitution of March 4 was carried on February 3, by a vote of 70, no ayes and noes having been taken on either side. The new Administration had already met with a serious if not fatal check. As Mr. Gallatin said in a note to Mr. Jefferson of February 4, the day after the disaster: “As far as my information goes, everything grows more quiet in Massachusetts and Maine. All would be well if our friends remained firm here.”
The votes of February 2 and February 4, 1809, carried a deeper significance to Mr. Gallatin than to any one else, for they did not stand alone. Congress had already shown that it meant to accept his control no longer, and this was no mere panic and no result of New England defection. He had at last to meet the experience of defeat where he had supposed himself strongest. As has been seen, the administration of naval affairs had always been repugnant to Mr. Gallatin’s wishes; the time when he had opposed a moderate navy had long passed, and, as Secretary of the Treasury, he had never wished to diminish the efficiency or lessen the force of the few frigates we had; but he conceived that the management of the Department under Mr. Robert Smith was wasteful and inefficient. Very large sums of money had been spent, for which there was little to show except one hundred and seventy gun-boats, which had cost on an average $9000 each to build and would cost $11,500 a year in actual service. At the beginning of the session it had been distinctly intimated by the Executive that no present increase of force was required; but suddenly, on the 4th January, 1809, the Senate adopted a bill which directed that all the frigates and other armed vessels of the United States, including the gun-boats, should be immediately fitted out, officered, manned, and employed. The law was mandatory; it required the immediate employment of some six thousand seamen and the appropriation of some six million dollars, and this excessive expenditure on the part of the navy was not accompanied by any corresponding measures for shore armaments and defences. If war did not take place the expense was entirely lost. Had these six millions been expended in buying arms, constructing fortifications and putting them in readiness for war, or in organizing and arming the militia, or in building frigates and ships of the line, the government would have had something to show for them; but to waste the small national treasure before war began; to support thousands of seamen in absolute idleness, with almost a certainty that the moment a British frigate came within sight they would have to run ashore for safety, seemed insane extravagance. Yet when the Senate’s amendment came before the House it was adopted on the 10th January by a vote of 64 to 59, in the teeth of Mr. Gallatin’s warm remonstrances. Among his papers is the following curious analysis of this vote.
THE NAVY COALITION OF 1809.
By whom were sacrificed
Forty Republican members, nine Republican States,
The Republican cause itself, and the people of the United States,
To a system of
Favoritism, extravagance, parade, and folly.
———
| 1. Smith Faction, or Ruling Party. | ||
File Leader, W. C. Nicholas, E. W.; Assistants, Dawson, | 6 | |
| 2. Federalists, Old and New. | ||
Dana, Elliot, Goldsborough, Harris, Kay, Lewis, | 17 | —27* |
| 3. Quids. | ||
Cook, Findley, Gardner, Van Horn | 4 | |
| 4. New York Malcontents. | ||
Mumford, Swart, Thompson, Van Cortland, Wilson, Riker | 6 | |
| 33 | ||
| 5. Scared Yankees. | 33 | |
| Bacon, Barker, Durell, Illsley, Storer | 5 | |||||||
| 6. Republicans. | ||||||||
| Virginia. | N. York. | N. England. | N. Jersey. | Other States. | ||||
| Basset. | Blake. | Cutts. | Helms. | Kenan. | ||||
| Clay. | Humphreys. | Deane. | Lambert. | N. Moore. | ||||
| Clopton. | Kirkpatrick. Fisk. | Newbold. | Smelt. | |||||
| Gholson. | Van Allan. | Green. | Troup. | |||||
| Holmes. | Verplanck. | Seaver. | ||||||
| Smith. | Smith. | |||||||
| Wilbour. | ||||||||
| 25- | ||||||||
| 7. Sui Generis. | ||||||||
| Jones | 1 | |||||||
| 64 | ||||||||
| *27 | ||||||||
| Friendly only | 37 | |||||||